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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
This thesis is an examination of adults’ experiences of ADHD. It is a study of life 
with ADHD, embodied experiences of ADHD, the implications of being diagnosed 
with ADHD, and ways of relating to the diagnosis. The number of people diagnosed 
with ADHD has increased within the last couple of decades and so has the number 
of prescriptions for drugs treating ADHD. We know, however, only little about the 
effects of diagnosing and about phenomenological aspects of ADHD. By analyzing 
how individuals experience symptoms of ADHD, interpret themselves through the 
diagnosis, and make use of the resources following the diagnosis, this thesis is a 
contribution to a limited literature on adults’ experiences of ADHD.  
The study is entirely qualitative. The analyses are based on data from interviews, 
conversations, and from time spent with 13 adults diagnosed with ADHD in 
adulthood (five men and eight women, ages 26-45); on observations at doctor’s 
consultations; conferences for people diagnosed with ADHD, their relatives, and 
professionals working with ADHD; and finally from observations at online forums 
about ADHD. All research is conducted in Denmark. Following phenomenological 
and anthropological research on illness experiences, the study comprehends 
experiences of ADHD as embedded in social and cultural contexts. Hence, it is a 
general argument in the thesis that experiences of ADHD unfold in relation to social 
relationships, family struggles, cultural explanations of suffering, and contemporary 
expectations of being human. Within our specific culture and place in time, certain 
ways of being in the world and certain ways of understanding oneself are available. 
In this context, experiences of ADHD are intertwined with the desire of being a 
good parent, of wanting to navigate in society, of keeping a job, of maintaining 
friendships, and of being accepted. 
The thesis is organized into ten parts: six chapters that set the introductory frame, 
three articles about adults’ experiences of ADHD, and finally a conclusion.  
In the first six chapters, the thesis presents different sociological, historical, and 
psychiatric perspectives on the emergence of ADHD as a diagnostic category, 
research on explanations of psychiatric diagnoses, and theories about medicalization 
of behavior and biologization of mental illness. A literature review of research on 
adults’ experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis demonstrates how being 
diagnosed with ADHD involves changes on the individual’s self-understandings as 
well as ambivalence towards the diagnosis. Finally, a description of the theoretical, 
methodological and methodical background of the study is presented.  
The first article ”Structuring the self: moral implications of getting an ADHD 
diagnosis” examines the formative process of getting an ADHD diagnosis and how 
individuals diagnosed with ADHD use the diagnosis as a part of a self-evaluative 
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and self-constitutive project. The article illustrates how a diagnosis offers a certain 
narrative, into which the individual’s life-trajectory is interpreted. Moreover, it is 
described how new everyday practices and routines are changed following the 
diagnosis, and how medical treatment changes the individual’s way of perceiving 
and being in the world. These processes of understanding, making use of and 
experimenting with the opportunities offered by the diagnosis reflect different moral 
tasks, it is argued, concerning the act of taking responsibility, learning how to 
manage difficulties in life, and of striving to become a good parent, friend, and 
partner. 
The second article “ADHD and temporality: a desynchronized way of being in the 
world” examines embodied experiences of ADHD. The article explores how to 
understand ADHD from a phenomenological perspective as a certain being in the 
world and as a matter of phenomenological difference in rhythm. It is argued that 
people with ADHD experience time differently than others, and when inner time 
accelerates in relation to outer time, a desynchronization occurs. This situation of 
desynchronization may result in discomfort and experiences of social clashes. The 
article emphasizes the intersubjective and intercorporeal aspects of ADHD and it is 
suggested that ADHD is not only an individual phenomenon, but symptoms of 
ADHD appear in relations, clashes, and interactions. 
The third article “My ADHD and me: identifying with and distancing from ADHD” 
examines how individuals diagnosed with ADHD relate to ADHD. The study 
presents two positions of how people diagnosed with ADHD understand themselves 
and their actions based on neurobiological explanations of ADHD. The first position 
involves identifying with ADHD as a way of being human and a specific way of 
managing (and failing to manage) life based on certain neurological structures in the 
brain. The second position involves distancing from ADHD by separating the self 
from ADHD, transferring ADHD into an entity, explaining ADHD as caused by 
neurochemical impulses, and disclaiming behavior connected to ADHD. Lastly it is 
discussed how the neurobiological explanation of ADHD reduces comprehensions 
of how to live with ADHD and options for coping with the difficulties ADHD brings 
about. 
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DANSK RESUME 
Denne afhandling er en undersøgelse af voksnes erfaringer med ADHD. Det er et 
studie af livet med ADHD, kropslige erfaringer med ADHD, implikationer af at 
blive diagnosticeret med ADHD og måder at forholde sig til diagnosen på. Antallet 
af mennesker diagnosticeret med ADHD er steget voldsomt de seneste årtier, og 
ligeledes er antallet af recepter på medicin til behandling af ADHD steget. Vi ved 
imidlertid ganske lidt om effekterne af at blive diagnosticeret og om 
fænomenologiske aspekter af ADHD. Gennem analyser af hvordan mennesker 
oplever at leve med symptomer på ADHD, hvordan mennesker fortolker sig selv 
gennem diagnoser, og hvordan mennesker gør brug af de ressourcer, der følger med 
en diagnose, bidrager denne afhandling til en begrænset litteratur om voksnes 
erfaringer af ADHD. 
Afhandlingen er et kvalitativt studie af erfaringer med ADHD. Analyserne er baseret 
på data indsamlet via interviews, samtaler og samvær med 13 voksne diagnosticeret 
med ADHD i voksenalderen (fem mænd og otte kvinder i alderen 26 til 45 år), via 
observationer foretaget ved lægekonsultationer, på konferencer for mennesker 
diagnosticeret med ADHD, deres pårørende og professionelle, der arbejder med 
ADHD, og endelig via observationer foretaget i internetfora om ADHD. Al 
dataindsamling er foretaget i Danmark. I tråd med fænomenologiske og 
antropologiske undersøgelser af lidelseserfaringer er forståelsen i dette studie, at 
erfaringer med ADHD er indlejret i sociale og kulturelle kontekster. Et overordnet 
argument i afhandlingen er således, at erfaringer med ADHD udfolder sig i relation 
til sociale relationer, familieproblematikker, kulturelle forklaringer af lidelse og 
normative forventninger til mennesket. Der eksisterer særlige måder at være i verden 
på og særlige måder at forstå sig selv på i vores specifikke samtid. Ud fra dette 
perspektiv er erfaringer med ADHD forbundet med ønsket om at være en god 
forælder,  kunne navigere i samfundet, kunne varetage et job, bevare venskaber og 
blive accepteret. 
Afhandlingen er organiseret i ti dele: seks kapitler, som danner en overordnet 
ramme, tre artikler om voksnes erfaringer med ADHD og til sidst en konklusion.  
I de første seks kapitler præsenterer afhandlingen forskellige sociologiske, historiske 
og psykiatriske perspektiver på opkomsten af ADHD som diagnostisk kategori, 
forskning om psykiatriske diagnoser og teorier om medikalisering af adfærd og 
biologisering af psykiske lidelser. En litteraturgennemgang af forskning om voksnes 
erfaringer med at få en ADHD diagnose demonstrerer, hvordan diagnosticeringen 
både medfører forandringer på individets selvopfattelse og ambivalens over for 
diagnosen. Endelig præsenteres en beskrivelse af det teoretiske, metodologiske og 
metodiske udgangspunkt for afhandlingen. 
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Afhandlingens første artikel ”Structuring the self: moral implications of getting an 
ADHD diagnosis” undersøger, hvordan det er en formativ proces at få en ADHD 
diagnose, og hvordan mennesker diagnosticeret med ADHD anvender diagnosen 
som en del af et selvevaluerende og selvkonstituerende projekt. Artiklen illustrerer, 
hvordan en diagnose tilbyder et særligt narrativ, inden for hvilket individets 
livsforløb kan fortolkes. Ligeledes bliver det beskrevet, hvordan nye 
hverdagspraksisser og rutiner forandres i tiden efter diagnosticeringen, og hvordan 
den medicinske behandling forandrer individets måde at opfatte og være i verden. 
Artiklen argumenterer for, at den måde som voksne forstår, gør brug af og 
eksperimenterer med de muligheder, som diagnosen tilbyder, involverer forskellige 
moralske opgaver i forhold til at tage ansvar, at lære at håndtere vanskeligheder i 
livet, og til at stræbe efter at blive en god forælder, ven og partner. 
Afhandlingens anden artikel “ADHD and temporality: a desynchronized way of 
being in the world” studerer kropslige erfaringer af ADHD. Artiklen undersøger 
ADHD fra et fænomenologisk perspektiv som en særlig måde at være i verden og 
som et udtryk for en fænomenologisk, rytmisk uoverensstemmelse. Der 
argumenteres for, at mennesker med ADHD oplever tid anderledes end andre, og at 
en form for desynkronisering opstår, når indre tid accelererer i forhold til ydre tid. 
Denne situation af desynkronisering kan resultere i ubehag og en følelse af sociale 
sammenstød. Artiklen betoner de intersubjektive og interkropslige aspekter af 
ADHD og foreslår, at ADHD ikke udelukkende er et individuelt fænomen, men at 
symptomer på ADHD opstår i relationer, sammenstød og interaktioner. 
Afhandlingens tredje artikel “My ADHD and me: identifying with and distancing 
from ADHD” undersøger, hvordan mennesker diagnosticeret med ADHD forholder 
sig til ADHD. Studiet præsenterer to positioner, ud fra hvilke diagnosticerede med 
ADHD forstår sig selv og deres handlinger – begge baseret på neurobiologiske 
forklaringer af ADHD. Den første position involverer en identifikation med ADHD 
som en særlig måde at være menneske og måde at fungere (og mislykkes) i livet 
baseret på særlige neurologiske strukturer i hjernen. Den anden position består i en 
distancering til ADHD ved at adskille selvet fra ADHD, transformere ADHD til en 
entitet, forklare ADHD som forårsaget af neurokemiske impulser og frasige sig 
ansvaret for adfærd knyttet til ADHD. Til sidst diskuteres, hvordan den 
neurobiologiske forklaring af ADHD begrænser alternative måder at forstå, leve 
med og håndtere vanskeligheder forbundet med ADHD. 
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CHAPTER 1. A PH.D. PROJECT ABOUT 
EXPERIENCES OF ADHD 
“I am hyper on my speech” Karen says as on the first things when I meet her. Karen 
is 45 years old and was diagnosed with ADHD at 41. She has agreed to be 
interviewed by me about her experience of living with ADHD, how symptoms of 
ADHD affect her everyday life, and what changes the diagnosis has brought about. 
Karen is an enthusiastic storyteller, and just as she told me, Karen speaks from the 
moment I switch on my digital recorder till we say goodbye four hours later. From 
east to west, from one incident to another, and from yesterday’s laugh and back to 
some of the darkest times in her life, Karen takes me on a tour into her experiences 
of ADHD. Sometimes Karen loses track of her story and I need to remind her where 
she started, but my interview questions are almost unnecessary as Karen honestly, 
figuratively and humorously introduces me to her life with ADHD, a diagnosis she 
was given after numerous doctor appointments and nights of speculations. Karen has 
struggled most of her life: in school, with her family, and at work. She has never 
kept a job for a longer period of time, and she has been in more relationships than 
most people, she tells me. Karen’s story whirls me into a life of disappointments 
when expectations from other people have not been met, when misunderstandings 
have ruined relations, and when family fights have torn her to pieces, but it also tells 
me about a life of managing to keep a family together against all odds and about a 
life where she is slowly finding her footing.  
I had just started my Ph.D. project a couple of months before I interviewed Karen, 
and since ADHD was still an unexplored field for me, I asked her how she would 
explain what ADHD is to someone who does not know about the diagnosis. The 
picture she painted of ADHD as a clash of expectations and a life of constant 
challenges has stuck with me throughout this project: “It’s like approaching a candy 
vending machine, putting a dollar in it, and pressing ‘Daim’ [chocolate bar]. And 
then you expect a Daim to snarf, but instead a boxing glove comes out, ‘boing,’ 
giving you a box on the ear.” To Karen, ADHD is about being different, about 
following a different logic, and about acting and speaking differently – and 
occasionally being knocked out for it. She once attended a seminar hosted by the 
Danish ADHD Association, where a presenter talked about speaking ADHD’ish, 
and she was thrilled to finally meet someone expressing so clearly what she had 
always believed: that she was somehow speaking another language. Life with 
ADHD is a constant encounter with clashes and misunderstandings when different 
ways of thinking and acting collide. Sometimes she manages to fit in and live up to 
the expectations of others. “I seem calm to you, right? But I can damn right promise 
you, I’m not,” Karen says, explaining how she twists her legs around the legs of the 
chair and keeps her arms crossed in front of her chest in order to keep herself 
restrained. “The whole body is locked.” She knows that her restless movement, 
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when she tries to ease her “craving for being hyper” is disturbing to others, and thus 
instead of moving her legs and fidgeting with her hands, she limits her cravings for 
movement by locking her body. At other times, life hits her like a boxing glove. 
Karen has the courage of her own convictions, and sometimes she stands firm on her 
way of doing things differently, unaffected by the consequences. Then she knows 
the boxing glove will hit. But occasionally, the boxing glove comes out of the blue. 
Karen has always felt different from her peers, but only after her daughter was 
diagnosed with ADHD and Karen started reading about the diagnosis, did she 
realize why. Karen was in the middle of a dramatic and evaluative time in life when 
she was diagnosed and she was struggling to hold her family together and keep 
custody of her children. “I was tearing down and building up my life and I was 
reaching the point of being stuck, something needed to be done, but what the heck 
was I supposed to do?” After being rejected by several doctors who explained her 
difficulties as existential problems, Karen finally got the ADHD diagnosis. Karen 
describes herself as someone who has always developed strategies in order to 
manage her difficulties, but at this time in life, she needed new strategies. The 
diagnosis became the help she was longing for and it helped her understand herself 
in new ways. Medication following the diagnosis is a great help that gives her 
“calmness and breaks for me to learn,” and consultations (financed by herself) at a 
psychologist, who specializes in ADHD, helps her “because he puts things in to 
words.” “A handicap,” Karen tells me, “is when you don’t understand, when the 
surroundings don’t understand, and when no one is trying to explain.” The diagnosis 
is the explanation that mitigates the handicap. It does not eliminate every 
experienced problem, but it helps you understand the clashes of everyday life and 
develop strategies for limiting conflicts and experiences of failure. 
Karen’s story is one of 13 life stories about ADHD I have listened to as part of this 
Ph.D. project. All the stories bear unique lives in them and ADHD plays a particular 
role in these 13 lives. A small glimpse into Karen’s story about ADHD illustrates 
elements of why and how some handle their problems through the help of a 
diagnosis and elements of what changes a diagnosis brings about. In this thesis, I 
examine different aspects of adult life with ADHD, embodied experiences of 
ADHD, the implications of being diagnosed with ADHD, and ways of relating to the 
diagnosis. 
1.1. ASKING QUESTIONS AND FRAMING THE PROJECT 
How can we understand experiences of racing thoughts, the head speeding, chaotic 
thinking, and bodily sensations of electricity running through the limbs? 
Experiences of thoughts jumping from subject to subject: from a friend in 
kindergarten, through reflections of a proper cemetery plot, and to the daily 
newspaper’s story about the first Danish astronaut in space? The American 
psychiatric association characterizes experiences like these as ADHD (Attention-
CHAPTER 1. A PH.D. PROJECT ABOUT EXPERIENCES OF ADHD 
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Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder); it categorizes ADHD as a neurodevelopmental 
disorder; and it describes the disorder as comprising symptoms of inattention, 
hyperactivity and impulsivity. In large numbers, people are diagnosed with ADHD 
and adults increasingly receive the diagnosis that was previously considered a 
diagnosis for children. But how do individuals experience getting an ADHD 
diagnosis as an adult, and how is the diagnosis understood, used and acted upon? 
Examining questions about the bodily experiences of what we call ADHD and the 
experiences of getting the diagnosis is the purpose of this thesis. It is an attempt to 
delve into the phenomenology of ADHD and unfold experiences of a highly debated 
diagnosis from a first-person perspective and it is an attempt to understand these 
experiences within the context of our time, culture and ways of understanding the 
human being. ADHD is a complex phenomenon and a relatively new psychiatric 
diagnosis, and to understand what symptoms of ADHD feel like, why a growing 
number of people are diagnosed, why some people wish to be diagnosed, what 
explanatory force the diagnosis entails, and how it is received by the diagnosed, we 
need to address ADHD from multiple angles. In this thesis, my aim is to offer three 
different perspectives that each illustrate aspects of experiences of ADHD. Each 
perspective is presented in one of three articles, which form the main analytical 
arguments of the thesis.  
The first perspective concerns morality. It examines experiences of getting an 
ADHD diagnosis and the moral implications following the diagnostic process. I 
argue that the process of being diagnosed entails different moral tasks such as 
creating meaningful self-narratives, crafting new skills, and experimenting with self-
evaluation practices. 
The second perspective is about temporality. It examines embodied experiences of 
ADHD and offers an analysis of ADHD as a rhythmic phenomenon. I explore how 
to understand ADHD from a phenomenological perspective as a certain being in the 
world – or more specifically, as a matter of a phenomenological difference in 
temporal experience and rhythm.  
The third perspective deals with neurobiology. It examines how individuals 
diagnosed with ADHD explain and relate to ADHD and the implications of 
understanding ADHD as a brain disorder. I argue that my informants relate to 
ADHD by balancing between positions of identifying with and distancing 
themselves from ADHD – both positions drawing on neurobiological explanations 
of ADHD. 
I wish to focus on stories about life with ADHD, about experiences of struggling 
with a chaotic mind and a restless being and about getting an ADHD diagnosis that 
describes these experiences. Hence, when studying experiences of ADHD, I refer 
broadly to a variety of experiences of ADHD, including both experiences of living 
with symptoms of ADHD and experiences of getting the ADHD diagnosis. Research 
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on adults’ experiences of ADHD is limited (Andersen, 2009; Halleröd, Anckarsäter, 
Råstam, & Scherman, 2015; Young, Bramham, Gray, & Rose, 2008), and 
considering the amount of psychiatric literature on psychopharmacological 
treatment, prevalence and neurological aspects of ADHD and of sociological 
literature on medicalization and the emergence of ADHD as a diagnostic category, 
the lack of research on how people experience living with ADHD is striking. We 
know very little about the effects of diagnosing and phenomenological aspects of 
ADHD as a way of experiencing and being in the world. I hope this thesis can 
remedy this lack and contribute to reducing the imbalance in research on ADHD.  
My analyses are based on data from interviews, conversations, and from time spent 
with adults diagnosed with ADHD (in adulthood). I have been invited into the 
homes of my informants and they have shared their life stories with me. They have 
explained me about life with ADHD and the process of receiving a diagnosis, and 
they have challenged me on my tentative ideas throughout the research process. 
Some of them have even invited me to join them at consultations with their doctor. I 
have also gathered data from observations at official conferences for both people 
diagnosed with ADHD and their relatives and professionals working with ADHD. 
Finally, I have followed different online forums about ADHD and kept myself 
updated on popular media coverage of the diagnosis. Attending the conferences has 
taught me about the official explanations for ADHD and ideas about coping with 
ADHD and discussions on the online forums have given me insights into the 
interests of people diagnosed with ADHD who use these forums for exchanging 
views and ideas. All data was collected in Denmark, but since the increased number 
of those diagnosed with ADHD in Denmark reflect a phenomenon that is spreading 
in most western societies, the context of my study includes larger cultural, medical, 
and scientific tendencies and practices. 
The study is entirely qualitative. It takes a qualitative stance, as psychologist Jeanna 
Marecek (2003) describes as the characteristic of qualitative inquiry. Doing research 
that this way involves more than using specific techniques for collecting data, since 
it also entails a certain approach to the production of knowledge. What characterizes 
qualitative inquiry, according to Marecek, is how the researcher embeds the study in 
its historical, societal, and cultural context; resituates the informants in their social 
location; regards the informants as reflexive, meaning-making and intentional 
actors; and brings forward one’s role as a researcher in the research process 
(Maracek 2003). Likewise, my methodological ambition is to examine experiences 
of ADHD as contextually shaped and to acknowledge my own stance as a researcher 
in the analysis and presentation of these experiences. 
 
CHAPTER 1. A PH.D. PROJECT ABOUT EXPERIENCES OF ADHD 
17 
1.2. WHY STUDY EXPERIENCES OF ADHD? 
There are various reasons why studying experiences of ADHD is relevant. Firstly, 
and most importantly, literature on experiences of ADHD is surprisingly limited, 
and especially literature on adults’ experiences is almost non-existent, as pointed out 
in the section above. Researchers argue that diagnoses are far from only doctors’ 
tool in clinical practice, but people actively engage with the diagnostic descriptions, 
interpret their symptoms through the diagnostic vocabulary, and turn to their doctor 
in search of a particular diagnosis (Brinkmann, 2016; Conrad, 2007; Hacking, 2007; 
Jutel, 2011). Hence, diagnoses not only function as entries for treatment and 
resources, but also as carriers of explanations and self-understandings. The voices of 
the people being diagnosed, however, are rarely examined, and there is an immense 
quest for research on first-person perspectives on living with a diagnosis in general 
and with ADHD in particular. 
Secondly, the number of people being diagnosed with ADHD has been increasing 
rapidly since the diagnosis first entered the diagnostic manuals and so has the 
number of prescriptions for drugs treating ADHD. According to the Danish Health 
Data Authority, the number of people acquiring prescriptions for drugs treating 
ADHD in Denmark has increased from 2,901 people in 2002 to 35,554 people in 
2011, corresponding to a 1,125 % increase (Statens Serum Institut, 2012). In 
particular, adults are representing a larger number in the statistics. While almost no 
adults were diagnosed with ADHD in 2001, 3,000 adults were registered as 
diagnosed with ADHD ten years later, and only within a three-year period, from the 
end of 2009 till the end of 2012, the number of adults receiving pharmaceutical 
treatment for ADHD has doubled (Statens Serum Institut, 2013). According to 
often-referenced psychiatrist Russell Barkley, prevalence studies of adult ADHD are 
few and the results are not clear, but estimates from longitudinal studies of the 
percentage of persistence of ADHD in children into adulthood show that the 
prevalence is approximately 3.3-5.3 of the adult population (Barkley, Murphy, & 
Fischer, 2008, p. 17).  
Thirdly, ADHD receives great public attention. ADHD is treated in TV shows, in 
newspapers, and it is heavily debated among professionals and laypeople. The 
dramatic rise in prescribed Ritalin and other central nervous stimulants has hit the 
popular media, and headlines as the following has brought massive attention to the 
diagnosis: “New shock numbers: 38,000 are taking ADHD medication1” (Ritzau, 
Politiken April 14th 2013) and “Explosion: Adults on ADHD medication has 
increased twentyfold2” (Cuculiza & Weber, Metroexpress, February 22nd 2016). In 
2014, the headline “Non-treated ADHD costs nearly 3 billion kroner each year3” 
reached almost every Danish newspaper, the captions referencing a big research 
                                                            
1 In Danish: Ny (sic) choktal: Nu får 38.000 ADHD-medicin 
2 In Danish: Eksplosion: Voksne på ADHD-medicin tyvedoblet 
3 In Danish: ADHD koster ubehandlet 3 mia. kroner om året 
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project funded by The Rockwool Foundation, a big independent research 
foundation, which estimated a massive reduced tax income due to, among other 
things, difficulties keeping a job and risks of committing crime among people with 
un-treated ADHD (Rockwool Fonden, 2014). In January 2016, The Danish Council 
of Ethics4 launched a so-called ethical theme dealing with diagnoses focusing 
especially on ADHD, depression, and functional disorders. Other ethical themes 
from the council include abortion, euthanasia and cloning, but this specific theme 
raised questions about power relations, social services, stigma, and explanations for 
suffering. Based on workshops with invited professionals and patients, the council 
formulated selected ethical dilemmas in regards to diagnosing and even if the 
outcome of the project might not reach the broad public, the attention from the 
Council of Ethics illustrates how psychiatric diagnoses and ADHD have gained 
attention from authoritative institutions in Denmark. A TV show that managed to 
raise a lot of public attention was the program “Denmark on drugs,5” which critically 
portrayed the, according to the program, alarming increase in the Danes’ 
consumption of drugs prescribed for psychiatric diagnoses. A famous stand-up 
comedian diagnosed with ADHD hosted the program and revealed how he stopped 
taking drugs due to dramatic side effects. The program received 180 complaints 
from viewers who criticized the one-sided angle on pharmaceuticals and especially 
the coverage of antidepressants, but generally, the program reflected the massive 
attention towards psychiatric diagnoses and pharmaceuticals. A whole range of other 
programs, such as “That’s the crazy mind,6” “Mad or normal,7?” and “Dad, mom 
and ADHD8” followed, all dealing with mental illnesses including ADHD.  
Controversies over ADHD and questions about legitimacy, stigmatization, and 
medical treatment in public debates have aroused my interest in ADHD as a 
phenomenon, but it has also strengthened my curiosity towards everyday 
experiences of ADHD. While critics of ADHD and stories about the dramatic 
numbers of drug prescriptions often attract headlines in the media, the people 
diagnosed with ADHD share their experiences, frustrations, and hopes in parallel 
forums online, with their doctor, friends and families, and they hardly ever hit the 
headlines. I believe these experiences deserve more public and academic attention in 
order to nuance the debate about the increasing diagnosing of ADHD. 
                                                            
4 According to its webpage, The Council of Ethics is established “to provide the Danish 
Parliament, official authorities and the public with ongoing advice and information about 
ethical problems raised by developments within the national health service and the field of 
biomedicine” (etiskraad.dk). 
5 In Danish: Danmark på piller 
6 In Danish: Sådan er det skøre sind  
7 In Danish: Gal eller normal 
8 In Danish: Far, mor og ADHD 
CHAPTER 1. A PH.D. PROJECT ABOUT EXPERIENCES OF ADHD 
19 
1.3. RESEARCH LAUNCH PAD: THE DIAGNOSTIC CULTURE 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
My involvement in the Diagnostic Culture research group at Aalborg University has 
been significant for the development of my research throughout the process. The 
group has been a safe place for juggling ideas and receiving inputs and constructive 
critique, and the discussions within the group have guided my thinking. The overall 
ambition of the Diagnostic Culture project is to investigate the high prevalence of 
psychiatric diagnoses, using depression and ADHD as representatives of the 
expansion of psychiatric diagnoses. The research project asks if the increasing 
numbers of diagnoses are signs of genuine epidemics or if they reveal an immense 
pathologization of normal human behavior and sensations. By using a three-angled 
research strategy, the group wishes to contribute to the current discussion about 
psychiatric diagnoses. In the project’s description, it is outlined that we wish to 
study:  
1) How adults experience the process of receiving these diagnoses [depression 
and ADHD], and what it means for them to have their experience of 
suffering filtered through a diagnostic and psychiatric vocabulary; 
2) How depression and ADHD are constituted in public discussions in media, 
films and television; 
3) How these diagnostic categories have emerged and developed historically 
to become influential in many people’s self-understanding (dc.aau.dk).	  
The intention of the project is to chart what we call a diagnostic culture, and my 
initial part in the group was to concentrate on ADHD and contribute to examining 
angles 1 and 2 and only briefly angle 3. I started collecting articles from newspapers 
and searching for ADHD in the public media. Presupposing that public discourses 
about ADHD affect adults’ perceptions of ADHD and hence their experiences of 
getting the diagnosis, my aim was to examine not only media discourses but also 
how my informants positioned themselves in relation to the portrayals of ADHD in 
the media. Within half a year, a huge pile of articles rose on my desk with mostly 
critical articles in the Danish newspapers commenting on ADHD as a trending 
diagnosis and the rise of prescriptions for ADHD medicine. However, quite early on 
I realized that a discourse analysis of ADHD entailed some difficulties. Firstly, as I 
started interviewing people diagnosed with ADHD, I found that these stories could 
easily take up a whole Ph.D. project and I wanted to give them my full attention. 
Secondly, my supervisor became an influential voice in the public debate about 
psychiatric diagnoses, and to study the current debate would unavoidably be partly a 
study of our own research. That the work of the group appeared in the public debate 
did not make a discourse analysis entirely impossible, but in order to focus on my 
primary interest, which was individuals’ experiences with ADHD, I chose to cut out 
the discourse analysis. The ambition of analyzing the interplay between individual 
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experiences and society, though, is still part of my project as part of the Diagnostic 
Culture project.  
When I joined the Diagnostic Culture research group in 2013, it had already been 
working as a group for half a year and a first article was in preparation. This article, 
as well as the book “Diagnoser: perspektiver, kritik og diskussion9” (Brinkmann & 
Petersen, 2015), which was published in 2015, contains a definition of a diagnostic 
culture. Pointing to the rising numbers of diagnoses in the psychiatric manuals; the 
use of diagnoses in other institutional settings than the psychiatric system when 
assigning social services; the growing number of people receiving psychiatric 
diagnoses; and the change in people’s perceptions of suffering that is increasingly 
interpreted through diagnostic categories, the concept diagnostic culture provides a 
“diagnosis of the culture and a cultural analysis of the diagnoses” (Brinkmann, 
Petersen, Kofod & Birk, 2014, p. 692, my translation). A diagnostic culture is 
“characterized by the circulation of psychiatric diagnoses and categories that not 
only professionals (doctors, psychologists, psychiatrics etc.), but also by laypeople 
and the public use in order to understand life problems and human deviance within 
many different social practices” (p. 693, my translation). Even in magazines 
diagnostic tests appear and TV series often portray characters with different 
psychiatric diagnoses. The diagnostic language infiltrates everyday language when 
we talk about being depressed, when we are sad or disappointed, being 
schizophrenic when we are having mixed feelings about something, and being manic 
when we are eagerly occupied with a task. Besides diagnosing our contemporary 
time and culture as a diagnostic culture and analyzing the historical and societal 
context for the development of such a diagnostic culture, the concept also involves 
an inherent critique of the pervasiveness of the diagnostic gaze. While the diagnostic 
language and the diagnostic comprehension of human suffering and deviance 
spreads, other ways of understanding the human being (social, existential, moral, 
religious etc.) become less influential and the overall palette of understanding but 
also importantly addressing human suffering narrows (p. 393).  
My motivation for working with ADHD stemmed from my academic interest in the 
development of new psychiatric diagnoses and how diagnoses spread throughout 
history and within societies from my time as a student in medical anthropology. I 
was, however, even more interested in gaining insight into personal experiences of 
living with a psychiatric diagnosis and the possibility of examining a phenomenon 
as ADHD that is clearly situated in the midst of personal experiences and cultural 
practices and perceptions of the human being. The Diagnostic Culture project was 
my base and my initial entry into the field of ADHD, but along the way, I also 
realized that I needed to find my own path and academic standpoint in the group and 
that I had to balance between being critical of the medicalizing and pathologizing 
processes that were presented in the majority of the literature we were reading and 
discussing in the diagnostic culture research group (at least to begin with). This was 
                                                            
9 In English: Diagnoses: perspectives, critique and discussion 
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also a question of doing justice to my informants’ stories as well as their common 
acceptance and great relief of receiving an ADHD diagnosis. I found it important 
that these stories were the foundation for my analyses and I wanted my informants 
to be able to recognize themselves in my text if they were ever interested in reading 
it. To use the critical literature and the discussions within the diagnostic culture 
group as my research launch pad became my strategy as I started to move into the 
complex jungle of restlessness, inattention, hopes, disappointments, and experiments 
connected to living with ADHD and getting an ADHD diagnosis.  
1.4. AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ADHD 
Medical anthropologists have pointed to the biological, cultural, and sociopolitical 
factors that underpin different illnesses (Lock & Nguyen, 2010) as well as to the 
medical reasoning that shapes experiences of illness (Good, 1994a). ”In every 
culture, illness, the response to it, individuals experiencing it and treating it, and the 
social institutions relating to it are all systematically interconnected” (Kleinman, 
1980, p 24), anthropologist and psychiatrist Arthur Kleinman states. Kleinman has 
had a massive impact on the emergence of medical anthropology as a field in his 
illustration of how beliefs about sickness, behavior exhibited by sick persons, 
expectations about treatment, and responses from practitioners (what he calls the 
clinical reality), are socially constituted (Kleinman, 1980, p. 38). From his fieldwork 
in Taiwan and China, Kleinman has demonstrated how individuals experience, 
exhibit and express symptoms differently across cultures and he emphasizes the 
need for having a contextual approach to illness. As a medical anthropologist, I 
follow Kleinman’s way of understanding individual suffering and illness 
experiences as socially constituted, and that available resources, languages and 
treatments form the basis of how individuals and societies perceive illness. Pointing 
to the increasing psychiatric diagnosing of different types of suffering and to 
laypeople’s use of the diagnostic language in everyday conversations, the Diagnostic 
Culture research project wishes to examine some of the many mechanisms that form 
our (western) ways of understanding mental illnesses. Hence, what makes the study 
of experiences of ADHD interesting from an anthropological perspective is the 
complexity and the social dimensions of illness and how individuals engage with 
and are shrouded in cultural understandings of illness. Even when studying 
experiences of ADHD, aspects of diagnostic practices and available treatment, 
conceptions of morality and responsibility are entangled with the individual’s 
experiences of ADHD.  
An anthropological study of ADHD could, however, naturally have taken many 
different directions. Anthropologists Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Margaret Lock 
(1987) point to three different perspectives from which the body may be studied, and 
a similar analytical differentiation can be used when studying ADHD. Examining 
the social body ”referring to the representational uses of the body as a natural 
symbol with which to think about nature, society, and culture” (p. 7), could have 
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focused on ADHD as a symbol of the sick body representing a sick society; and 
studying the political body ”referring to the regulation, surveillance, and control of 
bodies” (p. 7), could have addressed questions of medicalization and disciplining of 
the body when diagnosing and prescribing central nervous stimulants. My research, 
though, focuses on the individual body, ”understood in the phenomenological sense 
of the lived-experience of the body-self” (p. 7) and the individual’s experiences of 
living with ADHD. However, as Schepher-Hughes and Lock describe, the three 
approaches intersect and studying individual experiences of suffering implicitly 
equals studying the surrounding social and cultural norms and practices (p. 31). 
Societal changes have brought about transformations in the cultural idioms for 
communication of discontent, and traditional ways of expressing suffering are being 
replaced by a psychiatric understanding of human distress, Schepher-Hughes and 
Lock stress (p. 26). Similarly, the Diagnostic Culture project describes the 
mechanisms of how the diagnostic understanding of suffering has spread into 
layperson’s vocabulary and self-interpretations. My aim in this Ph.D. project is to 
examine individual experiences of ADHD, shaped by and acted upon in a diagnostic 
culture. By investigating cultural explanations for ADHD, moral responsibility and 
moral crafting of the self, and intersubjective and phenomenological aspects of 
ADHD, I wish to contribute to the anthropological literature on illness with analyses 
of one of the most debated psychiatric diagnoses today. 
1.5. ADHD AS EXPERIENCE AND DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORY 
Throughout this thesis, I use the term ADHD to describe my informants’ 
experiences of restlessness, speeding thoughts, inattention and what they portray as 
symptoms of ADHD as well as when I refer to the diagnostic category. I will 
elaborate on the psychiatric definition of ADHD specifically in chapter 2 and on 
anthropological perspectives on illness experiences more generally in chapter 4, but 
an initial explanation of my use of the term ADHD might provide some clarification. 
I use the term ADHD instead of the term Hyperkinetic Disorder, which is ICD’s10 
term for symptoms of inattention and/or hyperactivity. Officially, Denmark follows 
the ICD’s manual when diagnosing, but ADHD, which is a DSM-5 term, is widely 
used: It is used in guidelines from the Danish Health Authority, the Danish patient 
association calls itself The ADHD Association, all the official conferences I have 
attended refer to ADHD, the media talks about ADHD, and most importantly, my 
informants use the term ADHD. Since ADHD is used in any corner of the field I 
examine, I use the term ADHD as well.  
Sometimes I write “what we call ADHD today” to underline the fact that ADHD is a 
contemporary term that defines and describes a specific set of symptoms in a 
specific time, but I have no intentions of deconstructing the diagnosis and I consider 
                                                            
10 ICD is WHO’s standard diagnostic classification system. 
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ADHD to be real in the same sense as anthropologist Emily Martin describes bipolar 
disorder as real: namely, that the reality of the disorder “lies in the cultural contexts 
that give particular meanings to its oscillations and multiplicities” (Martin 2007, p. 
29). Professionals, the public, and people experiencing the set of symptoms included 
in the diagnostic criteria all describe this phenomenon as ADHD, and they attribute 
certain characteristics to this description. Therefore, following the tradition in 
anthropology of using emic concepts, I use the term ADHD when I describe what 
my informants are suffering from. Martin uses the phrase “living under the 
description” of the diagnosis in order to reflect that people are given a diagnosis and 
she calls attention to the fact that the diagnosis is only offering one description of a 
person (2007). The phrase is useful to underline that ADHD is inscribed upon 
individuals based on certain criteria, which a phrase such as “people with ADHD” 
does not indicate. However, I prefer to use the phrase “people diagnosed with 
ADHD” when specifying that the individual is given a diagnosis to avoid what I 
perceive as an inferior position when talking about living under a description. From 
a stigmatization perspective, to be diagnosed with a diagnosis could have the same 
connotations as above, but since diagnoses are no longer only put on individuals, but 
are often demanded from people and perceived as a resource, I find this phrase more 
neutral. 
All the people I have interviewed were diagnosed with ADHD when I met them, 
which means they already relate to the diagnosis and interpret their experiences 
through the diagnostic descriptions in different ways. Therefore, to separate illness 
experiences and the diagnosis is complicated if not impossible (a more detailed 
elaboration of the relation between illness experiences and the diagnosis will be 
dealt with in chapter 5). I examine ADHD as a certain being in the world and by that 
I recognize that the ADHD diagnosis covers a specific way of experiencing. I 
believe that the people I have interviewed suffer from many of the same problems 
and that these problems should be acknowledged and addressed. Experiences of 
illness are distributed along a qualitatively defined continuum and it is not a 
question of either-or but rather to what degree people experience symptoms of a 
particular diagnosis (Hvas, 2015; Jenkins, 2015). Whether the ADHD diagnosis and 
the following treatment is the right solution for people experiencing symptoms 
related to ADHD are not the focus of this thesis, but I pragmatically recognize 
ADHD as a diagnosis that describe certain behavior and sensations and that people 
relate to and interpret themselves through the diagnosis.  
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is structured into ten chapters. It has been a continuous experimental 
process to do this project and my thoughts and writings have taken many directions. 
This thesis is a product of that process and it is my ambition to communicate both 
my findings and the messy way that has led me to these findings. I present the 
different paths I have taken even if they led me to dead ends or were impossible to 
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follow – not to excuse the results of the choices I have made, but because I believe 
transparency about the process forms the best basis for assessing and critiquing what 
is written. In that way, this thesis is a collective description of the research process. 
Every person I have met: informants, professionals, and colleagues, are part of my 
data. They constitute what I have explored and how I have interpreted what I have 
met. I have been guided by all the different settings I have taken part in, and every 
process of my research has carried new opportunities and thoughts with it. The main 
contributions of this thesis are the three articles that each present different aspects of 
experiences of ADHD, but hopefully a description of the context to and the 
underlying premises for writing the three articles, provides a useful framework for 
reading and evaluating the articles.  
In chapter two I introduce ADHD as a diagnostic category and outline psychiatric, 
historical, and sociological perspectives on what ADHD is and how the diagnosis 
has emerged historically. 
Chapter three entails an introduction to relevant literature on explanations of 
psychiatric diagnoses, theories about the biologization of mental illness, and how we 
as individuals respond to being diagnosed. 
Chapter four presents a literature review of existing studies of adult’s experiences of 
getting an ADHD diagnosis, which reveals both advantages and disadvantages of 
being diagnosed with ADHD, and I position my research in relation to this literature. 
Chapter five is where I account for my theoretical and methodological background. I 
clarify what I mean by the concept of experience and how I position my project 
within a phenomenological framework. I also present a theoretical perspective on 
the dynamics between individual experiences and diagnoses that have informed my 
research. 
Chapter six contains a description of my fieldwork: how I recruited my informants; 
considerations about whose voices are represented in the project; a description of the 
sites for my observation studies; and how I have conducted my interviews. Finally, 
some of the ethical considerations in relation to my project are discussed.   
Chapter seven consists of my first article about experiences of ADHD where the 
aspect of morality is analyzed. The article illustrates how getting a diagnosis is not 
only a clarifying process but also a formative process that shapes the diagnosed in 
certain ways. The process involves different moral tasks such as creating meaningful 
self-narratives, crafting new skills and experimenting with self-evaluation practices.  
Chapter eight presents my second article, which deals with the aspect of temporality. 
Here I examine ADHD as impairment in the sense of time and a matter of a 
CHAPTER 1. A PH.D. PROJECT ABOUT EXPERIENCES OF ADHD 
25 
phenomenological difference in rhythm. The article explores how to understand 
ADHD as a certain being in the world that is constantly out of sync.  
In chapter nine I present my third article and last contribution to the investigation of 
experiences of ADHD, which is about the role of neurobiology. I examine how brain 
processes and mechanisms are perceived as causes of ADHD, and how people 
diagnosed with ADHD use this neurobiological explanation in different ways when 
relating to the diagnosis. 
Chapter ten concludes the study. I outline the arguments and contributions in the 
thesis and point to avenues for future research on experiences of ADHD. 
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CHAPTER 2. A STORY OF ADHD AND 
MEDICALIZATION 
One of the first tasks I decided to tackle after entering this project was to acquaint 
myself with literature on psychiatric diagnoses in general and on ADHD in 
particular and with research outlining the development of the DSM manuals and 
how comprehensions of mental illnesses have changed over the past 50 to 60 years. I 
wanted to know how ADHD became an official diagnostic category and understand 
the premise behind current discussions about the status of psychiatric diagnoses. The 
literature demonstrates different portrayals of ADHD, and while reading book after 
book about psychiatric diagnoses, I realized that I was moving into a field of 
complexity and controversies between disciplines’ readings of how to understand 
ADHD. The heavy debates over ADHD are not only presented in the media, I 
learned, but the academic literature on ADHD likewise represents very different 
approaches to ADHD. 
In this chapter I present relevant studies on developments in psychiatry, different 
explanations of the emergence of ADHD, and research on medicalization of 
behavior. The area of the review lies in an intersection between research traditions 
within psychiatry, sociology, history, and psychology, and illustrates in different 
ways how mental illness must be understood within its scholarly, social, historical 
and cultural context. I start the chapter, however, with a short introduction to the 
psychiatric definitions of ADHD and the official recommendations for diagnosing 
and treating ADHD in Denmark. 
2.1. DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 
ADHD is listed in the American Psychiatric Association’s manual DSM-5 (The 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual, fifth edition published in 2013). The diagnosis is 
defined by symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity and patterns of 
behavior are characterized as failure to pay attention to details, difficulty organizing 
tasks and activities, excessive talking, fidgeting, and inability to remain seated in 
appropriate situations. Criteria for getting the ADHD diagnosis is a positive 
response to a list of elaborate symptom descriptions such as: “often fails to give 
close attention to details or makes careless mistakes in schoolwork, at work, or 
during other activities,” “often fidgets with or tap hands or feet or squirms in seat,” 
is “often ‘on the go,’ acting as if ‘driven by a motor,’” or  “often blurts out answers 
before questions have been completed.” At least six (five for adolescents and adults) 
of the listed symptoms for inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity respectively 
need to be present to a degree that is maladaptive and inconsistent with 
developmental level and the symptoms need to have persisted for at least six 
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months. Another fundamental criterion is the presence of the symptoms causing the 
impairment before the age of 12. Furthermore, the specific behavioral difficulties 
need to be present in multiple settings and there must be clinical evidence of 
significant impairment and performance issues in social, educational, or work 
settings (APA, 2013). The biggest change from the diagnostic descriptions of 
ADHD from DSM-IV to DSM-5 is the explicit inclusion of adults. Previous editions 
of DSM did not provide guidelines for diagnosing adults specifically, but as APA 
writes: “by adapting criteria for adults, DSM-5 aims to ensure that children with 
ADHD can continue to get care throughout their lives if needed” (APA, 2013). 
Hence, when introducing the DSM-5, diagnosing adults was officially authorized.  
According to the clinical guidelines for diagnosing adults offered by the Danish 
Health Authority, diagnosis is given based on a questionnaire completed by the 
patient and a thorough interview with patient and relatives, both addressing 
experienced problems during childhood and adulthood. Anamnesis should contain 
systematically collected information about the individual’s development and 
psychiatric symptoms and accompanying difficulties from early childhood till 
adulthood and possibly substance abuse. Moreover, information about the 
individual’s health, social, and economic status and educational and occupational 
background should be collected (Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2015). In order to collect the 
preferred information, the tool ASRS (Adult ADHD self-report scale), a 
questionnaire that “in a structured way collects self-reported information about the 
patient’s symptoms” (p. 15, my translation), is recommended for initial assessment. 
Diva 2.0, which is a “semi structured interview guide (…) that systematically 
collects information about the patient’s symptoms” (p. 16, my translation), is 
recommended. The Danish Health Authority recommends treatment with 
methylphenidate or lisdexamfetamine, both central nervous system stimulants. 
According to the guidelines, evidence shows an effect on ADHD symptoms and 
functional capacity from pharmaceutical treatment and despite reports of unwanted 
side effects the advantages of the treatment are assessed to exceed the disadvantages 
(p. 23). If the patient is considered to benefit from it, medical treatment is combined 
with cognitive behavioral therapy. Psych education is listed as good practice (p. 41).  
My informants describe very different experiences with the diagnostic process. 
While some were put through several tests and questionnaires, others describe the 
diagnostic process as a ten-minute conversation with a psychiatrist. Some were 
encouraged to bring relatives to the consultation while others were not. Only a few 
were offered additional treatment to the pharmaceutical treatment in the form of 
group therapy or psych education, but all were prescribed some type of drug. 
2.2. A STORY OF ADHD AS AN EVER-PRESENT DISORDER 
Scholars remain divided over the legitimacy of ADHD and while some scholars 
view ADHD as a genuine disorder with a long history others consider the diagnosis 
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as a form of social control. I will present both sides of the story of ADHD, starting 
with the first reading of ADHD as a disorder that can be traced back in history.  
According to psychiatric scholars, behavior connected to what we call ADHD today 
is described as identified in children over the last couple of centuries, and books 
about ADHD tell an almost identical story of how different physicians have 
observed symptoms of hyperactivity in children throughout the history of childhood 
behavioral disorders. In the following section, I will outline the most common 
descriptions of how the history of ADHD is told. My intention is not to determine 
whether or not symptoms of ADHD have always existed, but rather to use this 
historical overview to illustrate how ADHD is commonly perceived as having 
emerged as a diagnostic category and how symptoms of what we call ADHD today 
have been treated throughout the last couple of centuries. Through changing medical 
discoveries and comprehensions of and explanations for deviant behavior, a review 
of the history of ADHD contributes to an understanding of how we have come to 
think about ADHD today or what Edward Comstock (2011) calls the proliferation of 
the “ADHD subject” and it illustrates the close-knit link between how we conceive 
this type of behavior and conceptions of how it should be treated. 
2.2.1. THE INCAPACITY OF NECESSARY ATTENTION  
In 1798, physician Alexander Crichton published three books on his clinical 
observations of mental illness, including the chapter “On Attention and its Diseases” 
(Lange, Reichl, Lange, Tucha, & Tucha, 2010, p. 242). Crichton expatiated on the 
nature of attention and the morbid alteration of attention, which he found in both 
children and adults (Crichton, 1798/2008). From personal observations, he identified 
what he called “incapacity of attending with a necessary degree of constancy to any 
one object” (p.  203). The people mentioned were easily distracted by extraneous 
stimuli and were incapable of keeping attention, they felt a mental restlessness and 
had “the fidgets” (p. 203). Uncommon at that age, Crichton took a medical and 
physiological approach to mental derangement issues and asserted that inattention 
was caused by an unnatural morbid sensibility of the nerves that a person was either 
born or that was caused by an accidental disease (p. 242). Hence, inattention was for 
the first time described in the literature as a pathological phenomenon – an 
understanding that has dominated both medical spheres and the general public since 
then. Whether Crichton actually described what we today call ADHD is debated and 
his research is only included in part of the literature about the history of ADHD. 
Firstly, Crichton did not mention hyperactivity in his accounts meaning that a 
comparison to ADHD can be criticized for being retrospectively strained and 
secondly, Crichton’s reflections on inattention are difficult to ascertain today as they 
are based on unspecified personal experience (Barkley, 2008, p. 206). Nevertheless, 
Crichton made some interesting deliberations on the etiology of inattention disorders 
that now, more than 200 years later, are still relevant in the comprehension of 
ADHD. 
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2.2.2. CHILDREN SUFFERING FROM IMMORALITY 
While some consider Crichton to be the first to describe early symptoms of ADHD, 
others claim that the identification of hyperactivity, inattention and impulsivity in 
children, and a conceptualization of the symptoms as a medical phenomenon, has its 
roots in the early years of the last century. At that time, the behavioral sciences were 
influential and for the first time psychiatrists linked a kind of behavior that was 
never before subject to scientific knowledge to a medical discourse (Comstock, 
2011, p. 48).  
Doctor George F. Still is widely known as the first pediatrician who described 
children with abnormal incapacity for sustained attention and a distinctive 
fidgetiness. Still was interested in childhood diseases and was publishing and 
performing several lectures about his findings, including the most well-known series 
“Some Abnormal Physical Conditions in Children” from 1902. In these lectures, 
Still described his clinical observation of 20 deviant children who had all committed 
crimes or repeatedly transgressed moral boundaries and how he found that these 
children all had deficiencies in volitional inhibition. From his studies, Still was 
stunned by how these children repeatedly maltreated and inflicted pain on other 
children without feeling regret or were thieving needless things without any efficient 
motive.  It seemed, Still noticed, that punishment did not have any deterrent effect, 
as the children could commit the same misdemeanor within a few hours after the 
punishment (Still, 1902/2006, p.  130). While the children’s behavior could be 
interpreted as symptoms of imbecile behavior this particular kind of behavior was 
not caused by intellectual shortage, according to Still. The differentiation between 
children suffering from mental retardation and the children from his observations 
was a central concern in his lecturers and he repeatedly emphasized that these 
children were not necessarily less intelligent than other children of the same age. 
Instead Still concluded that the children were suffering from immorality or a “defect 
of moral control” (p. 130) defining moral control as “the control of action in 
conformity with the idea of the good of all” (p. 126). Hence, the children’s lack of 
moral control was due to “the overpowering of one stimulus to activity – which in 
this connexion is the activity contrary to the good of all – by another stimulus which 
we might call the moral idea, the idea of the good of all” (p. 127). Still did not 
consider this lack of moral control as an individual shortcoming, but rather a 
biological defect caused by a failure in development (Mayes & Rafalovich, 2007, p. 
438). In a time influenced by evolutionary thinking and eugenics, Still was inspired 
by the contemporary currents and hypothesized that the moral ineptitude and failure 
in development was in accordance with the phenomenon of evolution. Following 
this evolutionary approach, moral control was regarded as the very highest product 
of metal evolution and a morbid limitation of moral control was therefore thought of 
as a developmental defect. Despite his insisting on biological and morbid causes for 
the children’s condition, Still was not suggesting medical treatment to the children 
but instead a careful training involving environmental accommodations since “moral 
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control can only exist where there is a cognitive relation to environment” (Still 
1902/2006, p. 127). This relation to the environment needed to be strengthened so 
the children could develop their moral consciousness in order to be able to act within 
moral conformity. 
Still’s focus on morality and the children’s constant violation of moral codes – as a 
discrepancy between the child and the environment – is still relevant in discussions 
of ADHD. Furthermore, Still identified some characteristics of the inattentive 
children that we still recognize today: namely that there is an element of heredity to 
the specific behavior, that the inattentiveness becomes visible between the ages of 7-
12, that there is a marked overrepresentation of boys and that the children’s memory 
tended to be affected in a negative way.  
2.2.3. MINIMAL BRAIN DAMAGE AND ANTI-SCHOOL BEHAVIOR 
Another leading expert on mental impairment, Alfred F. Tredgold, who was 
conducting clinical observations of children with attention and concentration 
difficulties, was also explaining these children’s deviant behavior with a moral 
developmental deficiency. Tredgold introduced the term “minimal brain damage” 
(MBD) and was thereby following Still’s conviction that the children’s difficulties 
did not stem from character flaws or lack of discipline but from physiology (Mayes 
& Rafalovich, 2007, p. 438). According to Tredgold, the children suffered from an 
organic abnormality on the higher levels of the brain and he thus made a pioneering 
link between behavior and neurological impulses (p.  440). Tredgold and his medical 
research colleagues proposed many hypotheses as to what caused the impairment in 
the brain. Among other explanations, an epidemic of encephalitis lethargica in 1922 
was thought of as causing neurological damages as clinicians began to encounter 
children with symptoms of impulsiveness, hyperactivity and irritability - similar 
symptoms to Still’s observations (p.  441). Tredgold was raising an essential 
awareness of how brain damages caused behavioral disturbances though he did it in 
light of evolutionism: shrouded in evolutionary thinking, he argued that the areas of 
the brain where the sense of morality was located were products of recent evolution 
and therefore more susceptible to damage (p. 440). That explained why the children 
were afflicted by their morality. 
What is interesting about Tredgold’s findings today is his pointing towards the 
school as a revealing setting for the specific hyperactive and inattentive behavior. 
According to Tredgold, the children exhibited “anti-school behaviour” (p. 439), as 
the children’s shortcomings were most noticeable when the children were subjected 
to school demands. The argument about how the symptoms of today’s ADHD stay 
unnoticed until demands of education exposes them are widely acknowledged. 
Moreover, the linking of behavior and neurological impulses in the brain still 
dominates thinking about ADHD today. 
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2.2.4. A QUESTION OF NEUROLOGY: THE RISE OF MEDICAL 
TREATMENT 
Many psychiatrists thereafter followed Still’s and Tredgold’s interest in children’s 
inattentive and transgressive behavior. But the cluster of symptoms was not defined 
as a diagnostic category until 1957 when psychiatrist Maurice Laufer presented the 
diagnostic label “hyperkinetic impulse disorder” for children with an “organic 
drivenness”(Mayes & Rafalovich, 2007, p. 442). Laufer was employed at the 
Bradley home, a neuropsychiatric hospital for neurologically impaired children and 
headed by the psychiatrist Charles Bradley. The pediatricians at the home regarded 
the children’s difficulties as a conflict in emotional development caused by 
anomalies in the structure of the central nervous system. In the early 1930s, a 
neurosurgical remedy in the form of a spinal tap was performed on some of the 
children as an experimental treatment but the quite drastic surgical procedure turned 
out to cause severe headaches (Mayes & Rafalovich, 2007). In response to surgery 
Bradley started clinical experiments in 1937 with the amphetamine Benzedrine on 
the so-called “problem children” showing restlessness, hyperactivity and 
distractedness. Bradley’s research demonstrated how the children receiving the drug 
showed a decrease in their symptoms: they were not running around but behaving 
quietly, they lowered their voices, they did not rush into offensive discussions in the 
same manner, and they generally exhibited more “subdued behavior” (Bradley, 
1950, p. 24). Another positive effect of Benzedrine was a “dramatic acceleration of 
their academic progress” (p.  25) and Bradley noticed that Benzedrine in its 
elimination of unwanted behavior was serving as a kind of performance optimizing 
drug. Suddenly drugs were not only used for curing diseases, but also for controlling 
specific behavior. However, the drug was only addressing the deviant behavior and 
not the psychological subject, Bradley believed, and Benzedrine did not change the 
children’s character and the emotional conflict that caused the specific behavior but 
only the symptoms thereof (Comstock, 2011, p. 52).  
With Bradley, it became practice to prescribe medications to children in order to 
regulate behavior and reduce the children’s mind-addling disturbances. The 
professional view on the effect of the drugs changed during the 1950s from 
regarding drugs as a way to balance the children’s behavior with the surrounding 
social norms to a genuine understanding of drugs as not only adjusting behavior, but 
also actually treating disorders (p.  53). 
2.2.5. THE DSM-ERA  
By the 1960s, the term MBD was challenged and accused of being speculative, since 
no solid empirical data could validate if organic lesions in the brain were the actual 
cause of the behavioral pattern of children exhibiting poor attention and 
hyperactivity. Instead focus shifted to behaviorally defined syndromes based on 
observations of children (Lange, Reichl, Lange, Tucha, & Tucha 2010, p. 251). The 
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DSM has included different versions of the diagnostic category. In 1968, DSM-II 
coined the label “Hyperkinetic reaction of childhood” and the concept of 
hyperactivity was incorporated in the official diagnostic classification manuals for 
the first time. In 1980, DSM-III renamed the disorder “attention deficit disorder” 
(ADD) and emphasis changed from hyperactivity towards inattention – a symptom 
that also showed the best response to stimulant treatment (p.  252). Hyperactivity, 
though, was included in a revised version of DSM-III and the diagnosis “Attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder” (ADHD) was introduced in DSM-III-R in 1987. 
DSM-IV continued with the term ADHD, and the idea that ADHD was not 
exclusively a child disorder was tentatively presented in DSM-IV, as it included 
examples of workplace difficulties in the diagnostic descriptions. However, not until 
the release of DSM-5, as previously noted, did the diagnostic description explicitly 
present a diagnostic description for adults. 
2.3. A ONE-SIDED STORY OF ADHD?  
The above history of ADHD tells us a story of pathologization of certain patterns of 
behavior, and the development of a diagnosis based on contemporary perceptions of 
illness and treatment. Behavior that was not previously treated within the medical 
field was suddenly considered as pathological and requiring treatment. In spite of 
changing medical perspectives, similarities between the different categorizations of 
behavior and explanations are noticeable: The question of whether the disorder is 
caused by brain mechanisms has been persistent, and even if the MBD hypothesis 
was abandoned and focus shifted to observations of behavioral patterns, the 
assumption that a brain dysfunction causes the behavior exists in different versions 
among researchers and clinicians throughout the history of ADHD (Timimi & Leo, 
2009, p. 2). Further, the tradition of prescribing stimulants to children with 
behavioral problems started years before the ADHD diagnosis was established, even 
if it did not become regular practice before Ritalin entered the marked in the 1960s 
(Smith, 2013, p. 43). The idea that the children’s problematic behavior is caused by 
a dysfunction in the brain can be traced back to both Bradley and Still. Today, 
theories about hyperactivity and inattention seem to follow some of the same ideas 
about the dynamics between behavior, brain mechanisms and medical treatment: 
ADHD is a neurobiological disorder, because drugs are the most effective treatment, 
and drugs not only treat symptoms, but address the brain mechanisms that produce 
the symptoms (Comstock, 2011, p. 66).  
Some researchers critique the story of ADHD for being selective, putting too much 
emphasis on specific types of behavior and leaving out factors that might tell a 
different story of the children in question in order to legitimize current conceptions 
of ADHD. According to historian Matthew Smith (2013), the stories of 
hyperactivity follow a similar pattern in the description of hyperactivity because 
they share the same purpose, which, according to Smith, is “to depict hyperactivity 
as a genetic and neurological condition that has been ever-present in humans and has 
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little to do with the social environment” (p. 23). A certain story about ADHD is told 
in order to verify that what we call ADHD today has always existed and to reject the 
position that ADHD as a diagnosis is a product of social and cultural conceptions of 
what is considered deviant. Moreover, Smith claims, the history “fits into the 
broader notion that modern medicine is a progressive, ever-improving enterprise” (p.  
44). Instead, Smith advocates for a more nuanced historical analysis that contributes 
to the discussion of whether what we call ADHD today has always existed as 
problematic behavior or if the diagnosis is a product of our time and specific social 
arenas and medical regimen. Smiths’ historical analysis of ADHD is elaborated in 
the following section among other analyses of why the number of ADHD diagnoses 
has been increasing over the years. 
2.4. A CRITICAL EXPLANATION OF ADHD 
The world’s struggling children diagnosed with various psychiatric diagnoses are 
like canaries in a coalmine, teacher Chris Mercogliano (2009) writes in his analysis 
of children diagnosed with ADHD. The children’s behavior and suffering witness a 
polluted environment, in which diagnoses and medical treatment become the 
answer, and we need to recognize their so-called symptoms as reactions of distress 
and not as evidence of a neurological pathology, Mecogliano states. In this section, I 
present some of the critical literature on psychiatric diagnoses, diagnostic practices, 
pharmaceutical treatment, and medicalization of behavior.  
2.4.1. MEDICALIZATION OF SOCIETY 
Sociologist Peter Conrad is widely known and referenced for his thoughts on what 
he calls medicalization of society. Conrad (2007) points to the fact that the number 
of life problems defined as medical problems has increased immensely and he asks 
if there is an epidemic of medical problems; if the medical practice is better at 
identifying and treating already existing problems; or if a whole range of life’s 
problems are being diagnosed and subjected to medical treatment despite the 
dubious evidence of their medical nature (p. 3)? In Conrad’s analysis, the answer to 
the question lies in medicalization, which is “a process by which nonmedical 
problems become defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of 
illness and disorders” (p. 4). Diagnoses increasingly demarcate what is expected and 
acceptable and what is considered pathological, and behaviors and emotions that 
were once defined as immoral, sinful, or criminal, are now being diagnosed as 
medical problems, transferring them “from badness to sickness” (p. 6). Different 
drivers for medicalization can be identified, Conrad argues, but especially social 
movements and patient organizations, and not the least the pharmaceutical industry, 
have played a significant role in medicalization, promoting, and advocating for 
specific diagnoses (p. 134). Both group have an interest in medicalizing certain 
conditions for either the benefit of legitimization and access to resources or profit 
from selling drugs and they mutually support each other in their errand. The 
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American advocacy group CHADD (Children and Adults with Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder), comprising patients and relatives, has become a strong 
supporter for diagnosing ADHD and for treating the disorder with pharmaceuticals. 
The organization, however, is supported financially by the pharmaceutical industry, 
and it is no secret that CHADD receives support from Novartis, the manufacturer of 
Ritalin (p. 139). 
The main problem with medicalization, Conrad claims, is “its transformation of 
many human differences into pathologies” (p. 148). Medicalization narrows the 
range of what is considered acceptable and “diminishes our tolerance for and 
appreciation of the diversity of human life” (p. 148). Furthermore, medicalization 
locates the source of the problem in the individual rather than in his or her social 
environment and thereby “calls for individual medical interventions rather than more 
collective or social solutions” (p. 8). The individualization of social problems 
“obscure the social forces that influence well-being” (p. 152), and by expanding the 
medical jurisdiction, medicalization “increases the amount of medical social control 
over human behaviour” (p. 8), Conrad argues.  
2.4.2. SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL FACTORS BEHIND THE 
EMERGENCE OF ADHD 
As briefly described above, two general stories about ADHD figure in the literature 
about the diagnosis. One is the story of how hyperactivity has been identified in 
children throughout the last couple of centuries; the other is the story of ADHD as 
emerging in a specific context in which political, environmental, and social factors 
have created conditions that either produce certain behavior or under which certain 
behavior becomes the focus of professional attention. 
Smith is one of the researchers writing about what he calls “the controversial history 
of ADHD” (2012). Smith offers a historical account of hyperactivity and reveals 
how complex factors have come to shape our understanding of ADHD and the 
treatment thereof and why the increase in ADHD diagnoses happened during the 
post-war period. According to Smith, the rivalry between the USA and the Soviet 
Union, and the political climate following it, produced circumstances for ADHD to 
emerge. Fearing that the Americans were losing ‘the brain race’ against their rivals, 
new initiatives needed to be taken in order to improve the educational performance 
of the American population (p. 54). Whatever obstacle interfering with the goals of 
educational achievement was considered threatening to the overall aim of winning 
the race against the USSR, and politicians, educators, and researchers started 
analyzing where to deploy resources. The answer was the children. The post-war 
period had experienced a baby boom and overloaded classrooms together with a 
shortage of good teachers creating what Smith refers to as a crisis in education (p. 
57). To meet this challenge, new educational strategies were developed. Education 
became the battlefield where the race was to be won and the relatively newly 
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established reform pedagogy was replaced by a stricter pedagogy that required great 
discipline (p. 60). Moreover, the school counselor entered the classroom in order to 
help the teacher identify children who were struggling academically and disturbing 
the lessons and subsequently referring the children to a psychiatrist for diagnosis and 
treatment (p. 55). These factors collectively created an educational milieu where 
hyperactivity, impulsivity, and inattention became associated with academic 
underachievement and intellectual shortcomings, thereby representing the fearful 
thought of the US lagging behind. Children’s behavior became an important focus 
area, and with the increasing use of pharmaceutical drugs, the answer was obvious. 
The role of Ritalin, which Smith also points to in his analysis of the emergence of 
ADHD, will be dealt with in the following section. 
Another critic of the neurobiological explanation for ADHD is psychiatrist Sami 
Timimi. Based on a review of the critical literature on ADHD, Timimi (2009) sets 
up two possible explanations for the increase in ADHD diagnoses: either there has 
been a real increase in ADHD-type behavior, which has led to greater scrutiny and 
concern about the behavior; or there has not been a real increase in ADHD-type 
behavior, but rather we have come to think about and deal with children’s behavior 
differently. An interaction between both explanations might give a clearer picture of 
the causes for the increase in ADHD diagnoses, Timimi proposes, and we should 
therefore investigate these tendencies more intensely (p. 134).  
Firstly, environmental factors play a crucial role. Like Smith, Timimi points to 
changes in the educational system, but emphasizes new teaching methods focusing 
on self-regulating and the highly stimulating environment in the classroom as key 
components for why children who have problems with organizing and attention are 
struggling under the new circumstances in school. Standard tests are introduced in 
class and energetic activities such as music and gym have been set aside, resulting in 
increased pressure on children’s ability to concentrate on academic tasks11 (Timimi, 
2009, p. 139). Moreover, there has been a moral panic about boys underperforming 
in school, and whether or not boy’s underachievement is a consequence of what 
some refer to as a feminization of the school that favors girls’ behavior; there is a 
noticeable gender gap in ADHD diagnoses (p. 150). Similarly, Rosenfeld and 
Faircloth (2006) describe what they call “medicalization of boyhood” (p. 134) when 
explaining why boys comprise the majority of children diagnosed with ADHD. On 
the domestic front, Timimi argues, children are increasingly exposed to television 
and computers and a general “domestication of childhood” (Timimi, 2009, p. 138) 
has happened throughout the last couple of decades. Together with nutritious 
changes where processed food has brought significantly higher rates of sugar, 
saturated fat, and salt into children’s diets, children’s physical and mental health 
suffers. The growing literature investigating the link between dietary interventions 
                                                            
11 In Denmark, the new primary school reform from 2013 includes more physical activities in 
school, and the inactive teaching model might be changing. 
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and reductions in symptoms of ADHD, however, show divergent results and the 
connection remain unclear (p. 136).  
Secondly, Timimi points to changes in how we think of children’s behavior and the 
role of parenting as a factor in the ADHD epidemic. As the state has become 
continuously more interventionist in family life, parents are more aware of their 
children’s behavior and tend to leave guidance of the children to the expertise of 
professionals (p. 141). The so-called mother-blaming discourse accusing failed 
motherhood for children’s deficiencies might also explain why mothers have 
actively demanded psychiatric diagnoses for their children, thereby transferring the 
cause from parenting skills to neurobiological causes (p. 148). Generally, patients 
have become more engaged in the diagnostic process and more demanding when it 
comes to demands for a diagnosis, Conrad (2007, p. 46), similarly claims. 
Lastly, Timimi directs focus towards psychiatry and the pharmaceutical industry. 
According to Timimi, the number of psychiatric consultants in the UK has more 
than doubled in the past two decades and a similar increase in prescriptions to 
psychiatric patients are written (Timimi, 2009, p. 147). The pharmaceutical industry 
supports both patient activist groups and doctor’s seminars at popular vacation sites, 
and the role of the industry in the emergence of new diagnoses should not be 
underestimated, Timimi argues (p. 145). Furthermore, the search for quick-fix 
solutions in the form of diagnoses and pharmaceutical treatment reflects a general 
societal attraction to technological advances that apparently make life easier, and in 
that respect, drug treatment fits in perfectly with our craving for efficiency and 
accuracy (p. 151). Family therapist Marilyn Wedge (2015) presents a similar 
analysis, criticizing the American psychiatrists for over-diagnosing and over-
medicating children and drawing attention to France, where children are not equally 
diagnosed with attention disorders. According to Wedge, alternative guidelines for 
diagnosing together with strict parenting strategies explain “why French kids don’t 
have ADHD,” as she writes, and her analysis points to how culture within both 
family structures and medicine foster different circumstances for ADHD to spread.  
2.4.3. RITALIN ON THE MARKET 
Throughout the critical literature about ADHD, Ritalin is described as a central 
factor for the emergence of ADHD. Conrad (1976) even proposes that a cynical 
reading of the history of medicalization might be that “the label was invented to 
facilitate the use of a particular social control mechanism, in this case psychoactive 
drugs” (p. 15), and science journalist Robert Whitaker (2010) accuses the 
pharmaceutical company that produces Ritalin for misguiding their consumers when 
telling them that children with ADHD are suffering from low dopamine levels. The 
reason, Whitaker argues, that parents were told this story is because Ritalin stirs 
neurons to release extra dopamine, and the company therefore had great interest in 
promoting the theory of ADHD as a consequence of low dopamine levels (p. 77). By 
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identifying the mechanisms of a particular drug, the company transformed research 
about the effects into a theory of impairment, Whitakers states. Notwithstanding the 
level of cynicism, researchers point to the fact that Ritalin played a crucial role in 
the rise of the neurobiological explanation for hyperactivity. Because the drug 
promoted ADHD as a neurological problem and not an issue of improper parenting 
or unhealthy environments, parents and others involved in the children’s 
development welcomed the drug. Parents got a legitimate explanation for their 
children’s behavior, doctors got a concrete tool for treatment, and Ritalin thereby 
had the ability to generate a positive clinical encounter between patient, parent, and 
psychiatrist (Smith, 2013, p. 122).  
Smith describes how Ritalin was first marked for different conditions such as 
obesity, narcolepsy and depression, but its real success started when it was 
introduced as treatment for ADHD (p. 107). The company manufacturing Ritalin 
marketed the drug heavily in publications and films and they even organized 
meetings for parents and teachers about hyperactivity (p. 116). The advertisements 
were not only directed at doctors, they also spoke to parents12 when infusing hope 
for getting happier and much calmer children. An advertisement from a medical 
journal in the 1970s illustrates Smith’s point: On the one side is an angry boy, 
playing with a wooden toy, which he has torn apart. With teeth clenched and eyes 
closed, the boy is pictured unhappy, and the image is blurred as if the camera could 
not keep up with his movements. On the other side of the page, the child is much 
calmer, reading a book, and looking relaxed and quiet. Above the first picture, a 
caption states “how children with minimal brain dysfunction may be ‘aggressive, 
destructive, easily frustrated’ and ‘can’t concentrate’” (p. 101), while the second 
picture similarly has a caption declaring “how ‘it may be that stimulants act on 
higher (cortical) centers of the brain and thereby “stimulate” greater conscious 
awareness’” (p. 101). 
Researchers in neuroanatomy and social work respectively, Jonathan Leo and 
Jeffrey Lacasse (2009) also point to the link between the introduction of Ritalin and 
especially the advertising of the drug and the dramatic rise in the number of children 
diagnosed with ADHD. From the webpage ritalinla.com13, hosted by a 
pharmaceutical company, Leo and Lacasse found the text: “Studies show that the 
brains of children with ADHD may function differently than those of other children. 
These children may have an imbalance of chemicals in the brain that help to regulate 
behaviour” (p. 291). Another text informs us that: “While the specific cause has not 
been confirmed, brain imaging research using a technique called magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) has shown that difference exist between the brains of children with 
and without ADHD” (p. 289). Leo and Lacasse notice that radiological images of 
                                                            
12 Smith’s example is taken from an American context; DTCA (direct-to consumer-
advertisement) is not legal in Denmark. 
13 Leo and Lacasse found the texts on the webpage in 2008. From my browsing through the 
webpage in spring 2016, I found no similar text. 
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the brain have been used for marketing ADHD medications and that the consumers 
interpret the images as documenting a definable and visible neuropathological 
abnormality. The neuroimaging studies, however, “are plagued by a significant 
confounding variable” (p. 289), Leo and Lacasse argue, and like the theory of 
altered biochemistry of the brain is both complex and contested, parents and other 
recipients of the advertisements are not necessarily aware of the scientific 
reservations of the research. While the medical literature shows conflicting results 
and is based on a continuous questioning of its results, the advertisements portray 
the research in a simplistic way that leaves the consumer to think that evidence for 
the biological aspects of ADHD are unambiguous and clear (p. 308). Proponents of 
these kinds of advertisements directed at the consumers might propose that the 
advertisements increase disease awareness and therefore raise general public health 
and according to Leo and Lacasse, patients actually increasingly bring their concerns 
about potential symptoms to the doctor after seeing these advertisements (p. 287). 
The result of more people searching for answers to their experienced problems 
within a medical context, however, is that more people are getting the available 
answers within this context.  
2.4.4. DIAGNOSING ADULTS WITH ADHD 
How did ADHD, which for years was deemed a disorder of childhood, become a 
diagnostic category that also includes adults? Conrad (2007) describes what he calls 
a “diagnostic expansion,” entailing the process of how “once a diagnosis is 
established, its definition, threshold, or boundaries can be expanded to include new 
or related problems or to incorporate additional populations beyond what were 
designated in the original diagnostic formulation” (p. 47). Hence, the identification 
of ADHD in adulthood is a product of including new problems into a diagnostic 
category, and while childhood ADHD was a product of medicalization of behavior, 
adult ADHD is a consequence of medicalization of underperformance, Conrad 
argues (p. 64). 
A combination of media portrayals of ADHD, popular books about adult ADHD, 
and lay organizations and the pharmaceutical industry’s advocacy for adult ADHD 
explains the proliferation of adults being diagnosed with ADHD. In the 1990s, 
popular books about ADHD in adulthood reached out to a big audience. In 1993, the 
self-help book “You Mean I’m not Lazy, Stupid, or Crazy?! A Self-Help Book for 
Adults with Attention Deficit Disorder” by Kate Kelly and Peggy Ramundo 
described how an ADHD diagnosis could bring a shift in responsibility among 
adults. The following year, Thom Hartman (1994) published his book “Attention 
Deficit Disorder: A Different Perception,” in which he, within a sociobiological 
framework, associates ADHD with an evolutionary adaptation to the environment 
and links ADHD to the quality of prehistorical hunting skills. That same year, 
Edward Hallowell and John Ratey’s book “Driven to Distraction” became a 
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bestseller. The two authors draw on their own experiences of living with ADD and 
promise their readers that life with ADD can be successful. They write: 
The best way to think of ADD is not as a mental disorder but as a 
collection of traits and tendencies that define a way of being in the world. 
There is some positive to it and some negative, some glory and some 
pain. If the negative becomes disabling, then this way of being in the 
world can become a disorder. The point of diagnosis and treatment is to 
transform the disorder into an asset (Hallowell & Ratey 2005, p. xxxii). 
The same year, 1994, the cover of Time Magazine asked: “Disorganized? 
Distracted? Discombobulated? Doctors say you might have attention deficit 
disorder. It’s not just kids who have it” (Conrad, 2007, p. 55). After reading and 
hearing about the benefits of the diagnosis, self-diagnosing became a widespread 
practice and adults increasingly demanded an ADHD diagnosis, fuelling “the social 
engine of medicalization (p. 59). Simultaneously, the two actors promoting 
medicalization of ADHD in childhood, CHADD and the pharmaceutical industry, 
also advocated for ADHD in adults to be recognized. CHADD organized several 
conferences about adult ADHD (p. 55), and the pharmaceutical company that 
produces Ritalin redefined ADHD as a lifetime disorder, drawing on arguments 
about ADHD as a genetic disorder (p. 57). In 2002, Strattera became the first drug 
specifically approved and promoted for treating ADHD in adults (p. 68), and as 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, DSM-5 explicitly included adults in the 
diagnostic descriptions. 
Conrad’s analysis shows how the diagnosis is embraced and promoted by the people 
who receive it and how the widespread acceptance of diagnoses stimulates a 
diagnostic expansion. “The lay promotion of ADHD and predominance of self-
diagnosis contradict some of the basic premises of labelling theory of psychiatric 
diagnoses,” Conrad says (p. 67) and the proliferation of diagnoses is not only a 
consequence of the pharmaceutical industry trying to expand their markets, but it is 
also a product of the “popularization of symptoms and diagnoses” (p. 67), spread 
through popular media, books, and lay organizations. This development points to a 
fundamental shift in how we as researchers need to examine the dynamics between 
diagnoses and the people receiving it, how to understand both the stigmatizing and 
legitimizing effect of diagnoses, and how to navigate in the paradox of both seeing 
diagnoses as agents of social control and acknowledging that people increasingly 
demand diagnoses and welcome medical treatment.  
2.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The stories of ADHD presented in this chapter illustrate the complexity of 
understanding what ADHD is and how ADHD has emerged as a diagnostic 
category. ADHD is accepted as a psychiatric diagnosis and it has been included in 
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the diagnostic manuals for decades. Researchers within psychiatry widely believe 
that ADHD is caused by impairment in the executive functioning of the brain, and 
some claim that behavior connected to ADHD can be traced back in history and that 
is was identified in children centuries ago. Not everyone, however, accepts this story 
of ADHD and researchers state that psychiatric diagnoses such as ADHD are not 
indicators of objective conditions but rather products of socio-political factors. 
Psychiatric diagnoses are socially and culturally situated, reflecting, and reinforcing 
contemporary ideas about the human in general and mental illness in particular, it is 
argued. The consequence of diagnosis, therefore, is also debated and while some 
view the diagnosis and the following treatment as a source of help for people 
suffering from a medical condition, others consider the diagnosis a specious and 
damaging label, harming people who do not fit into our narrow conceptions of 
normality. As noted by Smith (2013), the different explanations of ADHD are 
interpreted by many, ranging from Thom Hartmann (1994), who contends that 
hyperactive people genetically are hunters who have been left behind in modern 
society, to people who believe that hyperactivity is a consequence of a high-
performance and drug culture, continuously demanding more of people (Smith, 
2013, p. 16f). What is alarming, Smith argues, is that “most hyperactivity theorists 
have been stubbornly unwilling to accept that hyperactivity is a complicated concept 
that can be justifiably interpreted in many different ways” (p. 17). Pluralism and 
acceptance of various explanatory factors behind ADHD are much needed. As 
sociologist Nikolas Rose (2015) also points out: only few would dispute that 
neurological processes are involved in how we think feel, act etc. (p. 33), but we 
also need to understand how mental illness is a matter of a living organism in its 
milieu. 
In this Ph.D. project, it is my ambition to embrace the pluralism in the explanations 
of ADHD. I pragmatically recognize that all these different explanations exist, and I 
take them to be equally real, as I describe in the introduction. My interest is how 
people make use of these different explanations and what meanings they are 
inscribed with when used as ways of understanding oneself as I present in the article 
“Structuring the self: moral implications of getting an ADHD diagnosis” and in the 
article “My ADHD and me: identifying with and distancing from ADHD. In the 
article “ADHD and temporality: a desynchronized way of being in the world,” I 
explore the phenomenology of ADHD as a rhythmic being in the world, and I 
thereby acknowledge that some people experience symptoms related to what is 
categorized as ADHD. That does not entail, however, that experiences of 
restlessness, speedy thoughts, and difficulties with attention are not shaped by 
cultural circumstances. Rather I consider ADHD to be a complex phenomenon that 
needs to be examined from multiple angles and with an understanding of its 
historical, political, and social context. 
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CHAPTER 3. PSYCHIATRIC 
DIAGNOSES AND BIOLOGIZATION OF 
THE HUMAN 
We have never been more aware of the arbitrary and constructed quality 
of psychiatric diagnoses, yet in an era characterized by the increasingly 
bureaucratic management of health care and an increasingly pervasive 
reductionism in the explanation of normal as well as pathological 
behavior, we have never been more dependent on them (Rosenberg, 
2006, p. 417). 
So far, I have presented literature dealing with explanations of mental illness and the 
emergence of the ADHD diagnosis. But what is a diagnosis? What role are 
diagnoses playing in contemporary health care? And how is a diagnosis ‘acting’ and 
being acted upon? Obviously, a diagnosis is the clinician’s tool for classifying 
disorders and arranging treatment. As historian Charles E. Rosenberg writes in the 
quote above, diagnoses are fundamental for managing health care, notwithstanding 
the arbitrary quality of diagnoses. Similarly, Rose (2015) lists numerous ways 
diagnoses have come to function in our contemporary society: A diagnosis is a 
condition of treatment and for financial coverage of its costs; a diagnosis gives 
access to social services; in clinical settings, a diagnosis is a central feature of 
patients’ records; and for researchers, diagnoses make it possible to make estimates 
and predictions of incidence and prevalence (p. 18f). Besides the structuring 
function in institutional settings, researchers also point to how diagnoses become 
fundamental for people’s interpretation of themselves and their suffering or 
difficulties. In this section, I present different perspectives on what a diagnosis is 
and how a biologization of the human has changed our conception of the human 
being in general and of mental illness in particular. 
3.1. CREATING MENTAL ILLNESS 
In his book “Creating Mental Illness“ sociologist Alan Horwitz (2002) criticizes 
what he calls diagnostic psychiatry for not differentiating between genuine mental 
diseases and culturally expressions of distress. From his 25-year study of mental 
disorders, Horwitz identifies a change in both mental health professionals’ and 
patients’ comprehensions of mental illness and he directs his critique towards the 
publication of the DSM III, which marked a “revolution of thinking about mental 
illness” (p. 2). What happened with the DSM III was a change from a holistic, 
etiological approach to diagnosing people, often based on psychoanalytic theory, 
into a symptom based approach in which certain clusters of symptoms are said to 
indicate distinct underlying diseases, Horwtiz writes. No biomarker exists for 
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identifying mental diseases, and psychiatry is bound to diagnose patients on the 
basis of clinical observations of symptoms, however, “although diagnostic 
psychiatry is officially agnostic about the variety of factors that lead people to 
develop mental diseases, the medicalized system of classification it uses emphasizes 
underlying organic pathologies” (p. 3). The primary problem with diagnostic 
psychiatry, therefore, is how “biological models seek the primary causes of mental 
diseases in genetic and biochemical factors and so locate the pathological qualities 
of psychological conditions in the physical properties of brains, not in the symbolic 
systems of minds” (p. 3). According to Horwitz, genuine mental diseases are 
“conditions where symptoms indicate underlying internal dysfunctions” (p. 15), 
while mental illnesses refer to “whatever a particular social group defines as such” 
(p. 15), and to address the two similarly is mistaken. Mental diseases such as 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorders and other psychoses fit the premise of a diagnostic 
psychiatry, since they clearly show dysfunctions in mechanisms regulating 
perception and thinking, but mental illnesses do not fit into the schema because of 
their cultural dependency (p. 13). That does not mean people are not suffering from 
mental illnesses, Horwitz emphasizes, but rather that they need to be understood as 
ontologically different than mental diseases. 
The reason for the success of the diagnostic psychiatry is manifold and only by 
taking political, economic and social factors into consideration, it is possible to 
explain why the idea of specific disease entities has become so influential, Horwitz 
argues. In an article co-written with Rick Mayes he elaborates further on the issue: 
For one thing, research oriented psychiatrists needed specific cases to study and 
therefore embraced a system that allowed them to more clearly demarcate different 
mental disorders, to compare cases and to generalize beyond research sites (Mayes 
& Horwitz, 2005, p. 256). In the clinical room, psychiatrists needed specific 
categories to obtain reimbursements for their services (Horwitz, 2002, p. 74). 
Politically, it suited the administrative climate to focus more on specific illnesses 
with specific treatment options rather than on broad complex social problems (ibid, 
p. 77), and insurance companies increasingly demanded diagnoses and treatment 
that were demonstratively effective and financially accountable (Mayes & Horwitz, 
2005, p. 254). Similarly lay advocacy groups, fighting for the rights of people with 
mental illnesses, welcomed the idea that mental illnesses are brain-based disorders 
caused by biological factors, since it rejected the theory that mental illness are 
caused by poor parenting and traumatic experiences, which has haunted families 
experiencing mental illness (Horwitz, 2002, p. 77). And last but not least, psychiatry 
was facing a major dilemma, as psychotherapy was not only growing in popularity, 
but also increasingly performed by psychologists who undercut them in price, and 
psychiatry had to decide how to demonstrate the legitimacy of their profession if 
they were leaving psychotherapy to other professions. The diagnostic psychiatry 
with its focus on neurobiology and drug treatment was the solution to strengthening 
psychiatry as a profession (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005, p. 257). Overall, with the DSM 
III, psychiatry shifted from a dynamic understanding of mental illnesses to a 
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biological understanding that stresses brain chemistry and drug treatment and 
supersedes the psychosocial understanding of mental illness that had dominated for 
decades.  
The proliferation of mental illnesses “illustrates the spread of a medicalized disease 
framework to encompass many sorts of problematic psychological conditions” 
(Horwitz, 2002, p. 5), and too many of the conditions represented in the DSM are 
not mental diseases nor specific disease entities, but rather the illnesses “reflect 
expectable reactions to stressful conditions, culturally patterned forms of deviant 
behaviour, and general human unhappiness and dissatisfaction” (p. 15). People who 
become depressed or anxious “react in appropriate ways to their environments” (p. 
14, italics in original), and they will not be mentally disordered if the symptoms 
disappear because of changes in their social circumstances. In the end, the entry of 
the diagnostic psychiatry, Horwitz argues, has led to an overestimating of the 
prevalence of mental disorders and improper treatment of people experiencing 
mental distress. Like Conrad (2007), who describes what he calls “diagnostic 
expansion,” Horwitz points to the continuous inclusion of new types of distress into 
the diagnostic manuals and he critiques the increasing comprehension of all kinds of 
suffering as caused by biological dysfunctions in the brain. As part of this argument, 
Horwitz points to a central concern, namely that even if people’s reactions to stress 
vary only slightly across time and place, the meaning people ascribe to these 
reactions, notions of what causes the reactions, and the help people seek to ease the 
suffering has changed dramatically within the last couple of decades.  
In the case of ADHD, as I outlined in the previous chapter, ADHD is said to be a 
consequence of medicalizing of behavior and underperformance rather than a 
genuine mental disease. Following Horwitz, ADHD might reflect an expectable 
reaction to the changing conditions in modern life, as also noted by Timimi, and 
people experiencing symptoms related to ADHD might react in appropriate ways to 
the challenges they meet. If expectations in school, at work, and changes in level of 
activity favor certain kinds of behaving, ADHD related behavior intensifies. And if 
we at the same time witness a diminishing of tolerance for and appreciation of the 
diversity of human life, as Conrad notices, this kind of behavior becomes 
inappropriate and will eventually be subjected to medicalization.  
3.2. PUTTING A NAME TO IT 
Like Mayes and Horwitz (2005), Rosenberg (2002) describes the change in 
psychiatry when focus shifted from etiology to symptoms and the discipline started 
to understand various forms of human suffering in terms of specific diagnostic 
categories. From his analysis of technological breakthroughs in medical history, 
Rosenberg outlines the dilemma in what he calls disease specificity and the idea that 
idiosyncratic human beings can fit into constructed and constricting ideal-typical 
diagnostic categories. This disease specificity is based on the notion that diseases are 
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entities existing outside their manifestation in particular individuals, and the context, 
in which the symptoms appear, as Horwitz also states, is neglected. “It helps makes 
experience machine readable” (p. 257), Rosenberg notes, pointing to the 
standardization of experiences that diagnoses represent that transforms experiences 
into categories, charts, and boxes within institutions. Diagnoses function as a way of 
systemizing experiences in institutional settings, but diagnoses also affect the 
individual whose experiences are systemized. Diagnosing is “a ritual of disclosure,” 
when “a curtain is pulled aside, and uncertainty is replaced – for better or for worse 
– by a structured narrative (p. 255). What used to be diffuse bodily sensations or 
emotional difficulties are analyzed, categorized, and labeled within a diagnostic 
framework that offers a specific narrative to the suffering. Rose (2015) similarly 
describes how a diagnosis enables the doctor to organize the patient’s history into a 
treatable condition and how the diagnosis reframes troubles into an illness, thus 
providing a framework for understanding the past and for orienting to the future for 
the patient (p. 20). The built-in narrative in the diagnosis renders a much more 
concrete way of understanding and talking about suffering possible, and even if a 
diagnosis sometimes predicts a life with chronic illness, it is welcomed by many 
because of its ability to transform experiences into a comprehensible entity. 
Diagnoses have become “indisputable social actors, real inasmuch as we have 
believed in them and acted individually and collectively on those beliefs” 
(Rosenberg, 2002, p. 240). Diagnoses ‘act’ on people and despite their constructed 
quality, they have real, social implications.	  	  
A researcher who advocates for the development of a “sociology of diagnosis” is 
Annemarie Jutel (2011). Jutel argues that diagnoses are social constructions that 
provide “a cultural expression of what a given society is prepared to accept as 
normal and what it feels should be treated” (p. 3). Overall, three circumstances 
determine if a condition is classified as a disease and listed as a diagnosis: Firstly, it 
must be recognized as undesirable, secondly technology needs to be able to discern 
it, and lastly, a collective will to assimilate the condition into the spectrum of 
diseases needs to be present (p. 35). That diagnoses are constructed, however, does 
not mean that they are not real, but rather that their existence is bound to what is 
defined as problematic. In that perspective, diagnoses are concepts formed by 
biology, technology, the social, the political and the lived, Jutel emphasizes (p. 13). 
Diagnoses capture a reality despite their fluid nature of that reality, and to exemplify 
her point, Jutel refers to an illustrative description by Mirowksy and Ross (1989) 
saying that diagnoses are like star constellations in the sky. These formations are 
truly present, but the meaning of them is shaped by how we assemble them in 
recognizable patterns (Jutel, 2011, p. 61). Like constellations of stars, symptoms are 
linked together to create a diagnostic pattern, and “a collective cultural position 
determines which symptoms we will see, which we will brush off as insignificant, 
how we make sense of what is there, and what social consequences the diagnosis 
will convey” (p. 61).  
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While a diagnosis provides structure and distinguishes the pathological from the 
normal, a diagnosis also rearranges identity. From her own experience of being 
diagnosed, Jutel describes how the diagnosis came to play an important role in the 
way she understands her life and illness. The diagnosis conferred a new identity, as 
she, in the moment of the diagnosis, “became someone with an autoimmune 
disorder” (p. xii). To be that someone may remove the individual from the isolation 
of his or her suffering and provide the person with a new collective identity together 
with others suffering from the same. “Being diagnosed gives permission to be ill,” 
Jutel argues, referencing Talcott Parson’s notion of the sick role, and once 
diagnosed, the suffering person is no longer blamed for failing social expectations, 
but is instead treated for a disease (p. 11). A diagnosis, thus, can both stigmatize and 
legitimize conditions dependent on how the diagnosis is commonly perceived. As an 
example, people diagnosed with fibromyalgia often ambiguously welcome the 
diagnosis. For one part, receiving the diagnosis is relieving because it validates the 
suffering and gives a sense of credibility, for the other part, the psychiatric diagnosis 
does not cover what the patients believe to be a physical disease (p. 78). Hence, the 
legitimacy of the diagnosis relies on whether it corresponds with what society and 
the patient recognize as a legitimate disease and whether the patient accepts the 
narrative offered by the diagnosis. Similarly, the degree to which the diagnosis is 
incorporated into and rearranging identity depends on whether the diagnosis is 
accepted by the patient. The fact that diagnoses potentially offer identities, 
legitimacy, and access to resources, explains the gravity in the battle over diagnoses. 
As also noted by Conrad (2007), Jutel points to lay social movements’ advocacy for 
specific diagnoses in search for explanation and legitimization as an illustration of 
how diagnoses have become the center of battles not only inside psychiatry but also 
in society. The submissive patient has become a minority among patients pursuing 
diagnoses (Jutel, 2011, p. 69), and diagnoses have increasingly become the subject 
of negation and disputes of recognition.  
As I will show in chapter 4, adults diagnosed with ADHD often welcome the 
diagnosis as a legitimization of their experienced problems and an official 
explanation of their difficulties. In research, we might point to the arbitrary 
construction of the diagnoses and emphasize diagnoses as pragmatic tools for 
treating suffering, but from the patients’ perspective, diagnoses become much more 
than that. As my first article: “Structuring the self: Moral implications of getting an 
ADHD diagnosis” will illustrate, an ADHD diagnosis brings about new ways of 
understanding oneself and of managing everyday practices. As noted by Rosenberg, 
diagnoses structure experiences by offering a specific narrative to the suffering and 
in this article I analyze how this structuring effect unfolds in my informants’ lives 
and engagement with the diagnosis. 
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3.3. A NEUROCHEMICAL ERA 
While the theory of a chemical imbalance in the brain as the cause of mental illness 
has been subject to critique and is now widely rejected, a general biologization of 
mental illness still strongly prevails and research on ADHD also reflects a 
tremendous interest in the neurobiological mechanisms of the disorder. 
Neuroscientists are now examining subjects that traditionally have been studied 
from psychological, anthropological, philosophical, and religious angles and the 
humanities are increasingly inspired by neuroscientific knowledge about how human 
nature is shaped by the structure and functions of the brain (Rose & Abi-Rached, 
2013, p. 1).  
The question of how neurobiological knowledge changes the way we think about the 
human being in general and of (mental) illnesses specifically is extensively 
discussed within a wide range of research disciplines. The debate provokes 
questions about how we as laypersons engage with this type of knowledge and if it 
has produced a shift in everyday conceptions of the self. In an article reviewing 
empirical investigations of how neuroscientific knowledge affects lay 
understandings of personhood, psychologists Cliodhna O’Connor and Helene Joffe 
(2013) conclude that neuroscientific ideas become integrated in our understandings 
of selfhood and that especially people who have been through a diagnostic process 
adapt the neuroscientific knowledge. According to the review, some of the most 
dramatic research reveals that neuroscientific insights “will fundamentally alter the 
dynamic between personal identity, responsibility and free will” (Illes & Racine, 
2005, p. 14); that “neuroimaging has contributed to a fundamental change in how we 
think of ourselves and our fellow persons” (Farah, 2012, p. 75); and that 
neuroscientific knowledge is “propelling humanity toward a radical reshaping of our 
lives, families, societies, cultures, governments, economies, art, leisure, religion – 
absolutely everything that’s pivotal to humankind’s existence” (Lynch, 2009, p. 7). 
O’Connor and Joffe, however, also conclude that the effect of neuroscientific 
knowledge on people’s conception of selfhood is sometimes overestimated and that 
neuroscientific knowledge is assimilated into our existing social and psychological 
ideas about selfhood in ways that “perpetuate rather than challenge existing modes 
of understanding” (O’Connor & Joffe, 2013, p. 262). Other studies examining the 
impact of the neurobiological explanation for ADHD in public and private 
discourses come to similar conclusions (Bröer & Heerings, 2013; Danforth & 
Navarro, 2001; Horton-Salway 2011). Sociologists Christian Bröer and Marjolijn 
Heerings (2013) find that a neurobiological discourse dominates public discourses 
about ADHD in Holland, while personal discourses encompass more various 
descriptions of ADHD ranging from sociological to spiritual portrayals of the 
disorder. Researcher in discursive psychology Mary Horton-Salway (2011) finds 
two overall repertoires representing stories about ADHD in the UK newspapers: 1) 
A biological repertoire that describes ADHD as a brain disorder and justifies 
medical treatment for ADHD and 2) a psychosocial repertoire that support moral 
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judgments about poor parenting and the so-called sick society and criticizes 
medicalization processes for the diagnostic labeling of bad behavior. Generally, it	  
seems that, parallel to the two main explanations for ADHD in the scientific 
literature on ADHD, research in public discourses likewise identifies both a position 
explaining ADHD as a neurobiological disorder and a position explaining ADHD as 
a product of social and cultural factors. 
3.3.1. A SHIFT IN THINKING ABOUT THE HUMAN 
Rose and Abi-Rached (2013) outline how the social sciences have shifted back and 
forth between a biologization and a psychologization of the human being. In the 
eighteenth-century’s racial sciences, a biologization of the human being dominated 
scientific understandings of human nature, but the period was followed by an intense 
psychologization of the human throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 
And now, paradoxically, we witness a return to the biological explanation of human 
nature in the form of the influence of neuroscience. Horwitz (2002) makes a similar 
analysis, stating that “the current emphasis on the biological foundations of mental 
disorders is a re-emergence of earlier biological thinking in psychiatry” (p. 132). 
Especially after the second world war, the biological theories became associated 
with eugenic programs and reactionary political thoughts and the theories were 
discredited, and a period of what Horwtiz calls dynamic psychiatry came to 
dominate psychiatric thinking (202). Moreover, the anti-psychiatry wave in the 
1970s, represented in popular culture with movies like “One Flew over the Cuckoo’s 
Nest” (1975), criticized biological psychiatry for “creating the forms of damages and 
disordered selfhood that it claimed to explain” (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 113). 
Today, the scientific landscape has changed again, and “the study of brains and of 
genetics now dominates psychiatry” (Horwitz, 2002, p. 133). The accusations 
against psychiatry, however, have not gone silent and researchers such as Whitaker 
(2010), psychiatrist David Healy (2012), and in a Danish context Peter Gøtzsche 
(2015), critique the pharmaceutical industry for doing more damage than good and 
for incorrectly explaining mental illnesses as consequences of a chemical imbalance 
in the brain. But generally, a “regime of futurity” (Rose & Abu-Rached, 2013, p. 
14), in which science wishes to govern the future, prevent illnesses, and tackle the 
burdens of mental disorders, has come to form our way of thinking.  
So what does this neurobiologization of the human entail? Rose and Abu-Rached 
claim that non-conscious neural processes are considered as constituents of moral 
action and that especially researchers and professionals working with mental health 
consider the brain as a target of self-improvement (p. 219). The concept of the 
brain’s plasticity, however, is central. Since we know that the brain is plastic, we 
acknowledge that “human brains are both shaped by and shape their sociality” (p. 
22) and the neurobiological understanding of selfhood has not eliminated or rejected 
psychological understandings of selfhood, but the two approaches exist 
concurrently. Knowing that the brain is plastic and is shaped by its sociality, we are 
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expected to take moral responsibility for nurturing and optimizing it in the best 
possible way (p. 223). The brain becomes the subject for interventions of various 
kinds. As Rose and Abu-Rachid put it:  
We extend our hopes and fears over our biological bodies to that special 
organ of the brain; act upon the brain as on the body, to reform, cure, or 
improve ourselves; and have a new register to understand, speak and act 
upon ourselves – and on others – as the kinds of beings whose 
characteristics are shaped by neurobiology (p. 223). 
3.3.2. THE SELF IN MEDICAL TERMS 
Rose’s analysis of “the neurochemical self” (Rose, 2003) and how modern 
individuals have come to understand themselves in terms of their brains and bodies 
is highly referenced in sociological research on contemporary biomedicine. Inspired 
by Foucault’s notions of governmentality, Rose claims that the active and 
responsible citizen is obliged to constantly monitoring his or her health and 
improving oneself in response to society’s requirements and that pharmaceuticals 
have come to be the tool for these self-disciplining practices (p. 59). 
Pharmaceuticals ”are entangled with certain conceptions of what human are or 
should be” (p. 59) and taking drugs becomes a practice of adapting to the specific 
norms that are inherent in the drugs. While Rose talks about neurochemical selves, 
anthropologist Janis Jenkins (2010b) analyses what she calls the “pharmaceutical 
self.” Since the primary source of psychiatric treatment is psychopharmacology and 
because aggressive marketing of pharmaceuticals shapes the perception of subjects 
in need of treatment, we have become pharmaceutical selves, Jenkins claims. Based 
on her research on treatment of psychoses, she examines the dialectic between what 
she calls the pharmaceutical imaginary, which is the dimension of culture oriented 
towards pharmaceuticals as potentials for human life, and the pharmaceutical self, 
which is the aspect of the self oriented toward pharmaceutical drugs (p. 23). 
According to Jenkins, individuals adopt the pharmaceutical imaginary of mental 
illnesses as caused by chemical imbalances and interpret themselves and their 
problems in light of this imaginary. Subjectivity is not only a feature of individual 
experience, Jenkins states, and it cannot be distinguished from its surroundings, but 
the self must be understood as “the sum of processes by which the subject is 
oriented in the world and toward other people” (ibid). As patients incorporate and 
take the idea of schizophrenia as a consequence of a chemical imbalance, 
schizophrenia as a form of subjectivity can only be understood as strongly 
intertwined with the idea of restoring the balance with psychopharmacology. Thus, 
both Rose and Jenkins address consequences of neurobiological explanations for 
disorders on not only decisions about treatment but also on how we think about 
ourselves. Similarly, a study conducted by anthropologist Joseph Dumit (2003) 
examines the role of brain images experienced by people suffering from mental 
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illness. Dumit describes how brain images have altered people’s understanding of 
their body, or what he calls their “objective self,” which consists of: 
our taken-for-granted notions, theories, and tendencies regarding human 
bodies, brains, and kinds considered as objective, referential, extrinsic, 
and objects of science and medicine. That we “know” we have a brain 
and that the brain is necessary for our self is one aspect of our objective-
self (ibid, p. 39).  
We are confronted with scientific images of the brain on a daily basis and we are 
convinced that these images can tell us who we are. 
ADHD is illustrative for how we have come to think about human behavior as 
shaped by neurological processes. As I outlined in chapter 2, comprehensions of 
inattention and hyperactivity have changed throughout the past couple of centuries, 
but the neurobiological explanation has roots in the very early descriptions of 
children’s disruptive behavior. Even if no biomarkers or brain scanning reveal 
ADHD, the biologization of ADHD is widely accepted, and as noted by Jutel and 
Conrad among others, patient organizations intensively advocate for the 
neurobiological explanation of the disorder. In my third article: “My ADHD and me: 
Identifying with and distancing from ADHD,” I will illustrate how understanding 
ADHD as a neurobiological disorder opens up a number of interpretations and ways 
of relating to the diagnosis. The neurobiological explanation forms what Rose calls 
the register for people diagnosed with ADHD to understand, speak, and act upon 
themselves, and in this article, I analyze how the pharmaceutical imaginary, in 
Jenkins’s words, affects the pharmaceutical self.  
3.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The degree to which we have become neurochemical selves and how neurobiology 
has changed the way we think of the human and of human suffering is debated. Rose 
is criticized for overstretching the argument about people exclusively understanding 
themselves in terms of neurobiology, claiming that psychological and social 
explanations for suffering exist parallel to the neurobiological explanations (Bröer & 
Heerings, 2013; O’Conner & Joffe, 2013). Rose and Abu-Rached (2013), however, 
emphasize that “we are not seeing personhood replaced by brainhood, but the 
emergence of a new register or dimension of selfhood, alongside older ones – a 
dimension in which we can understand and take care of ourselves, in part, by acting 
on our brains” (p. 223). Rose might have nuanced his argument himself and the 
critique seem to accuse Rose for a rigid argument he is not presenting (any longer). 
Notwithstanding the level of neuroscience’s influence on our perception of self, the 
idea that we increasingly understand ourselves in biological terms is widely 
acknowledged.  
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Psychiatric diagnoses are constructions or selective symptoms clustered together in 
order to differentiate between different kinds of suffering and coordinate treatment 
accordingly. Nonetheless, we often think of diagnoses as existing in themselves, 
independent of the individual’s history and the social circumstances in which the 
individual suffers. Diagnoses give access to resources and are central for people 
organizing, demanding legitimization of their experienced problems, and in that 
sense diagnoses become powerful tools for the fight of social rights. Moreover 
diagnoses rearrange identity by offering a specific narrative and grouping the 
individual with others suffering the same. But maybe most notably, if the way we 
explain and think of diagnoses affects expectations of how to react to suffering and 
decisions of treatment, these explanations are immensely powerful. 
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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIENCES OF AN ADHD 
DIAGNOSIS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
Academic literature on adults’ experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis and living 
with symptoms of ADHD is limited. Historical and sociological literature 
contextualizing the diagnosis in macro societal developments dominate the 
investigations of ADHD within the social sciences and the few studies taking a first 
person perspective on ADHD all call for more research. Considering the increased 
number of adults diagnosed with ADHD, the absence of qualitative studies 
investigating adults’ experiences of being diagnosed with ADHD is striking. I 
previously introduced some of the literature dealing with how diagnoses in general 
affect people’s self-understanding, but in this section, I present studies that 
specifically investigate adults’ experiences of receiving an ADHD diagnosis and the 
consequences thereof based on interviews with adults diagnosed with ADHD and a 
single study analyzing online narratives on Internet blogs by adults diagnosed with 
ADHD. I chose to include research that either focuses on experiences of getting a 
diagnosis and the consequences following the diagnosis or on how individuals cope 
with and experience symptoms of ADHD. 
4.1. BEING DIFFERENT AND LIVING IN CHAOS 
The most referenced study in investigations of adults’ experiences of getting an 
ADHD diagnosis is conducted by psychologist Susan Young and her colleagues. 
Based on interviews with adults diagnosed with ADHD, the study evaluates the 
psychological impact of receiving an ADHD diagnosis and examines how diagnosis 
and drug treatment change the individual’s self-perception (Young, Bramham, Gray, 
& Rose, 2008). The study lists three overall themes: how the diagnosis makes the 
individual review the past, how the diagnosis is followed by an emotional reaction 
and readjustment process, and finally how a diagnosis brings considerations about 
the future. In the first theme, the interviewees describe their feeling of being 
different from others. Throughout their lives, the participants have experienced 
negative judgments from family members, teachers, and friends who told them they 
were stupid, lazy, and disruptive, and while some ignored the feedback, others 
accepted it, which negatively affected their self-esteem (p. 496). Narratives about 
feeling different appear in the majority of literature about experiences of ADHD and 
reviewing the past as problematic and full of failure are common characterizations. 
From their interview study with adults diagnosed with ADHD psychologists Sheila 
Jones and Morten Hesse (2014) report how the interviewees have never felt like 
their peers and often experience a lack of social skills (p. 4), and Michelle Toner, 
Thomas O’Donoghue and Stephen Houghton (2006) demonstrate from an interview 
study with adults diagnosed with ADHD, how the interviewees have always felt 
different from the rest of the world (p. 252). The latter study describes the feeling of 
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being different as part of being socially isolated and lists the narratives of 
differentness together with the experience of failing in school, a history of 
frequently changing employment and a lack of self-esteem under a category they 
call “chaos.” According to the study, the participants regularly describe their lives as 
“chaotic,” “unsettled,” and “turbulent,” and the authors conclude that “chaos” as a 
concept “captures the notion that the starting point of people with ADHD is disorder 
and that they must work to achieve order in their lives” (p. 251). Thus, the diagnosis 
becomes a tool for ordering life, understanding one’s differentness, and working on 
how to cope with the differentness. As the literature also shows, however, the 
diagnosis and the following treatment paradoxically both help eliminate the feeling 
of being different and enforce it. 
4.2. RECONSTRUCTING SELF-PERCEPTIONS AND LEARNING 
NEW WAYS OF MANAGING 
The second theme listed in the analysis made by Young and colleagues (2008) 
describes the process of psychological adjustment following the diagnosis, which 
falls into three stages. Firstly, the participants describe an initial sense of relief 
because the diagnosis is accepted as the long waited explanation for their 
difficulties. The diagnosis provides the opportunity for relocating blame for previous 
failures, and “it enabled them to shift from an internal attribution that they were 
solely responsible for their problems to an external attribution whereby ADHD was 
an explanation for their difficulties” (p. 496). The relief, however, is often followed 
by feelings of confusion about how to understand themselves in light of this new 
diagnosis as well as anger over not being diagnosed earlier (p. 497). Lastly, the final 
stage of the adjustment consists of acceptance of ADHD as part of their life and who 
they are and it marks the end of the ruminations that had previously been 
experienced in relation to the diagnosis (p. 497). That an ADHD diagnosis gives a 
sense of relief is consistent in the research I found. Hesse and Jones report that most 
of their participants were relieved to get the diagnosis and that the diagnosis affected 
their self-worth positively “because it filled a blank spot in their self-understanding” 
(Hesse & Jones, 2014, p. 6). However, as also mentioned by Young and colleagues, 
Hesse and Jones find that the initial relief is often followed by both disappointment 
for not being diagnosed earlier, as the interviewees believe it could have shielded 
them from previous frustrations and problems in life, and by anger towards 
professionals by whom they had felt misunderstood (p. 6). Likewise, Halleröd and 
colleagues demonstrate the ambiguous state of, on the one hand, welcoming the 
ADHD diagnosis as an explanation for the individual’s academic and social 
shortcomings and for the experience of feeling different and on the other hand being 
sad about “the lost years prior to diagnosis” (Halleröd, Anckarsäter, Råstam, & 
Scherman 2015, p. 4). Toner and colleagues (2006) describe the process of getting a 
diagnosis as a process of gaining control in a chaotic life. According to the study, 
the diagnosis offers a new awareness of the reasons for the individual’s difficulties, 
and even if he or she might always have known about their differentness, “the 
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answer was given to them with the naming of their condition” (p. 254). After being 
blamed and blaming themselves for whatever problems they have encountered in 
life, which is often experienced as being beyond his or her control, the participants 
recognized that the problems were “not their fault” (p. 254) Knowledge of their 
disorder brought acceptance of themselves; “they were able to allow for their 
weaknesses and give themselves permission to fail” (p. 254). Moreover, the 
diagnosis made it possible to explain their behavior to family and friends and to 
“arm themselves with all the knowledge they could about the disorder that was 
shaping their lives” (p. 254). 
In her Ph.D. thesis, social worker Maja Lundemark Andersen (2009) examines “how 
an ADHD diagnosis is filled with meaning and used in a meaningful way by the 
informants in terms of living their daily life” (p. 268), based on interviews with 
adults diagnosed with ADHD. Like the above studies, Andersen describes how an 
ADHD diagnosis puts a name to the individual’s difficulties and transforms the 
difficulties into a treatable phenomenon. The diagnosis offers a professional 
explanation and the individual thereby gains an understanding and acceptance of 
oneself (p. 119). At the same time, a diagnosis legitimizes the individual’s 
experiences and functions as a box into which the individual systematizes his or her 
experiences (p.  113). Andersen further argues that what has previously been 
interpreted as the individual’s fault can be deconstructed and reconstructed into an 
interpretation of ADHD as the fault (p. 110). ADHD becomes a category that 
recapitulates the individual’s experiences and the diagnosis is used as the knot that 
binds together the past, the present, and future possibilities. In that way, to get an 
ADHD diagnosis is a process of reconstructing self-perceptions as focus shifts from 
an unfounded differentness and failures to an official deviance that is evidence of a 
diagnosis (p. 264).  
In a study based on online narratives from adults diagnosed with ADHD on blogs 
and webpages dedicated to strategies for coping with ADHD, Fleischmann and 
Fleischmann (2012) find a certain narrative structure in the stories told by adults 
diagnosed with ADHD. The narratives often fall in two stages. The first stage, 
lasting from childhood to the time of the diagnosis, focuses on how the narrators did 
not understand the reason for their difficulties and therefore blamed themselves for 
their failures. The second stage, beginning after the diagnosis, focuses on how 
awareness of ADHD turned their life around. People recall how they as undiagnosed 
found it difficult to cope with their everyday difficulties because they did not know 
about the reasons for their misbehavior and thus could not obtain the appropriate 
help (p. 1489). The ADHD diagnosis, as the narratives illustrate, changed this 
situation of helplessness and self-blame. After being diagnosed, the narrators 
researched ADHD on websites, books, online blogs, turned to psychologists and 
coaches for help and started pharmacological treatment. Reading others’ 
autobiographical accounts of life with ADHD derived knowledge and consolation 
and the narrators developed the belief that it is possible to cope with ADHD. They 
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were taught tips about how to organize their time better, prevent procrastination, and 
avoid distractions, and thereby learned how to improve their ability to perform 
different tasks. “Armed with information these narrators realized that difficulties 
originated in ADHD” (p. 1490), and by knowing the difficulties were possible to 
cope with, the narrators “began to view their present and future in a more positive 
light”(p. 1491). 
4.3. AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS THE DIAGNOSIS  
Research on adults’ experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis describes different 
feelings of ambivalence towards the diagnosis. Besides using knowledge about the 
disorder to positively reconstruct self-perceptions, some people experience doubt 
and conflicting thoughts following the diagnosis. Andersen’s study reveals how 
ADHD is associated with handicap and disability categories, which are not 
perceived as attractive or relevant to the participants. While an ADHD diagnosis is 
experienced as liberating because of its ability to offer explanations for the 
individual’s difficulties, it is also constraining because it offers only a limited set of 
roles for the individual to hold (p. 121). Therefore, the participants try to navigate 
between, on the one hand, accepting the diagnosis and its symptoms descriptions 
when understanding themselves and, on the other hand, insist on maintaining 
individual characteristics and being different in their own specific way (p. 122). 
According to Andersen, the dilemma arises because the ADHD diagnosis is based 
on an essentialist understanding of the human. Even if the individual requests the 
diagnosis based on its symptoms descriptions, the essentialist descriptions collide 
with the individual’s self-descriptions. The participants do not “buy the whole 
ADHD package” and do not accept the stereotypical roles connected to ADHD (p. 
122). The diagnosis might mediate understandings and offer explanations, but the 
participants only partly accept the ADHD role. They chose ADHD as the headline 
for understanding themselves, but they write the content of the text themselves, as 
Andersen states (p. 137). 
Halleröd and colleagues list different reasons for having ambivalent feelings about 
getting an ADHD diagnosis. Firstly, some of the interviewees raised questions 
regarding the actual existence of ADHD as a diagnosis and expressed thoughts about 
not adapting to modern society rather than having a psychiatric diagnosis or that 
symptoms considered as ADHD were caused by childhood or environmental 
conditions (Halleröd, Anckarsäter, Råstam, & Scherman 2015, p. 4). Secondly, 
some of the interviewees did not see themselves as fitting into the stereotypical 
conception of a person ADHD or they did not feel resemblance with others 
diagnosed with ADHD and therefore questioned the accuracy of their diagnosis (p. 
5). Thirdly, some of the interviewees expressed feelings of insecurity concerning 
identity following the diagnosis and feared that the diagnosis might interfere with 
their identity. According to the study, the concern was expressed as to “whether one 
could remain the same person after having been assigned a diagnosis of ADHD” and 
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“how much of an individual’s characteristics and behaviour could be explained by 
ADHD” (p. 7). Some were afraid that the diagnosis could turn into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy if their possibilities in life were underestimated because of the diagnosis 
and if knowledge about difficulties associated with ADHD would result in loss of 
self-confidence and lack of courage to explore new possibilities. “One could lose 
one’s freedom and start living according to the diagnosis, letting the diagnosis guide 
one’s choices and thereby avoiding things which are considered difficult or 
impossible for people with ADHD” (p. 9). And lastly, even if the diagnosis was a 
great help to many in terms of giving access to resources and knowledge about 
themselves, their reactions and opportunities for managing situations in new and 
more strategic ways, some interviewees also reported disappointment with being left 
without the expected help after being assigned the diagnosis (p. 8). Young and 
colleagues report a similar disappointment following not only the diagnosis but also 
specifically the medication. Though the medication had a positive impact on the 
interviewees’ ability to function more successfully in their everyday lives, diagnosis 
and treatment with medication were not sufficient to overcome their experienced 
difficulties (Young, Bramham, Gray, & Rose, 2008, p. 498). 
4.4. CONCERNS ABOUT STIGMATIZATION  
The last main subject presented in the literature about adults’ experiences with being 
diagnosed with ADHD deals with concerns about stigmatization. Young and 
colleagues list the issue as part of their third theme about considerations of the future 
and describe how the participants were concerned that others may perceive them 
differently following the diagnosis (p. 497). Similarly, Andersen describes how the 
interviewees are afraid that others will connect the ADHD diagnosis to categories of 
being mentally ill and unstable and that the diagnosis will be used against them in 
that respect (Andersen, 2009, p. 111). Again, Andersen points to the dilemma 
between demanding the diagnosis in order to get relief and clarification and 
accepting the role offered by the diagnostic category that is associated with handicap 
and disability and potentially stigma (p. 118). Halleröd and colleagues refer to fear 
of discrimination because of the diagnosis as a big concern in the study. Some of the 
interviewees expressed worry that others, including authorities, would judge them 
by the diagnosis and treat them differently, resulting in difficulties with 
relationships, employment, insurance, and even getting a driving license (Halleröd, 
Anckarsäter, Råstam, & Scherman 2015, p. 9). To be able to pass, as Andersen 
describes it using Goffman’s concept, becomes important to adults diagnosed with 
ADHD in order not to be stigmatized due to their diagnosis. Toner and colleagues 
demonstrate that participants keep the diagnosis a secret from most people because 
they feel a lack of understanding about it as well as an unsympathetic attitude 
towards the disorder in society in general and in the media particularly (Toner 
O’Donoghue & Houghton, 2006, p. 257). The participants “pretend to be ok,” 
“winging it” (p. 257), and choose to hide the ADHD diagnosis, resulting in what 
Toner and colleagues describe as leading a double life. 
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4.5. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS TO THE EXISTING 
RESEARCH 
The current research on adults’ experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis informs 
us of both positive and negative consequences of being diagnosed with ADHD. The 
studies show quite concordant results and are primarily performed as interview 
studies, except Andersen’s study, which also includes observation studies and 
Fleischmann and Fleischmann’s study, which examines online narratives. I read 
these studies concurrently while doing my own research and I found that most of my 
findings were confirmed by these studies. Similar to the existing research, my 
informants told me about feelings of being different, experiences of failure, and 
about how the diagnosis helps them manage practices in more productive ways and 
not least how the diagnosis reduces blame and reconstructs new self-perceptions. 
My informants strategically chose whom to inform about the diagnosis, but 
generally, concerns about stigmatization are not dominant in the stories I was told 
about life with ADHD. Since my informants have experienced stigma in various 
degrees and ways throughout their life because of their differentness, the diagnosis 
is described as reducing stigma rather than enforcing it. The consequences of taking 
drugs, however, carry ambivalence due to experiences of radical changes in ways of 
perceiving, thinking, and acting. Receiving a diagnosis and drug treatment is a 
complex process that requires conditioning and experimenting with new 
opportunities. 
The existing research deals less with everyday life with ADHD, experiences with 
medication, understandings of the disorder and generally how adults engage with the 
diagnosis when interpreting themselves through the diagnosis. Psychologist Ilina 
Singh (2007; 2011; 2013) is one of the leading researchers studying children 
diagnosed with ADHD and their understanding of the diagnosis. From her fieldwork 
in UK primary schools, Singh (2011) draws attention to “ADHD as a lived 
experience in local contexts” (p. 889) and argues that the disorder not only resides in 
the child or is a consequence of narrowing surroundings that pathologizes certain 
behavior, but the disorder unfolds somewhere in the nexus of the two. Singh 
illustrates how children strategically use the ADHD diagnosis as a resource in order 
to explain behavior and morally disclaim responsibility, but also how they mobilize 
opportune behavior based on certain conceptions of what ADHD is. “Uncovering 
the social and moral dimensions of ADHD” (p. 890) in the spaces and relations in 
which it is expressed and negotiated is one of Singh’s agendas, and she demonstrates 
how children negotiate and consciously inhabit the diagnosis. Inspired by Singh, I 
wish to contribute to the existing literature on adults’ experiences of ADHD by 
examining how my informants creatively relate to and understand the diagnosis and 
how they experiment with practices and new ways of handling everyday problems 
following the diagnosis. From my longitude fieldwork and my analyses, the aim is 
to bring new perspectives of moral, bodily, and phenomenological aspects of life 
with ADHD to the existing literature.  
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CHAPTER 5. THEORETICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND: 
STUDYING EXPERIENCES OF ADHD 
“Is it a phenomenological project or is the project inspired by phenomenological 
perspectives and analyses?” a reviewer of one of my articles asked. I suddenly was 
not sure. Neither if I could subscribe to a specific scientific paradigm nor what the 
difference between a phenomenological and a phenomenology-inspired project was. 
I was studying experiences of ADHD and I was taking a first person perspective in 
my examination of ADHD. I was asking how we can understand the bodily 
experiences of what we call ADHD and the experiences of getting the diagnosis. 
Experience was a central concept, and following the anthropologist Michael Jackson 
(1996) who states that “phenomenology is the scientific study of experience” (p. 2), 
and that phenomenology seeks to describe “human consciousness in its lived 
immediacy” (p. 2), I considered my project a phenomenological project. I knew, 
however, that the concept of experience is intricate. Despite being a key concept in 
anthropology, the concept of experience is often taken for granted and it has 
remained largely unquestioned and unexamined (Throop, 2003). My use of the 
concept entails a broad spectrum of experiences ranging from bodily experiences of 
what we call ADHD to experiences of getting the diagnosis and using it as a tool for 
self-understanding and self-interpretation and I realized, after pondering over the 
reviewer’s question for a while, that I had to be more specific about the status of my 
project and about my conception of experience.  
In this section, I try to clarify what I mean by the concept of experience and how I 
position my project within a phenomenological framework. The following is not 
meant to be an exhaustive discussion of the notion of experience within 
anthropology and philosophy, but rather a selective excerpt of some of the central 
traditions and debates. According to anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup (1995), the 
notion of experience in anthropology is used both in the sense of the informant’s 
lived experience, comprising thoughts, desires, and words, and in the sense of the 
ethnographer’s shared experience with his or her informants as the initial step 
towards anthropological knowledge (p. 79). Studying experiences, then, entails 
attention to the informant’s lived experience as well as to the intersubjective process 
of studying experiences. I use this differentiation of how to understand experience 
and how to study experiences as my first approach to the concept. Lastly, I outline 
the theoretical perspective offered by philosopher Ian Hacking that has informed my 
thinking about the dynamics between diagnostic categories and individual 
experiences.  
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5.1. HOW TO UNDERSTAND EXPERIENCES? 
Jackson (2013) describes how entire domains of human experience were assigned to 
other disciplines in the formative years of establishing anthropology as a science. In 
the attempt to follow demands of objectivity from the natural sciences, the social 
sciences created an image of objectivity by reducing individuals to functions, roles, 
obligations, performers of rituals, and followers of rules and thereby deducting 
experience from people’s lives (p. 4). Today, however, anthropologists no longer see 
it as their task to discover hidden causes, structures, and meanings, but rather, 
inspired by phenomenology, to examine individuals as experiencing beings. The 
phenomenological turn calls for detailed descriptions of “how people immediately 
experience space, time, and the world in which they live” (p. 12), and to give 
ontological priority to what Husserl calls the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) over the world 
of theoretical thought and explanatory ideas. The task for anthropology, Jackson 
(1996) argues, is “to recover the sense in which experience is situated within 
relationships and between persons if the lifeworld is to be explored as a field of 
intersubjectivity and not reduced to objective structures or subjective intentions”(p. 
26). Individual experience is embedded in various contexts of interaction, 
recognition, and relationships, and if we only look at the individual as a product of 
social structures, we miss the chance of understanding human experiences. In my 
examination of ADHD, I am interested in understanding experiences of ADHD and 
not in explaining ADHD as a consequence of either medicalization of behavior or of 
neurological processes in the brain. My aim is to understand how experiences of 
ADHD unfold within various social contexts, and I thereby concur with the 
phenomenological ambition of examining experience. 
Phenomenology as a tradition is often portrayed as founded by Edmund Husserl and 
his ideas about human consciousness and experience as lived and embedded in the 
world. Husserl wanted to study the human as actively creating and being in the 
world instead of reducing the human to an object in the world (Jacobsen, Tanggaard 
& Brinkmann, 2010, p. 187). One of Husserls phenomenological successors is 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty who describes phenomenology as “an attempt 
to provide a direct description of our experience such as it is” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/2012, p.  Ixx). According to Merleau-Ponty, “phenomenology involves 
describing, and not explaining or analysing” (p. Ixxi), and the phenomenologist 
therefore needs to return to things themselves and not indulge in theoretical 
speculations. “Everything that I know about the world, even through science, I know 
from a perspective that is my own or from an experience of the world without which 
scientific symbols would be meaningless” (p. Ixxii), Merleau-Ponty argues. Science, 
from this perspective, is “the second order expression” (p. Ixxii) and simply an 
explanation of the world. To return to things themselves, therefore, is to “return to 
the world prior to knowledge” from a descriptive rather than an explanatory 
ambition. 
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Phenomenology conceives of the human as ontologically existing and experiencing 
in the world, which is captured by the concept of “being in the world.” The human 
being is immersed and shrouded in the world, and it makes no sense to differentiate 
between the world as it is and the world as it appears to human perception. As 
Merleau-Ponty writes: 
The world is not an object whose law of constitution I have in my 
possession it is the natural milieu and the field of all my thoughts and of 
all my explicit perceptions. Truth does not “dwell” in the “inner man”, or 
rather, there is no “inner man,” man is in and toward the world, and it is 
in the world that he knows himself (p. Ixxiv).  
The individual is not a solipsistic subject, but the individual is experiencing in the 
world and experiencing with others. According to the phenomenological analysis, 
the subject is not only for-itself, it is also for-others and aspects of both subjectivity 
and of things in the world are always related to the other (p. Ixxv). Referencing 
Heidegger, Jackson (2013) describes how “our own world (eigenwelt) is 
inextricably tied up with the world of others (mitwelt) and the physical environment 
of which we are also vitally a part (umwelt)” (p. 5). As individuals we “live 
intentionally and in tensions with others as well as with the world” (p. 5) in what is 
described as an intersubjective being in the world. Our relationships with the world 
and with others are relations of “inter-est” and “inter-existence” (p. 5), Jackson 
emphasizes, and we are therefore not a stable set of pieces with established essences 
or identities, but we are constantly changing and formed through our relationship 
with the world and others. The term intersubjectivity points to the notion of the 
subject as continuously in dialogue and the term thereby, as Jackson writes, invites 
us to explore 
the subtle negotiations and alterations of subjective experience as we 
interact with one another, intervocally or dialogically (in conversations 
and confrontations), intercorporeally (in dancing, moving, fighting, or 
competing), an introceptively (in getting what we call a sense of the 
other’s intentions, frame of mind, or worldview) (p. 5). 
Even if phenomenology calls for a first person perspective when studying 
experiences, experiences, from this perspective, are conceived as intersubjectively 
and intercorporeally embedded. Experiences are contextualized, situated and social, 
as well as shared with others and emerging out of engagement and interactions with 
the world and others. 
5.2. EXPERIENCES OF SUFFERING IN MEDICAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
The social dimension of experience is often emphasized in anthropological 
literature, and Hastrup (1995) even proposes using the concept ‘social experience’ as 
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a replacement of ‘lived experience’ since experience is always mediated by a 
socially based interpretation (p. 84). I, however, stick to the term experience, 
implicitly recognizing the intersubjective character of experience. 
Within medical anthropology, research on illness experiences also points to the 
social aspect of experiences. Medical anthropologists “explore the organization of 
sentience, of experience, as well as the object of experience, the contours of the 
world as experienced and responded to, as well as the organization and shaping of 
experience,” as anthropologist Byron Good writes (1994b, p. 37). According to 
Kleinmann, Brodwin, Good and Good (1994), for example, “the experience of 
chronic pain is fundamentally intersubjective” (p. 9). Chronic pain not only affects 
the suffering individual, but chronic pain also has a profound effect on the lives of 
the relatives and friends, who in turn “shape the experimental world of the sufferer” 
(p. 9). Therefore, to simply look at etiological mechanisms eschews what is essential 
in experience of pain, namely the “relationship between neurobiological and social 
psychological processes” (p. 9). Likewise, Jenkins (2015), referencing Hallowell’s 
notion of experience as culturally constituted, argues that conditions of mental 
illness must be understood as engaging fundamental human processes, formed by 
culture, biology, and psyche (p. 2). Mental illness exists in families, in romantic 
relations, and at work and manifests itself as a struggle, thwarting expectations and 
desires to navigate in these relations (p. 88). Therefore, in order to understand 
experiences of mental illness, we need to comprehend the social and cultural 
premises for experiences. From her research on mental illnesses, and especially 
experiences of psychoses and trauma, Jenkins argues that “there is no such thing as 
individual pathology insofar as the sociocultural milieu profoundly affects the 
formation of subjective experience” (p. 71). Situations of mental illness are 
“constituted by intersubjectivity, social and economic conditions of possibility and 
constraint, and the shaping of cultural expectations of persons in relation to gender, 
mental, and political status” (p. 3). Describing how informants diagnosed with 
schizophrenia conceive of their disorder, Jenkins illustrates that “cultural 
conceptions of mental illness play a role in shaping how illness is experienced” (p. 
38-39). As an example, her research shows that while Euro-Americans conceive of 
their disorder as a product of a chemical imbalances in the brain, African-Americans 
are more likely to speak of their disorder as a product of bodily instability and 
imbalance connected to social problems and family struggles (p. 37). “The metaphor 
has penetrated into the lived experience” (ibid, p. 39), Jenkins writes, pointing to the 
relation between cultural conceptions of illnesses and how experiences are shaped. 
As noted by Lakoff and Johnson (1994), metaphors both express and structure our 
perception of the world and way of navigating in it, and in Jenkins’s description, 
concepts and metaphors both reflect and shape experiences of illness.  
Jenkins’ cultural approach to comprehending experiences of mental illness 
resembles Kleinman’s (1994) emphasis on human suffering as embedded in “local 
moral worlds” (p. 172), understood as the microcontext that mediates the 
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relationship between societal and personal processes. According to Kleinman, local 
moral worlds are “particular, intersubjective, and constitutive of lived flow of 
experience” (p. 172). Experiences of illness, constructed in local moral worlds, are 
only part subjective, since the experiencing individual continuously orients him or 
herself in the world based on a moral sensibility to the local world (p. 173). 
Universal situations of for example death, disaffection and disease, are experienced 
as particular forms of bereavement, pain and suffering. Jenkins’ and Kleinman’s 
analyses both teach us about the intersubjective aspect of experience, but they also 
encourage us as researchers to examine the local context of the experiencing 
individual. “To understand what chronic pain signifies, what its experience is like, 
ethnographers must work out a background for understanding of local knowledge 
and daily practices concerning the body and the self, and of misfortune, suffering 
and aspiration generally” Kleinman (1994, p. 173) writes. Hence, how we 
conceptualize and understand the concept of experience involves specific ways of 
examining experience.  
In my fieldwork, I came to learn that experiences of ADHD were intertwined with 
the desire of being a good parent, of wanting to navigate in society, of keeping a job, 
maintaining friendships, and of being accepted. Taking drugs and experiencing a 
newfound calmness when reading bedtime stories for one’s children render the quest 
for being a good parent possible, as I describe in the article “Structuring the self: 
moral implications of getting an ADHD diagnosis.” Experiences of restlessness and 
having the feeling of being socially out of sync with people around you provoke the 
feeling of being different and misunderstood, as I describe in the second article: 
“ADHD and temporality: a desynchronized way of being in the world.” And 
experiencing ADHD as both a way of being human and as an entity to distance 
from, illustrate how scientific and public explanations of ADHD form ways of 
understanding oneself, as I describe in the third article: “My ADHD and me: 
Identifying with and distancing from ADHD.” Whether I examine bodily 
experiences of ADHD or experiences of getting and relating to the diagnosis, 
experiences of ADHD are socially embedded. My informants orient themselves in 
the world based on expectations from themselves and others and their experiences of 
ADHD are shaped by and situated within relations to others. Certain ways of being 
in the world and certain ways of understanding oneself are available within local 
contexts, and experiences of ADHD exist within these particular circumstances. In 
my analyses, it has been my ambition to focus on my informants’ particular 
experiences, understanding these experiences in relation to social relations, family 
struggles, and cultural explanations of suffering, and expectations of being human 
without understanding these experiences as simply products of social and cultural 
dynamics but rather in constant relation to these.  
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5.3. HOW TO STUDY EXPERIENCES?  
While the above perspectives on experience focus on the intersubjective aspects of 
experience, the debate over how or whether we can even study and understand 
experiences is almost inevitable, and I will continue by briefly outlining some of the 
arguments in this methodological discussion.  
Merleau-Ponty discusses Husserl’s notion of the phenomenological reduction and 
the phenomenologist’s ability to “loosen the intentional threads that connects us to 
the world in order to make them appear” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. Ixxvii). 
Normally, we are unaware of our engagement with the world, but in order to 
describe worldly phenomena, we need to distance ourselves from our being in the 
world. “Because we are through and through related to the world, the only way for 
us to catch sight of ourselves is by suspending this movement, by refusing to be 
complicit with it (…), or again, to put it put of play” (p. Ixxvii), Merleau-Ponty 
writes. Within anthropological terms, Jackson describes the phenomenological 
method as implying a practical relativism in which questions concerning the status 
of ideas and beliefs are set aside in order to fully do justice to the way people 
experience the world (Jackson, 1996, p. 10). This process of distancing does not 
entail a full transcendence, but rather a disengagement from one’s own being in the 
world, and Jackson thereby transforms the philosophical question of the individual’s 
ability to bracket his or her own perception of the world into applied anthropology 
and a method for understanding others’ experiences. Especially scholars in 
anthropology advocating for an interpretive approach, however, question whether 
the phenomenological reduction is the key for anthropology when understanding 
experiences. Instead, it is stated, we should focus on different forms of expressions 
of experiences. 
Anthropologist Victor Turner (1986) is often referenced in anthropological research 
on experience. Emphasizing the individual’s searching for meaning and the 
symbolic meaning of expressions, Turner draws on a hermeneutical approach, and 
especially on philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey when understanding experiences. 
Dilthey is known for contributing to the hermeneutic tradition with an interest in the 
interpretive study of human behavior and of pointing to the social and historical 
contexts as essential factors when interpreting meaning (Pahuus, 1995, p. 112). 
While philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher suggests that projection into the mind 
of the other is possible due to preexisting connections among all individuals, Dilthey 
on the other hand, argues that understanding is not merely based on contact between 
individual minds, but understanding is rather based on a reconstruction of the 
historical process that shapes expressions of experiences (Packer, 2011, p. 89). 
Following philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, Turner makes a distinction between mere 
“experience” and “an experience,” mere experience being “simply the passive 
endurance and acceptance of events”, while an experience is the “structure of 
experience” (Turner 1986, p. 35). We constantly try to find meaning in experiences, 
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in what has disconcerted us, and by that we turn mere experience into an experience 
(p. 36). Hence, mere “experience” is the individual experience and “an experience” 
is the articulation of experience into an expression (Bruner, 1986, p. 6). “While all 
of us have experiences all the time,” Hastrup interprets Turner, “an experience is cut 
loose from the chronological stream in a non-arbitrary fashion” (Hastrup, 1995, p. 
84, italics in original). Turner explains, again referencing Dilthey, how “experience 
urges toward expression, or communication with others” (p. 37). As social beings, 
we express our experiences through language and through different sources of 
aesthetic forms as for example social dramas and rituals, as Turner specifically 
focuses on.  
Within anthropology, the question of how to study experiences is widely discussed. 
The difficulty with experience, anthropologist Edward Bruner (1986) writes, is “that 
we can only experience our own life, what is received by our own consciousness” 
(p. 5). Even if the anthropologist and the informant tasted the same bowl of rice, as 
anthropologist Tamara Kohn (1994) says, it would be impossible to know, if they 
had shared the same experience. “The ‘other’s’ sensory experience, whether or not 
there is a vocabulary to describe it, can never be completely shared, only imagined” 
(p. 20). Others may be willing to share their experiences, but “experience has to be 
turned into expression to become part of ethnography” Hastrup and Hervik argue 
(1994, p. 8). What Turner calls mere experience is impossible to grasp by the 
anthropologist, and we therefore need to “transcend the narrow sphere of experience 
by interpreting expressions” (Bruner, 1986, p. 5). The relation between experience 
and its expressions, however, is dialogic and dialectical since “experience structures 
expressions (ibid, p. 6), but “expressions also structure experience,” as Bruner states 
(p. 6). Hence, life as lived, life as experienced, and life as expressed are inevitably 
not the same, but are interrelated. We understand other people’s expressions based 
on our own experiences, just as cultural and historical narratives, rituals and 
different forms of art illuminate experiences, Bruner says. This relation between 
narrative expressions is examined by, among others, Good (1994a), who explores 
“how illness narratives are structured in cultural terms, and how these reflect or give 
form to distinctive modes of lived experience” (p. 136). Good asks if the stories he 
is told by his informants are “reports of experience” or if they are largely “governed 
by a typical cultural form or narrative structure” (p. 138) and concludes by stating 
that “narrative is a form in which experience is represented and recounted” (p. 139). 
Similarly, anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly (1998) points to the dialectics in how 
“narratives are not just about experiences. Experiences are, in a sense, about 
narratives. That is narratives are not primarily after-the-fact imitations of the 
experiences they recount” (p. 19). These perspectives seem to not only claim that 
experiences are possible to examine through expressions of different sorts, but 
expressions, in the form of narratives, even have the ability to structure experiences. 
Often referenced are discussions of the anthropologist’s access to experience 
presented by anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1993) who represents an interpretative 
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approach to the study of experiences, and anthropologist Renato Rosaldo 
(1984/2004) who advocates for a descriptive and yet emotional approach. Geertz, 
like the anthropologists mentioned above, argues that the ethnographer cannot 
perceive what the informants perceive (Geertz, 1993, p. 58).  
We cannot live other people’s lives, and it is a piece of bad faith if we 
try. We can but listen to what, in words, in images, in actions, they say 
about their lives (…) Whatever sense we have of how things stand with 
someone else’s inner life, we gain it through their expression, not 
through some magical intrusion into their consciousness (Geertz, 1986, 
p. 373).  
Instead of trying to grasp the native’s point of view, as he says, referencing 
Malinowski, the ethnographer must interpret the symbols by and through which the 
informant perceives in the form of rituals, texts, and narratives. Rosaldo, on the 
other hand, criticizes the interpretive ethnography for adding meaning to 
experiences that might not be recognizable to the informant. Rather, the 
ethnographer must try to capture the experience of his or her informants by taking 
their descriptions literally (Rosaldo, 1984/2004, p. 580). There is no meaning behind 
the descriptions, no hidden truth to be revealed. Rosaldo further argues that 
comprehending experiences depends on a common frame of understanding and that 
he did not understand the rage that follows bereavement and leads to headhunting – 
a phenomenon he had been studying for a long time – until he lost his wife and 
experienced the complexity of rage and sorrow (p. 580). His inability to conceive 
the force of anger in grief, at the beginning of his research, led him to seek another 
level of analysis in order to provide an explanation of the desire to headhunt. 
However, by being repositioned through the experience of loss, he understood the 
literal sense of anger and headhunting, which he never would have understood 
through a symbolic analysis of the phenomenon, he claims.  
Rosaldo’s argument makes the project of understanding experiences complicated if 
we as researchers need to personally share experiences with our informants in order 
to understand their experiences. And even if we share experiences, how can we 
know, as mentioned by Geertz and Bruner, if we actually understand the other’s 
experience? I position myself between a phenomenological and a hermeneutical 
tradition. I follow the phenomenological ambition of studying lived experience 
“before it is subject to theoretical elaboration or conceptual systematizing”, as 
Jackson (1996) states, as I wish to understand my informants’ being in the world, 
their experiences of restlessness and of being different without having a prearranged 
analytical model to understand these experiences into. I enter the field with an 
ambition of bracketing my pre-understandings of ADHD and theories about 
medicalization of behavior, and I enter the field as a person, who draws upon my 
own experiences when trying to understand my informants’ experiences. I sit with 
my informants, I listen to their stories, and I sense the restlessness they verbally and 
bodily express. However, I also agree with the hermeneutical approach that 
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recognizes experiences as already interpreted in the informants’ expressions and that 
the analytical process in research implicitly entails an interpretive processing. I 
access experiences through different forms of expression; verbally in the form of 
narratives and metaphorical descriptions; bodily in ways of talking and being in the 
room; and figuratively from the use of pictures of ADHD often shared on the 
Internet and used by my informants. Social and cultural forms of expression shape 
my informants’ expressions, as noted by Good, and I try to interpret these 
expressions based on my personal and anthropological capabilities. Both approaches 
consider the individual to be situated in the world and ascertain that human thoughts 
are always about something, experiences are always of something, and actions are 
always directed towards something. Experiences are socially embedded and the 
individual relates to the world and experiences in contexts. Similarly, I understand 
and examine experiences.  
5.4. EXPERIENCES INFORMED BY DIAGNOSES 
Based on studies of several disorders ranging from multiple personality disorder to 
obesity and the now commonly forgotten disorder fugue, philosopher Ian Hacking is 
one of the researchers who has contributed a conceptual framework for 
understanding the dynamics between diagnostic categories and individual 
experiences. Hacking does not account for his use of the concept experiences, but 
his descriptions of the effects of diagnoses on individual’s experiences have been 
helpful in my examination of experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis. 
In his book “Mad Travelers” (1998) Hacking describes the man Albert, who was 
compulsively traveling around Europe in the late 1880’s in a state of obscured 
consciousness, forgetting where he had been. Albert was committed to a psychiatric 
hospital and became the first patient ever diagnosed with fugue for what was 
considered mad traveling (p. 8). After the publication of a thesis describing fugue in 
1987 and subsequently recognition of fugue as a medical disorder of its own, the 
diagnosis soon started to spread across Europe. Today, however, the diagnosis no 
longer appears in the diagnostic manuals and it seems to be forgotten. So how is 
that? Hacking argues that fugue is a “transient mental illness,” which is “an illness 
that appears at a time, in a place, and later fades away. It may spread from place to 
place and reappear from time to time” (p. 1). A transient mental illness reflects what 
is considered pathological at a certain place and time. Illnesses come and go, 
diagnostic categories change and social and cultural circumstances foster new ways 
of being ill. As a contemporary example, Hacking points to ADHD as a diagnostic 
category just recently emerged. We have known about fidgety children for a long 
time, but since ADHD is a relatively new diagnosis, both researchers and lay people 
question if it is a real disorder or if it is a social construction. This question, 
however, leads to banal discussions, Hacking claims, and he suggests we rather try 
to understand the contexts in which certain mental illnesses thrive and examine the 
mechanisms of how diagnoses and individuals interact (p. 1). Hacking argues that  
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one fruitful idea for understanding transient mental illness is the 
ecological niche, not just social, not just medical, not just coming from 
the patient, not just from the doctors, but from the concatenation of an 
extraordinarily large number of diverse types of elements, which for a 
moment provide a stable home for certain types of manifestations of 
illness (p. 13).  
Fugue emerged as a diagnosis in an age of tourism, when art and literature depicted 
adventurous journeys, but also in a time when the idea of the criminal vagrant scared 
people. Niches depend on a set of vectors or circumstances and the cultural polarity 
between tourism and vagrancy created a space for fugue as a phenomenon. Another 
vector is observability, and Hacking illustrates how demands of people carrying 
their papers of identification made it possible to trace people’s wandering (p. 68). 
Only by taking these vectors into consideration and understanding the niches within 
diagnoses emerge is it possible to understand why diagnoses suddenly emerge and 
why some only shortly thereafter disappear again from the diagnostic manuals and 
as a category to identify with.  
To examine how people diagnosed with fugue responded to the diagnosis is difficult 
since data mostly describe the process from the doctors’ perspective. The voices of 
people diagnosed with multiple personality disorder (MPD), however, are present in 
various media, TV-shows and on the Internet. These expressions illustrate how 
diagnoses are “making up people,” as Hacking calls it. People diagnosed with 
multiple personality disorder talk about being MPD and refer to the diagnosis when 
describing their experiences. From the moment the diagnosis was recognized, it 
offered a category to fit into, and MPD became a way of experiencing and of being 
human. Hacking lists two statements to illustrate his point:  
A) There were no multiple personalities in 1955; there were many in 
1985 
B) In 1955 this was not a way to be a person, people did not experience 
themselves this way, they did not interact with their friends, their 
families, their employers, their counsellors, in this way; but in 1985 
this was a way to be a person, to experience oneself, to live in 
society (Hacking, 2007, p. 299). 
In the case of MPD, both statements are true, however, the first being too brief and 
contentious, Hacking says (Hacking, 2007, p. 299). While an enthusiast for MPD 
would say that option A is false because of its rejection of people experiencing alter 
personalities before the diagnoses was established, a skeptic would, likewise, claim 
that option A is false, but from the opposite reason, arguing that MPD has always 
been a specious diagnosis and that there were no MPDs after the diagnosis was 
established either. Rather than discussing the status of the diagnosis, Hacking is 
concerned with option B and the process of how new kinds of being emerge. In 
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Hacking’s own words, he is interested in “the way that scientific knowledge about 
ourselves – the mere belief system – changes how we think of ourselves, the 
possibilities that are open to us, the kinds of people that we take ourselves and our 
fellows to be” (p. 10). Available descriptions in society offered by scientists, 
psychologists, therapists, media’s narratives etc. make certain ways of being and 
experiencing possible, and the classifications into which we are put or put ourselves 
into, thus, have a formative effect on how we understand ourselves (Hacking, 1995). 
These kinds of beings are moving targets, constantly interacting with the 
classifications and the scientific knowledge attached to it in a dialectical relation or 
as a product or what Hacking calls “looping effect.” When diagnosing, diagnosis 
and individual interact and inter-affect each other as the individual mirrors itself in 
the diagnosis and interprets him or herself accordingly and likewise the diagnosis 
reflects the individual’s symptoms. In the case of MPD, Hacking illustrates how 
patients started to report more and more alter personalities and how the diagnostic 
descriptions were changed in order to meet the patients’ symptoms (Hacking 2007). 
Hence, new ways of understanding and describing the illness alter as new ways of 
suffering change and vice versa. 
5.5. EXPERIENCES OF ADHD 
Hacking offers an interesting and compelling argument about the dialectic relation 
between diagnostic categories and individual experiences. While studies of 
medicalization processes primarily investigate the social, cultural, and political 
circumstances surrounding the individual that promote the emergence of diagnosis, 
Hacking contributes with a framework for understanding the dynamic relation 
between diagnosis and individual. However, something in the process of making up 
people is left in a black box, and we only briefly learn about the individual’s 
experiences and the process of how the individual transforms into this new way of 
being human. Philosopher Serife Tekin (2014) critiques Hacking for claiming that 
diagnoses change individuals’ sense of self without offering a clear account of what 
the self is and how exactly labelling processes change the subject’s sense of self and 
she contributes to Hacking’s framework with a psychological concept of the self. In 
my analyses of ADHD, I contribute with an anthropological and phenomenological 
examination of how the individual experiences symptoms related to ADHD and how 
they experience getting the diagnosis. I investigate the making up process, the 
everyday changes following a diagnosis, how explanations of the diagnosis are 
received and acted upon, and how the diagnosis offers a narrative to understand 
oneself by. Jutel describes how diagnoses rearrange identity as the diagnosis lets you 
become someone with that particular disorder; Rose argues that modern individuals 
have come to understand themselves in terms of their neurobiology; and Hacking 
claims that diagnoses are making new ways of being a person, of experiencing 
oneself, and of living in society available. Inspired by these perspectives, but 
focusing specifically on the individual’s experiences, I examine the complexity of 
socially and culturally embedded experiences of ADHD. 
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CHAPTER 6. STUDY DESIGN, 
METHODS, AND HOW I GAINED 
KNOWLEDGE 
For anthropology, ethnography remains vital, not because ethnographic 
methods guarantee certain knowledge of others but because ethnographic 
fieldwork brings us into direct dialogue with others, affording us 
opportunities to explore knowledge not as something that grasps inherent 
and hidden truths but as an intersubjective process of sharing experience, 
comparing notes, exchanging ideas, and finding common ground. In this 
process our social gumption and social skills, as much as our scientific 
methodology, becomes measures of the limits and value of our 
understanding (Jackson, 1996, p. 8, italics in original).  
Jackson describes the anthropological project and the ambition of gaining 
knowledge as a process that not only requires specific techniques, but also entails an 
involvement as an individual with the field and people of the study. We enter the 
field as a person with feelings and ways of communicating and we bring our cultural 
and social background into the field. We must “give up the illusion that it is possible 
to absent ourselves from the constraints of history and the contingencies of our 
situation” Jackson (1996, p. 9) argues. We may try to see the world from the point of 
the other and try to disengage from our own perspective, but we can never achieve 
full transcendence and gain an overarching perspective. Exploring a field and 
gaining knowledge, therefore, must be an intersubjective process of exploration and 
interchanging views.  
Similarly, Hastrup (2010) defines the anthropological project as a not only a matter 
of collecting data but also of producing knowledge. We go into a field, collect data, 
and produce a tacit knowledge about the field. We usually consider our knowledge 
as based on our data, but knowledge is much more than data, Hastrup argues. While 
data is the material you as a fieldworker collect from interviews and observations, 
knowledge is somewhat different. By situating yourself in a field and participating 
in activities along with you informants, you acquire a profound knowledge about the 
field and the interpersonal meanings produced in interactions between people and 
between people and society. This personal insight, when you as a researcher are 
embedded in the field, is the essence of knowledge production (p. 55). Knowledge is 
gained over time and through intersubjective processes and is not out in the field, 
awaiting discovery by application of a particular technique (Baarts, 2010; 
Gudemand & Rivera, 1995). To gain anthropological knowledge, however, is not 
the same as cultural knowledge, anthropologist Peter Hervik (1994) states, and he 
differentiates between knowing in the sense of knowing a particular social space as a 
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native and understanding it as analysts (p. 89). Through shared reasoning and shared 
social experiences, however, the basis for acquiring local knowledge expands, but 
“it still does not take the full step from ‘knowing’ the social space as participants to 
‘understanding’ as detached analyst” (p. 90). As I pointed out in the previous 
chapter, I do not claim to be able to experience what my informants experience, and 
neither do I claim to hold the same knowledge about ADHD as my informants, but I 
definitely have gained knowledge about ADHD through my fieldwork that has led 
me to a different kind of understanding of ADHD than any books or statistics could 
ever provide. 
In my analyses of adults’ experiences of ADHD I primarily use data from interviews 
with my informants. The interview data, however, is supplemented with and 
interpreted on the basis of knowledge I have gained through hanging out with 
informants, chatting with them on Facebook, following them to the doctor, talking to 
their relatives, and attending seminars and conferences about ADHD. Following the 
above anthropologists, I consider fieldwork as an intersubjective process of 
exchanging and challenging experiences and perceptions. In the following sections, I 
outline which methods I have used, the ways I have gained knowledge about adults’ 
experiences of ADHD, and what difficulties and ethical dilemmas I have 
encountered during the research process. 
6.1. DEFINING MY FIELD 
My fieldwork is not a classic ethnographic fieldwork in which I engage in a 
community and accommodate myself into the new surroundings, but it is more of a 
fragmented fieldwork, or what has been called a multi-sided fieldwork (Hannerz, 
2006; Marcus, 1998), taking place in many different settings and among people with 
no obvious other resemblances or connections than the fact that they share the same 
diagnosis and nationality. When I started my project, my intention was to collect 
data from newspapers, attend support groups for adults diagnosed with ADHD and 
medical classes at the university about mental illnesses, and to interview adults 
diagnosed with ADHD. Inspired by Martin (2007) and her work on manic 
depression, I wanted to create a collage of how ADHD is represented and 
experienced in Denmark, including very different kinds of methods and data. But 
even if my project changed to focus more on experiences of ADHD and less on 
representations of ADHD, as I describe in in the introduction, I still use the 
knowledge gained from reading newspapers and attending seminars on ADHD as a 
background for understanding the debates surrounding ADHD that my informants 
also relate and refer to. I examine experiences of ADHD in a time and place when 
ADHD is highly debated, and my informants often mentioned the general critique of 
ADHD as a trending diagnosis, making the debates and common explanations a 
natural subject for conversation. My extended field, then, is what I have previously 
referred to as a diagnostic culture, in which psychiatric diagnoses are used as tools 
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for understanding oneself, and more specifically, my field is a diagnostic category 
that people relate to in certain ways.  
Hannerz (2006) outlines the general shift in anthropological fieldwork from being 
geographically bounded to being multi-sided (p. 23). Following this shift, the 
traditional “anthropology of immersion,” when the anthropologist is involved to the 
point of almost going native, is replaced by an “anthropology by appointment,” 
referring to the reality that access to informants is often limited, regulated and timed 
(p. 34). The notion of immersion implies that the field exists as a fixed entity, 
awaiting discovery and independent of the fieldworker’s engagement (Amit, 1999, 
p. 6), and the ambition of being immersed might therefore always have been an 
illusion. Similarly, Marcus (1998) suggests that the idea of rapport and that 
identification with informants is the only access to real knowledge, needs to be 
replaced by a relation based on complicity and collaboration with the informants. 
My fieldwork has been anthropology by appointment, in the form of participating in 
seminars, in doctor’s appointments, and in scheduled interviews. I have entered the 
field in limited periods of time and withdrawn from it afterwards. But still, my 
informants have offered me stories about their life with ADHD and I have been 
challenged on my knowledge of ADHD. 
6.2. RECRUITING INFORMANTS 
As I described in the introduction to this thesis, my knowledge about ADHD at the 
beginning of this project was limited to research about the emergence of diagnoses 
and I had no personal experiences with ADHD and knew no one (as far as I know) 
diagnosed with ADHD at that time. I was dealing with a diagnosis widely debated in 
the media, but the voice of the people diagnosed was rarely spoken, so I decided to 
begin with the people in concern. It was my intention to slowly start interviewing in 
order to get a hold on what ADHD was, what concerns the diagnosed had, and let 
these first insight direct my research.  
I used two different channels for recruiting informants: Firstly, I was in contact with 
a clinic of general practitioners in a socially disadvantaged neighborhood through 
the Diagnostic Culture research group, and they offered to ask patients diagnosed 
with ADHD in their clinic if they wanted to participate in my research. Secondly, I 
posted a request for informants on a Facebook forum for adults diagnosed with 
ADHD. The clinic opened their doors for me, allowed me to participate in 
consultations when the patient accepted it, and helped establish contacts with some 
of their patients. At first hand, patients were interested in participating in the project 
and they were very open about my presence in the consultation room, but I came to 
learn that arranging time for an interview was more problematic. Some never 
responded to my phone calls or text messages, and some declared afterwards that 
they already had too many activities, but finally, three people from the clinic 
participated in the project. My post on Facebook was met with tremendous interest 
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and enthusiasm about participating in the project, and within a couple of days I had 
more than two handfuls of appointments in the pipeline. Some were curious about 
knowing more about ADHD and saw their participation as an exploring element in 
their own research about ADHD (and I had to remind them that they were the 
experts and I was the novice), while others were motivated by the possibility of 
telling their story to the public (and I had to inform them about the limitations of a 
Ph.D. project). Like my experience from the clinic, however, not all arrangements 
were possible to settle and I ended up with seven informants from the online forum 
who participated in my research. Additionally, one informant became part of the 
project after an ADHD seminar where my supervisor was doing a presentation, a 
friend of an informant joined, and yet another contacted me after reading about the 
project while researching information about ADHD.  
My criteria for choosing informants were firstly that they needed to be diagnosed as 
adults (after turning 18 years); secondly, I wanted to have equally as many men and 
woman; and lastly, I wished to have informants within a broad age span (at least 20 
years). These criteria were not based on an ambition of specifically investigating 
gender14, class, or social aspects15 of ADHD, but rather it was my intention to 
include a broad range of informants. Even if the common characteristic of my 
informants was the fact that they were diagnosed with ADHD and I was trying to 
identify patterns in experiences of ADHD, I was aware of not identifying my 
informants as a particular social group (Amit, 1999, p. 14; Gulløv & Højlund, 2003, 
p. 349), and I wanted to represent and leave room for each informant and their 
particular experiences in my analysis of ADHD.  
After unfortunately losing contact with potential informants, I ended up with 13 
informants participating in my project: five men and eight women, aged 26-45 years. 
They had all been diagnosed with ADHD within five years except for two 
informants who were diagnosed seven to eight years ago. The informants were 
occupied within a wide range of professions, from working in sales, being a social 
and health care assistant, working as a mechanic, working as an IT technician, being 
in a working ability testing program, and being a student. 
  
                                                            
14 Gender ratio estimates of prevalence of ADHD says 2:1 or 3:1 for males and females, and 
some studies even claim that the ratio is 1:1 among adults (Owens, Cardoos & Hinshaw, 
2015, p. 242). I do not explicitly deal with the gender issue, partly because I do not have 
enough data to support gender differences and partly because the gender aspect did not figure 
as a distinctive theme in my informants’ narratives. 
15 Research shows a significant overrepresentation of people diagnosed with ADHD in 
prisons compared to the general population (Berger, 2015). 
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All my informants had been on sick leave at least once due to stress or depression 
and the ADHD diagnosis was often received following this period. As an example, 
one of my informants, who I call Christian, told me the story of how he had 
experienced periods of unhappiness and of not functioning well, as he describes it, 
throughout his life. He remembers being bullied as a child, because he was different 
from the other children, and when he started studying, the pressure of administrating 
reading schedules and deadlines became too overwhelming. First, he was diagnosed 
with depression and was taking anti-depressants, but the bad periods kept returning 
and he had to quit his studies. Only then was he referred to a psychiatrist, who 
diagnosed him with ADHD. Another circumstance for getting the ADHD diagnosis 
was the diagnosing of a child, which was the case for five of my informants. As an 
example, a woman, who I call Judith, explained how the diagnosing of her son made 
her research ADHD and she was not only able to mirror her son but also herself in 
the diagnosis. Recognizing herself in the symptom descriptions made her see a 
psychiatrist, who diagnosed her with ADHD. 
Anthropologist Ton Otto (1997) warns fellow anthropologists about basing research 
on informants whose views “may not be typical for his or her society, or may 
represent the perspective of a particular group” (p. 98). Considering the number of 
potential informants who showed enthusiasm for the project and contacted me based 
on the Facebook post, but whom I lost contact with despite numerous phone calls 
and text messages or who let me know that they were going through a difficult patch 
and therefore could not participate, my informants may represent some of the more 
Name         Age      Occupation             Years since    Family relations               Interviews  
                                                                   diagnosis 
Peter 26 Mechanic 1 Lives with wife and two children 3 
Karen 45 Health care assistant 4 ½ Lives with her three children 1 
Ann 39 Working in health care ½ Lives with her three children 1 
Susan 42 In work ability testing 2 Lives with her two children 1 
Kenny 37 Pedagogue                7 Lives with girlfriend and child 2 
Thomas 38 Warehouse operator 5 Lives with his two children 1 
John 35 Working in sales 4 Lives with wife and two children 2 
Susie 43 Health care assistant ½  Lives alone 3 
Louise 26 Student 3 Lives with boyfriend 1 
Christian 33 Working with IT 4 Lives alone 1 
Jenny  28 Student ½  Lives with boyfriend 1 
Kelly 26 Student 3 ½  Lives with boyfriend 3 
Judith 45 Self-employed 7-8 Lives alone 1 
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advantaged people diagnosed with ADHD (even if they also had difficult periods 
during the period I came to know them). Moreover, the informants I recruited from 
the online forum all chose to participate in a forum debating ADHD related issues 
and to actively contact me. Hence, using this channel for recruitment gave me access 
to people who actively relate to the diagnosis, search for information, and benefit 
from discussing the diagnosis with others, and precludes me from getting access to 
people diagnosed with ADHD who are less concerned with the diagnosis or maybe 
even oppose the diagnosis. This may also account for the lack of concerns about 
stigmatization among my informants and their general gratification with being 
diagnosed, as I briefly describe in chapter 4. The people I have interviewed, have all 
had the surplus of mental resources to respond to my request, arrange a meeting, and 
talk to me about their thoughts and everyday practices. 
6.3. INTERVIEWING, BEING WITH, AND DOING OBSERVATIONS 
Doing fieldwork is a “way of doing” and “a way of learning and conversing” 
(Gudeman & Rivera, 1995). It is an encounter between anthropologist and 
informant, and during my fieldwork, I have continuously had the ambition of doing 
research in collaboration with my informants. We have shared views, they have told 
me their stories, and I have presented my ideas, which they have challenged and 
help me modify. 
6.3.1. INTERVIEWING 
Following Kvale and Brinkmann (2009), I consider the interview to be a situation of 
an “Inter View” understood as “an inter-change of views” (p. 2). From this 
perspective, the interview represents the interaction between two people as well as 
the production of knowledge constructed between the two (p. 2). I did my first 
interview three months after I started my project and the last interview seven months 
before I handed in the thesis. The longitude fieldwork of almost two and a half years 
made it possible for me to reflect on the first interviews, make corrections to the 
interview guide based on my experience using it, develop new interests from the 
stories I was told, and share my initial analyses with my informants.  
I conducted 21 interviews ranging from one to four hours. The level of structure 
varied in the interviews, some being closer to a conversation than an interview 
following a strict structure, but I chose to categorize conversations with my 
informants as interviews if they were recorded on my Dictaphone, were based on 
questions prepared in advance, and were transcribed afterwards. Eight of my 
informants were interviewed once, two were interviewed twice (two men) and three 
were interviewed three times (one man and two women). I wanted to keep contact 
and do follow-up interviews with a handful of my informants in order to elaborate or 
clarify subjects from the first interview and to get involved with and establish a 
closer relation with some of my informants, and it was my ambition was to re-
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interview at least two men and two women. I managed to maintain a fair gender 
ratio for my revisits, but pragmatism also settled whom I kept contact with as I again 
experienced cancellations when some were going through a bad period.   
The interviews were primarily conducted in the homes of the informants and I 
always initially suggested doing the interview in my informants’ home, since this 
location offered a natural opportunity for not only asking and answering questions, 
but also for observing and talking about everyday practices and routines. However, 
three informants preferred doing the interview in another place and one preferred 
doing the interview by the phone. A messy house and the flexibility of meeting in 
another place or talking by phone were mentioned as explanations for not doing the 
interviews at home, and I acknowledged that inviting a stranger into one’s home can 
be overwhelming or unwanted. Hence, one interview was conducted in my office at 
the university, one in my home, one at the local library, and one by phone. 
The first interview with each informant focused on the person’s life story, the 
diagnostic process, understandings of ADHD, what it meant to be diagnosed, 
everyday difficulties, and on the effects of medication; while the second and the 
third interview (with those who were interviewed more than once) opened up for 
discussing in further detail issues previously debated besides a general “since the 
last time.” For the first interviews, I used a semi-structured interview guide that was 
structured thematically based on the following themes: 
• Personal information: age, employment etc. 
• Life story: upbringing and family relations 
• Diagnostic process: the clinical encounter, life circumstances 
• Everyday difficulties: how ADHD is experienced in everyday life 
• Taking medication: experiences with and considerations about taking drugs 
• Understandings of ADHD: how is ADHD explained 
• Hopes and concerns for the future: job, family, treatment 
• Using online groups related to ADHD: how are the forums used 
• ADHD in the media: reflections on popular portrayals of ADHD 
For each theme, I had between two and six questions. The questions were open, 
encouraging the informant to elaborate, for example: “Can you tell me about your 
first consultation at the doctor, when ADHD was mentioned?” Or: “What is ADHD 
in your own words – if you should explain ADHD to someone who knows nothing 
about ADHD?” And: “What happens when you take the medication – how does it 
feel?” For the follow-up interviews, I prepared a separate interview guide for each 
informant, addressing issues from the first interview and asking about specific 
events I knew had happened since the last interview, as for example: “Last time we 
spoke, you told me that getting the diagnosis was like entering a labyrinth – can you 
clarify what that means?” Or: “Last time you told me about the negative side effects 
of the drugs – did you talk to your doctor about changing label?” Sometimes, my 
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informants texted me in order to update me on their life or if they had come up with 
additional thoughts to our previous conversation, and I used these extra comments as 
a basis for developing the second interview guide. Just like I was examining life 
with ADHD, so were my informants exploring how to live with ADHD, and I was 
grateful for being included in their everyday reflections and observations.  
Conventional interview techniques are challenged when doing interviews with 
people who have difficulties with attention and who get restless easily (Prosser, 
2006, p. 9). Generally, my informants were answering my questions in great detail 
and coming up with examples to illustrate their story. Some had attended various 
kinds of therapy in their life and were used to telling their story while others were 
more unfamiliar with the situation of describing and remembering past events. My 
role as an interviewer, therefore, ranged from a guiding role, asking many questions, 
to an organizing role, making sure we more or less kept focus on ADHD related 
issues. I often experienced the interviews taking new directions as one story 
followed another in a stream of anecdotes and I frequently needed to remind my 
informant, on their request, of my question. These detours, however, offered me 
valuable knowledge as they led us to talk about issues beyond the questions of my 
interview guide and as they illustrated what my informants described as difficulty 
with concentration and resting on one thing at the time.  
6.3.2. BEING WITH INFORMANTS 
Interviewing not only provided me with my informants’ verbal reflections on life 
with ADHD, the interviews also gave access to an embodied knowledge about 
ADHD. Anthropologist Anne Line Dalsgård (2003) argues that ethnographic 
knowledge stems from much more than interviews and observations. Emotions, 
sensory perceptions and bodily competences are mixed with intellectual knowledge 
and become experience (p. 330). During the interviews with my informants, I 
experienced the restlessness and the difficulty with concentration that my informants 
were verbally telling me about, manifested in their way of speaking and being in the 
room. From her fieldwork among blind people, anthropologist Pia Lundberg (2003) 
describes how doing fieldwork in a different sensory world is an act of gaining 
knowledge about a certain way of sensing, experiencing and being in the world (p. 
139). Similarly, I began to recognize during my fieldwork, by being with my 
informants, that understanding ADHD entailed an exploration of ADHD as a certain 
way of experiencing and being in the world. I started taking notes of my informants’ 
bodily movements, of their fidgeting with things, and of characteristics of their way 
of speaking during the interview as jottings (Bernard, 1994) as well as more 
extensively shortly after the interview as for example: “sits on his hands;” “stands 
up to open the door only to close it again a minute later;” “sometimes, I find it hard 
to follow her story as she jumps back and fourth in time;” or “I get the impression 
that he is having difficulty concentrating for long and that we need to take some 
breaks to make the situation [the interview] bearable.” Although interviewing is 
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often accused for entailing a bias towards verbal and theoretical knowledge (Otto, 
1997, p. 98), my experience with the practice of interviewing and of participating in 
the interview, was that not only the words but also the situation of being with my 
informants offered valuable knowledge. 
Within anthropology, participant observation as a method is debated. The concept 
itself is said to be an oxymoron, as participation and observation are mutually 
exclusive. The positivistic, observational gaze and the phenomenological endeavor 
to participate in order to gain knowledge contradict each other, it is stated 
(Gammeltoft, 2003, p. 279). Moreover, the term participant observation suggests 
that the method implies a “straight forward and clear cut methodology about which 
there is consensus, whereas in practice it covers quite different ways of data collect 
and correspondingly different kinds of knowledge” (Otto, 1997, p. 96). 
Anthropologist Tine Gammeltoft (2003) challenges the traditional comprehension of 
participant observation by arguing that participating includes more than the 
anthropologist’s practical engagement in everyday life in a local community. 
Participation is involvement with another human being’s life and world, which the 
anthropologist attains through his or her imagination and ability to empathize, 
whether it is an involvement in practical activities or personal stories (p. 286). 
Anthropological knowledge, Gammeltoft states, is based on involvement and even if 
we cannot experience what the other person experiences, we can use our ability to 
emphasize to imagine what the other experiences (p. 284). The theoretical 
differentiation between interviewing and doing participant observation is often not 
clear-cut while doing fieldwork. In my fieldwork, interviews, conversations, 
participations, and observations were not always easy to separate as distinct 
methods, but rather while being with my informants, I made use of all these 
methods. Being in the car on our way to the psychiatrist with an informant, while 
talking about both expectations for the consultation and about everyday issues; 
drinking coffee in the kitchen while discussing the rise of people being diagnosed 
with ADHD; chatting on Facebook about the evening’s TV show from the 
Amazonas and discussing whether indigenous people living in the jungle have 
ADHD; or texting an informant in order to hear if he is doing better after a stressful 
week made him cancel our last appointment. These practices are just ordinary parts 
of doing fieldwork, but they all involve different aspects of involvement, 
participation, observation, and conversation and they all contribute to gaining 
knowledge. 
6.3.3. DOING OBSERVATIONS  
During my fieldwork, I did several observation studies. I followed two of my 
informants to the doctor: one visit to the general practitioner with each of the two 
informants and one consultation at a psychiatrist with one of the informants; I 
attended four public seminars and conferences for people diagnosed with ADHD 
and their relatives and for professionals working with ADHD; I followed different 
EXPERIENCES OF ADHD IN ADULTS 
80
 
online forums and blogs about ADHD; and finally, I kept updated on popular media 
coverage of the diagnosis. My role as observer varied from nonparticipation 
(Spradley, 1980, p. 58), when reading newspapers and following online debates and 
blogs, to passive participation (p. 59) at conferences and seminars, taking the role as 
a spectator, and to moderate participation (p. 60) when following my informants to 
the doctor and being identifiable as a researcher but not actively participating in the 
activity. When participating in consultations and at conferences, I took detailed 
notes, both descriptive and analytical notes (Bernard, 1994, p. 188), trying to write 
down as much as possible a direct conversation. From my observations online, I 
copied relevant discussions, perspectives and conversations into a word document.  
The observations made it possible for me to observe how ADHD is discussed and 
expressed in different contexts and they contribute to my research as background for 
understanding the context in which my informants experience ADHD. Attending the 
seminars taught me about the official explanations of ADHD and ideas about coping 
with ADHD and following the online forums and blogs gave me insights into how 
ADHD to some is not only an individual diagnosis, but also a diagnosis to share 
with a community of others diagnosed with ADHD. Seminars as well as online 
discussions were well attended and the debates were vibrant and the participants 
exchanged ideas, experiences, and everyday tips. From my observations in the 
clinical rooms, my informants’ stories about drugs as the central theme for 
conversations with their doctor were confirmed. The discussion of drugs was not 
only initiated by the doctor but also by the patient, and the observations gave me a 
small glimpse into the institutional and biomedical regime that the individual is 
included into when getting a diagnosis.  
6.4. THEMATIZING, ANALYZING, AND WRITING 
The process of analyzing my data has been winding, investigational, and a 
continuous activity throughout the PhD project. Early in my research, I was thrown 
into the analytic process, as two assignments (a ten-page paper for a PhD. course 
and a chapter for an anthology about diagnoses) demanded a written product from 
my hand based on my initial data. What I considered to be the exemplary model of 
firstly gathering and analyzing a full data set before starting the writing process was 
impossible to comply with. Hence, I have been working with tentative analyses 
almost from the beginning of my project. The constructive aspect of working 
tentatively and explorative with my material has been the recognition of writing as 
an analytic process. The writing process required engagement with my data and 
knowledge from the on-going fieldwork and I learned that the writing process itself 
generated analytical ideas and arguments. While working with the text, new 
perspectives unfolded and I started to actively use the writing process as an 
instrument for experimenting with and materializing ideas. The unconstructive 
aspect of this type of working procedure, however, was the lack of overview of my 
data. I started writing all three articles presented in this thesis before I had finished 
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my fieldwork, but had I followed a more linear procedure, I would probably have 
structured my three main arguments, each presented in one of the three articles, 
differently. For example, I might have dealt with the issue of taking drugs in a 
separate article rather than including it in the article: “Structuring the self: moral 
implications of getting a diagnosis.” Medication is a central theme in my data 
material, and a more thorough analysis of the motivations for and the consequences 
of taking drugs could have made an important contribution to the thesis. 
My strategy for analyzing has primarily been a data-driven strategy (Gibbs, 2007). I 
have read my entire data material multiple times, and every time I am familiarizing 
more with the data, writing comments to myself in the margin, as illustrated with 
respectively a field note and an interview except in the table below.  
Field note, at the doctor My comment 
Kelly says she would like to discuss her medication. She 
describes how she has stopped taking Zyprexa because it 
made her too tired and made her lose all initiative. She 
started taking 1 tablet, then she took only a half and now 
she has stopped taking them. “How is your sleep then?” 
the doctor asks. “It’s short but I sleep reasonably,” Kelly 
answers. The doctor nods and smiles. Kelly continues: 
“But Zyprexa, I would really like to not take it anymore.” 
“But your period of anxiety has also stopped, and that’s 
really wonderful. How about Ritalin, do you still need 
that for the restlessness?” the doctor asks. Kelly answers: 
“Yes, I need 40 mg in the morning until you say stop.” 
Kelly continues, describing how she has applied for a 
new job and would like her everyday life to work again: 
“I feel like I can manage again and that I can stay 
awake,” she says. 
Experimenting with 
dosage and labels –
how to negotiate 
between not being too 
tired during the day 
and still being able to 
sleep? How to manage 
a normal life? 
Interview excerpt My comment 
There’s a before-Louise and an after-Louise. The life I 
lived before [the diagnosis] and the life I live now. It’s 
not at all the same. It’s not. It’s a readjustment process 
relating to it [the diagnosis]. For a period of time, I was 
looking at my life through ADHD glasses before I was 
able to separate things from each other. I mean: what was 
ADHD? All the things in my life. What if I didn’t have 
ADHD? All of a sudden you reconsider a lot of things 
Benefiting from the 
diagnosis – but it’s a 
process of 
accommodation, 
acceptance and new 
self-perceptions. 
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I did not practice a specific coding of my data, but I used my comments as a way of 
meaning condensation and meaning interpretation (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), and 
based on my comments, I clustered several general themes in my material. 
Psychologist Martin Packer (2011) points to the problems associated with coding, 
namely that it can lose the voice of each individual, it can destroy the 
interconnections in a transcript, and it assumes there is a single, fixed meaning (p. 
79). Coding can mask the interpretive process of analyzing, by pretending to 
overcome subjectivity when following special rules or procedures, Packer argues. 
Hence, the messiness and fluctuation of the data disappears and the context is lost. I 
have tried to take advantage of the iterative aspect of my analytical process, re-
reading my field notes and transcripts of interviews parallel with reading relevant 
theoretical texts, acknowledging the messiness of both my data and of the analytical 
process. I have moved forward and backward between sources of inspiration based 
on both a hermeneutic ambition of continuously reinterpreting my material and a 
pragmatic consequence of writing while doing longitude fieldwork. 
6.5. ETHICAL (AND ANALYTICAL) CONSIDERATIONS 
The American Anthropological Association’s Code of Ethics (2007) lists 
fundamental ethical concerns regarding responsibility to the people with whom 
anthropological researchers work and study. Two concerns are especially relevant to 
my study, namely that the development of knowledge can lead to change, which 
may be positive or negative or for the people of study, and that researchers must 
carefully and respectfully negotiate the limits of relationship. During my research, I 
needed to be clear about the reach and the limits of this project. I was met with high 
expectations from my informants to improve conditions for and raise awareness 
about ADHD, and on the one hand I had to emphasize the limitations of my project 
as previously mentioned, and on the other hand I knew that I was entering a 
controversial debate in Denmark about psychiatric diagnoses and in particular 
ADHD and that the Diagnostic Culture project and publications from this group 
would attract some level of public attention. I was aware of not “faking friendship” 
(Kvale & Brinkman, 2009, p. 75) in order to get access to data, but I was involved 
with my informants and therefore felt both a professional and a personal 
responsibility for representing their experiences respectfully and in a way they 
would recognize and appreciate. Moreover, I had to position my research and my 
engagement in the Diagnostic Culture project, which critically investigated the rise 
of diagnoses, and find a balance between curiously questioning the development of 
diagnoses and pragmatically observe that people are increasingly getting psychiatric 
and think: what could have happened and how? It was a 
process I had to go through. But those first months - 
when you had to find out what exactly it meant - they 
were tough. 
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diagnoses and examine the personal implications following a diagnosis. Concretely, 
I was contacted by a nurse working with psychiatric patients who was interested in 
my research and a man diagnosed with ADHD himself who challenged my 
arguments after reading a publication of mine (and accused me of not including 
neuroscientific research on ADHD). As with my informants, I entered into dialogue 
and had rewarding conversations with both about the ambitions of and the 
perspectives presented in my project, but the confrontations made me realize that I 
was not only representing my informants, my responsibility reached even further.  
Another ethical dilemma I encountered was how to navigate between on the one 
hand writing articles based on what my informants were primarily concerned with 
and repeatedly returned to in our conversations (which often involved hassles with 
social service institutions and their lack of knowledge about ADHD and about the 
relief of getting the diagnosis), and on the other hand having an academic ambition 
of generating new knowledge and filling a gap in research. In many aspects, my 
research confirmed what was already stated by the (yet limited) literature on adults’ 
experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis, and I fervently wanted to contribute 
with new perspectives to the research field. But to what extent could my theoretical 
and academic interest guide my writing? The general themes identified from my 
material formed the basis for my arguments, but my eagerness for not reproducing 
already existent research on experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis intrigued me 
into going in new analytical directions with my material. Some ideas crossed the line 
for what I later considered appropriate, but other ideas remained in different 
versions. In a way, my concerns reflected a general dilemma about how to represent 
others’ experiences and lives and the extent to which the anthropologist’s text 
portrays the writer’s interpretations and preferences rather than his or her 
informants. But my concerns also reflected my attempt to position myself within the 
research field I entered and within the Diagnostic Culture group.  
The first time I was confronted with the dilemma was while writing one of many 
drafts for what later became third article in this thesis about explanations of ADHD 
and ways of relating to the diagnosis. I had just started interviewing and I worried 
about not conducting authentic anthropological fieldwork. Moreover, being 
affiliated with the department of psychology and communication, I felt a need to 
adhere to my anthropological background. In one of his writings about headhunting, 
Rosaldo (1984/2004) reveals how he initially, in search for an explanation of the 
phenomenon, turned to traditional exchange theory, “because it had informed so 
many classic ethnographies” (p. 580). Being a central theme in anthropology, 
Rosaldo assumed the perspective would inform his research. He realized later, 
however, that there was no evidence supporting the perspective and that searching 
for a deeper explanation of headhunting detained him from understanding the 
phenomenon. Similarly, I might have been too enthusiastic about comparing ADHD 
to classic anthropological themes. From my interviews, I identified a certain way of 
speaking of ADHD as an entity, detached from the individual, and in order to 
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understand this way of relating to ADHD, I turned to ideas about spirit possession in 
anthropological literature. Descriptions of rituals, experiences of trance, and 
shamanism suddenly occupied my bookshelf as I explored anthropological accounts 
of these unfamiliar phenomena. I was not sure where this perspective would take 
me, but I had a troubling feeling that I had to abandon the approach. Like Rosaldo, I 
shared my thoughts with one of my informants as a way of testing the idea, and 
similarly to Rosaldo’s informant, who unimpressively said he could imagine 
someone could think such thing about headhunting, so responded my informant. 
Still I worried that the analysis exotizised ADHD and I was afraid that the 
perspective could be offensive. I was interviewing people, who wanted to live an 
ordinary life and were struggling for acceptance, and here I was ‘othering’ them, 
paralleling their experiences to mysterious phenomena. Even if I found it 
analytically interesting to compare experiences of ADHD with experiences of spirit 
possession, and the idea would contribute to the existing literature with new 
perspectives on experiences of ADHD, I finally chose to only briefly refer to spirit 
possession as phenomenon rather than making it a key argument. As it appears in 
the article “My ADHD and me: identifying with and distancing from ADHD,” the 
perspective was not completely shelved, and I returned to the idea in a moderate 
version and no longer as an attempt to explain experiences of ADHD, but rather to 
draw an analytical parallel.  
The question of analytical choices and of being seduced by an idea reappeared when 
I was writing my second article “ADHD and temporality: A desyncrhonized way of 
being in the world” about ADHD as an arrhythmic being in the world. In this article, 
I particularly wanted to examine the phenomenology of ADHD and ask if ADHD 
covers a certain way of being in the world. Even if I had learned from reading 
Hacking (2007) that experiences of symptoms and knowledge about a diagnosis 
interact, and through my interviews with informants similarly learned that talking 
about ADHD without using the diagnostic language was sometimes a challenge 
(Nielsen, 2015), I had an ambition of examining the illness, the pathology, the way 
of being and experiencing, rather than examining the diagnosis. On the one hand, 
this article was my attempt to get close to the lived experience of ADHD, and on the 
other hand, the article applied a specific analytical framework, namely the 
rhythmanalysis offered by Henry Lefebvre (2004), and again I considered if the 
analytical perspective overshadowed rather than opened up what I wanted to 
illustrate. However, after presenting the idea to both fellow researchers and to a 
couple of my informants who enthusiastically encouraged me to unfold the idea, I 
convinced myself that the perspective could maybe represent my informants 
respectfully as well as contribute to the literature on experiences of ADHD. I 
genuinely hope that the analytical and theoretical choices I have made and the 
research presented in this PhD. thesis help nuance the debate on ADHD. 
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Lastly, I should mention that the project was approved by the Danish Protection 
Agency.16 The names of my informants have been changed and personal 
information, which may compromise anonymity, has been changed in order to 
protect my informants’ anonymity. I informed all my informants about the project 
prior to the interviews and told them that they could withdraw from the project at 
any time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
16 In Danish: Datatilsynet 
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ABSTRACT: In this article, I examine experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis in 
adulthood. I illustrate how getting an ADHD diagnosis is a process in which 
existential questions are raised; judgements and choices are made; and everyday 
practices are scrutinized, evaluated and changed. Inspired by an analytical 
framework offered by anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly and based on interviews with 
adults diagnosed with ADHD, I analyse the implications of being diagnosed with 
ADHD. I argue that the implications entail different moral tasks that can be 
analysed from what Mattingly calls three moral scenes: 1) the trial where moral 
judgements are made; 2) the workshop where practices are cultivated; and 3) the 
moral laboratory where everyday experiments are carried out. In closing, I will 
briefly discuss the societal conditions for how diagnoses have become carriers of 
self-understandings. 
KEYWORDS: ADHD, diagnosis, experience, morality, moral striving 
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When I got the ADHD diagnosis, I got calmness. The reason I got 
calmness was because I got medication. And then I was suddenly able to 
start understanding myself. I was able to use my strengths in a more 
focused way, to find a balance, and develop new strategies and the like. 
I’ve always had many strategies for how to live life. (Karen, 45 years, 
diagnosed at 41) 
How can we understand experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis and the 
practical, existential, and moral implications that follow? Karen’s quotation above 
indicates how new ways of being, acting, and understanding oneself often 
accompany a diagnosis – some directly caused by the effect of medication, some by 
the explanatory force of the diagnosis, and others by the careful crafting of new 
practices. 
In this paper, I examine experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis in 
adulthood. According to the diagnostic criteria, anamneses must demonstrate 
symptoms of ADHD from the age of 12 or earlier in order to be diagnosed with 
ADHD (American Psychiatric Association 2013). Hence, the diagnosis offers a 
frame for interpretation that captures a whole life’s sensations, feelings, and patterns 
of behaviour when the individual is diagnosed in adulthood. The diagnosis answers 
a number of questions and helps the diagnosed to identify, accept, and cope with 
problems by offering concrete explanations to and treatment of the experienced 
problems. However, even if the diagnosis is a great help for many, the diagnostic 
process is not only clarifying but it also brings new challenges and questions. 
Relating to the diagnosis and testing drugs is a process full of evaluations, 
experiments and readjustments, in which the individual must turn his or her attention 
inwards and evaluate everyday problems. Therefore, the actual diagnosing might 
happen at the psychiatrist’s office, but acquiring and making use of the diagnosis 
happens in all sorts of settings and everyday practices. 
Through excerpts from my fieldwork, I illustrate how getting an ADHD 
diagnosis is a process in which existential questions are raised; judgements and 
choices are made; and everyday practices are scrutinized, evaluated and often 
changed. Inspired by a framework offered by anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly 
(2012, 2014) that outlines how moral practices can be studied from three analytical 
perspectives, or as she calls it, three ‘moral scenes’, I analyse the implications of 
being diagnosed with ADHD. The moral scenes are: 1) the trial where moral 
judgements are made; 2) the workshop where practices are cultivated; and 3) the 
moral laboratory where everyday experiments are carried out. Mattingly argues that 
the three moral scenes, representing Nietzscheian, Foucauldian and Aristotelian 
perspectives, respectively, can be used to analyse the same ethnographic material, 
but she advocates for the last. I, however, find each moral scene analytically helpful 
in illustrating how the process of receiving an ADHD diagnosis entails different 
moral tasks. Hence, my concept of morality has three dimensions, conceptualized by 
the three different moral scenes. From these analytical perspectives, I argue that the 
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diagnostic process entails a verdict and a process of recognizing oneself as someone 
with ADHD; a number of guidelines and a process of crafting new skills; and lastly 
demands of continuous self-evaluation and an experimental process of becoming the 
person you want to be. In closing, I will briefly discuss the societal conditions for 
how diagnoses have become carriers of self-understandings. 
I will present excerpts from my interviews with adults diagnosed with ADHD 
and my observations while visiting and spending time with the interviewees. 
Throughout the last two years, I have interviewed 13 adults diagnosed with ADHD 
(five men and eight women, ages 26– 45). Five of them have been interviewed two 
or three times while the others have been interviewed once. My informants describe 
their live as chaotic, their thoughts as messy, and they report of a life full of 
misunderstandings and of feeling different. In their struggle to find calmness in life, 
as Karen describes at the beginning of this article, the diagnosis has been helpful. 
The diagnosis helps order chaos in different ways by structuring self-
understandings, giving guidelines for practices, and changing experiences and 
perceptions through medication. Each moral scene in this paper, therefore, 
represents a way of structuring the self. My take on the data is to see the process of 
getting an ADHD diagnosis as a process of moral striving, and my analytical 
framework takes as its point of departure an anthropology of morality that stresses 
the importance of investigating theoretically and empirically the individual’s moral 
striving in life and in everyday practices. As anthropologist James Laidlaw (2013:3) 
states: ‘The claim on which the anthropology of ethics rests is not an evaluative 
claim that people are good: it is a descriptive claim that they are evaluative’. I follow 
this claim about people as evaluative (and self-evaluative) in my study of individuals 
exploring the possibilities of an ADHD diagnosis. 
ADHD and the effect of diagnosing 
ADHD is characterized by symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and 
impulsivity, and studies estimate a 3.3–5.3% prevalence in adult population 
(Barkley, Murphy and Fischer 2008, p. 17). Research on ADHD is mainly done 
from a psychiatric or critical sociological perspective, describing ADHD as either a 
neurobiological disorder (Barkley, Murphy and Fischer 2008) or as a product of 
medicalization processes (Conrad 2007; Timimi and Leo 2009). Gordon Tait (2005) 
identifies three general theories about ADHD in popular and academic literature: 1) 
the true believers of ADHD who are often psychiatrists and neurologists; 2) the ones 
who believe ADHD might exist, but that it is too often diagnosed; and 3) those who 
do not accept ADHD to be true. My understanding of ADHD, however, is more 
pragmatic rather than either supportive or critical. In her study of bipolar disorder, 
anthropologist Emily Martin (2007:29) argues that the disorder is real because of the 
social and cultural meanings attached to the diagnosis. I consider ADHD to be real 
in the same way. Real people go to the doctor and are diagnosed, real people 
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understand themselves through the diagnosis, and medical treatment is based on the 
directions of the diagnosis. 
Few studies have examined adults’ experiences of getting an ADHD 
diagnosis. Convergent with my research, the results from the studies show that 
people welcome the ADHD diagnosis as an explanation for their problems, that the 
diagnosis brings new knowledge, that medication has a positive impact on their 
ability to function, and that the diagnosis brings acceptance of oneself (Andersen 
2009; Halleröd, Anckarsäter, Råstam and Scherman 2015; Jones and Hesse 2014; 
Young, Bramham, Gray and Rose 2008). I contribute to this literature by illustrating 
how getting an ADHD diagnosis is also a moral and evaluative process. I want to 
focus on the formative aspect of the diagnosis and by that follow the ‘moral turn’ 
(Mattingly 2012) within anthropology that encourages anthropologists to raise 
questions concerning the individual’s moral striving and ‘how we should live and 
what kind of person we want to be’ (Lambek 2008:134) by focusing on the 
individual’s continuous striving for the good life.  
The trial: A verdict called ADHD 
Getting a diagnosis is like getting a verdict. The diagnostic process is the 
culmination of years of feeling different followed by months of assessing and 
weighing symptoms. The diagnosis is the demarcation of the normal from the 
abnormal and wellbeing from the pathological. I start by addressing the diagnostic 
process as an event of judgement by using Mattingly’s notion of the trial to examine 
the moral implications of getting an ADHD diagnosis.  
Mattingly (2012) introduces the trial as a moral scene where the moral ‘I’ is 
born. Inspired by Nietzsche, Mattingly describes this moral scene as a ‘courtroom in 
which we stand accused’ (p. 302), and as a place where ‘we are brought to trial, so 
to speak, and asked to justify our actions’ (p. 302). At the trial, the individual is 
blamed for his or her insufficiency, handed a verdict, and demanded moral 
responsibility of. In a context of diagnosing, the process of examining and 
completing anamnesis, scrutinizing childhood behaviour, school performance, and 
social skills parallels the justification and confession of the courtroom. The 
individual is the object of study and the one to change. He or she is held responsible 
and expected to take the necessary measures: to start treatment. Judith Butler 
(2005:10) argues that punishment posits the self as a causative force and thereby 
models a specific mode of responsibility: ‘We start to give an account only because 
we are interpellated as beings who are rendered accountable by a system of justice 
and punishment’. Referencing Butler, Mattingly (2012:303) argues that we come to 
see ourselves as having an ‘I’ when we explain ourselves in the process of 
interrogation, writing that ‘self-narratives are created as we – in terror – try to 
defend our own actions, casting a fearful look backwards at our past deeds, giving 
ourselves a history’ (Mattingly 2012:303). Mattingly emphasizes the terrifying 
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element in the verdict – the moment when we realize that we are the ones pointed at. 
In my material the verdict is not received with terror. On the contrary, my 
informants welcome the diagnosis and they accept the diagnosis as a long-awaited 
explanation for their problems. However, the process of giving an account of oneself 
brings about a specific ‘I’ that is shaped by the interrogation process and the 
thoughts accompanying it. 
An ADHD diagnosis often bumps into people’s lives during an evaluative 
moment of life, and the process of being diagnosed contributes to this evaluation 
with its questions and interrogation of childhood habits and everyday actions. Charts 
and questionnaires are filled out and for each box with symptoms ticked off in a test, 
a pattern of behaviour is transferred into a diagnosis. Ann, a 39-year-old woman 
who was diagnosed half a year before I talked to her, told me how the past year had 
brought various changes as she got divorced and was diagnosed with whiplash after 
a car accident. Ann has a history of different psychological problems and in this 
light; the ADHD diagnosis encapsulates a culmination of a life full of difficulties. 
The diagnosis enters into a process of evaluation and readjustment of life and 
contributes to clarifying thoughts and life choices. It directs Ann forward by offering 
explanations and treatment for her problems. In the following paragraph, Ann 
describes her reactions to the diagnosis: 
Well, it [the diagnosis] made me realize why I struggle with some things. 
Before, I never got a hold on why I was struggling and why I was the 
way I was.  [I] was so stressed out when too many things were 
happening. I kind of have a different understanding now, and I know 
how to act more appropriately. Things have got – well it hasn’t 
eliminated the problems – but it [the diagnosis] has given me an insight 
into why these problems occur. It made it possible for me to pin up my 
reactions and challenges to something. And in that way I’m actually 
happy and relieved to finally discover what was teasing me. I believe I’m 
nicer and kinder to myself [after the diagnosis]. I’m not so hard on 
myself anymore. 
Ann’s story is not unique and I was continuously told that the diagnosis offers an 
explanation of a life full of difficulties. Another of my informants, Christian, who is 
33 years old and was diagnosed four years ago, reports how the diagnosis made him 
change perspective about himself, his difficulties, and his entire way of looking at 
himself in relation to the surrounding world. Christian has suffered from depression 
and describes himself as a person who has always felt unfairly treated. The 
diagnosis, however, has changed his life philosophy. Christian explains: 
Christian: I remember the thought it might not be the world that was 
wrong, but maybe it was the way I perceived it that was wrong, so to 
speak. I mean … er … in the sense that something was wrong with me. 
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And I remember that it was actually a pretty relieving thought in many 
ways. 
Mikka: Okay? 
Christian: About the same time, my sister was diagnosed with diabetes 
and I sometimes think that – it isn’t the same of course – but I remember 
that to me it was nice … because I wasn’t feeling good at that time and 
being told that there was a concrete cause to it was actually really nice. 
Right after the diagnosis, Christian changed his perspective on life, and the 
diagnosis infused him with hope that he could change. That things could be 
different. Today, he thinks more pragmatically about the consequences of the 
diagnosis, Christian tells me. He does not think of it as pivotal to the way he 
perceives himself, but he remembers that the diagnosis changed his perspective on 
why he is constantly confronted with hindrances in life. To Christian and Ann, the 
diagnosis systematizes and concretizes experiences of continuously bumping into 
problems and conflicts, and the list of symptoms and descriptions of typical 
problems related to ADHD gives clarity to what were previously diffuse challenges. 
Diagnosing is ‘a ritual of disclosure,’ when ‘a curtain is pulled aside, and 
uncertainty is replaced – for better or for worse – by a structured narrative’ 
(Rosenberg, 2002, p. 255), as historian Charles Rosenberg notes. The diagnosis 
collects scattered experiences and connects them into an entity and a treatable 
condition. Nurse and researcher Annemarie Jutel (2011:1) describes the effect of a 
diagnosis as follows: 
Receiving a diagnosis is like being handed a road map in the middle of a 
forest. It shows the way – but not necessarily the way out. (…) With a 
diagnosis, things not necessarily get better, but they become clearer. The 
unexplained becomes explained, and management is defined.   
From the point of view of a tangible, well-described disorder, indicating specific 
difficulties and offering certain guidelines, Ann’s and Christian’s problems are 
easier to address. The diagnosis might not eliminate their problems, but it makes 
them clearer, as Jutel says. After being diagnosed, Ann and Christian changed 
perception of themselves. Ann interprets her history in the light of the diagnosis and 
uses the diagnosis to explain her actions and her confused and troubled life. With the 
diagnosis in hand, Ann gives herself a history. A history that centres around ADHD 
and in which ADHD has been crucial for how things have developed. Similarly, 
Christian positions himself and his difficulties differently after being diagnosed and 
he connects the troubles he has met in life to ADHD rather than to a hostile world. 
Realizing the world is not against him, but that he himself carries not only the 
problems but also the key to handle them, gives Christian a new perspective and 
confidence that he can act and think differently in the future. 
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In the process of being diagnosed, the act of giving an account of ourselves 
implies the moral question: who are you as an individual and what are your 
responsibilities? A specific moral ‘I’ is produced along the diagnostic process, as 
responsibility is paradoxically both installed in and taken away from the individual. 
On the one hand, the problem is located within the individual and not in its 
surroundings, and the individual is thereby responsible for changing what is 
considered problematic. But on the other hand, the problem is translated into ADHD 
and thereby used as an explanation for the problems. In both cases, however, the 
individual is imposed with a moral task: he or she must relate to the verdict, make it 
at part of his or her history, and act upon it in order to address the identified 
problems. Knowing about the diagnosis renders new ways of being and acting 
possible. Thus, the diagnosis not only offers an explanation of past events and 
current problems but it also offers prospects of the future, new ways of thinking 
about responsibility, and a structured self-narrative. ‘The past becomes different as 
the present and future change shape’, as Mattingly writes (2014:18). My informants 
tell their life stories and the psychiatrist passes the verdict, but at the same time, the 
diagnosis offers a specific narrative and the two stories entangle into a structured 
diagnostic self-narrative in which the individuals interprets themselves and their life-
trajectories.  
The artisan’s workshop: Structuring practices and crafting skills 
While the diagnosis is determined in the psychiatrist’s office, the practice of 
relating to it, discovering what it entails, and how to benefit from it happens in all 
sorts of places and is a long process that demands incorporation of new routines and 
continuous exercise. Treatment with central nervous system stimulants often follows 
the diagnosis and new practices and ways of administrating everyday tasks are 
refined in the effort towards ‘living in chaos and striving for control’ (Toner, 
O’Donoghue and Houghton 2006:247). 
Inspired by Foucault’s work on premodern virtue ethics and the notion of 
self-technologies, Mattingly introduces the second moral scene: the artisan’s 
workshop. The workshop is where ‘artisans carefully, painstakingly fashion their 
crafts, following exacting aesthetic standards’ (Mattingly 2012:303). Contrary to the 
trial, where definitions are set and judgements are made, the artisan’s workshop is a 
creative and productive moral scene, in which the individual works on him- or 
herself and crafts specific skills. As Foucault (1986:62) writes:  
The subject's relation to himself in this examination is not established so 
much in the form of a judicial relationship in which the accused faces the 
judge; it is more like an act of inspection in which the inspector aims to 
evaluate a piece of work, an accomplished task.  
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The subject is the guardian of the task, and the moral self is created through ‘the 
voluntary disciplining and monitoring of thoughts, acts and especially bodies in line 
with the stylistic norms of the ‘guild’ to which one has pledged oneself’ (Mattingly 
2013:303). As Mattingly informs us, the artisan’s workshop sheds light on the 
connection between crafting the self and learning, and how the individual refines 
body and mind according to certain aesthetic standards and guidelines. The 
perspective offers an analytical framework for examining practices as a means to 
cultivating a virtuous character and the individual’s everyday transformation of him- 
or herself (Mattingly 2012). From this perspective, the treatment and change of 
everyday practices is a moral, self-disciplining exercise, through which the 
individual crafts him- or herself by addressing certain difficulties and following 
certain guidelines offered by the diagnosis. 
During my fieldwork, I have encountered several practices related to the 
cultivation of desirable behaviour. In ADHD-related forums on Facebook, people 
ask for advice concerning everyday difficulties; my informants use smartphone 
applications that help in administrating medicine; some structure daily activities on a 
big whiteboard; and finally, taking psychoactive drugs is a cultivation practice. 
Along with psych education courses (in both public and private settings), which a 
couple of my informants have attended, these different forums and activities 
promote certain ways of understanding, relating to, and acting upon ADHD. One of 
my informants, John, is curious to learn about ADHD. He reads literature about 
ADHD and has attended an ADHD coach course in order to learn about ADHD and 
maybe teach others about ADHD. Based on the course, John is practicing new 
techniques for coping with his temper and impulsivity. I ask him how these practices 
work. John answers:  
John: Well, it’s all about training the brain, and about training myself to 
do things differently. To notice when the habitual behaviour comes. And 
then stop it and say: all right let’s go this way instead. I mean, when you 
react to something, you react based on feelings. And then you need to 
notice: when do these feelings come? When am I getting angry? What 
happened? Take a step back and notice: when am I getting angry? 
What’s the reason? What were my feelings before I got angry? And then 
next time you notice that feeling, instead of getting angry, I’ll try to take 
it easy. Like that … it doesn’t just happen like that … I think you need to 
practice for some years. Multiple times. 
Mikka: So are you aware of this in the situation or is it something you 
evaluate afterwards? 
John: In the situation, when it’s happening, you don’t think about it. It 
just happens. But then you get these tools for stepping back and thinking 
about it. And then you notice: what happened just before? And what’s 
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happening now? And then: how would I want it to be instead? And that 
last part is important in coaching. 
Mikka: Can you better notice that now yourself? When it starts to blaze? 
John: Yes, I believe so. Er… because now I’m more aware of it, it 
doesn’t just happen. My reactions are more… if I see something on 
Facebook that pisses me off, I wouldn’t just rush to the keyboard [on the 
computer], but I would think: what happens if I write this while I’m 
angry? Wait till tomorrow. And then I might forget about it. 
According to John, the diagnosis has become a tool for changing his way of thinking 
and acting. He does not always succeed in incorporating the techniques from the 
coaching course, but he is continuously testing, examining, and crafting new skills 
and learning about how to control what he now identifies as ADHD behaviour. 
Foucault (1986:68) writes that: 
The task of testing oneself, examining oneself, monitoring oneself in a 
series of clearly defined exercises, makes the question of truth – the truth 
concerning what one is, what one does, and what one is capable of doing 
– central to the formation of the ethical subject. 
Crafting and learning, searching and realizing are interconnected and caring for the 
self is therefore also knowing the self. Foucault (1986:61) emphasizes the 
importance of self-examination and the practice of asking oneself the questions, 
‘What bad habit have you cured today? What fault have you resisted? In what 
respect are you better?’ as part of the individual’s care for the self. John relates and 
responds explicitly to similar questions as part of his examination of ADHD. Other 
informants more implicitly deal with such questions and challenges. My visit at 
Susie’s place illustrates another way of cultivating practices. 
Susie is in her mid-forties, living alone, and on a sick leave when I first meet 
her. She has been struggling with depression since her mother died two years ago, 
but she dreams about returning to her job and maybe upgrading her skills at work by 
taking some additional exams. Susie is going through an evaluative time in life, 
when some things have ended and new opportunities lie ahead. Her primary care 
person is dead; like herself, her adult son has just been diagnosed with ADHD; and 
she is determined to start a new chapter in life with more stability and care for 
herself. Susie tells me that her biggest problem related to ADHD is her inability to 
keep structure. Her handbag is a mess, her apartment is a mess, and her life has 
somehow always been messy. Cheerfully, and with a sense of disbelief, she shows 
me pictures of her messy apartment from just a few months ago. But the ADHD 
diagnosis and the treatment she receives have helped her find some kind of order in 
her chaotic life, she tells me. Besides her medical treatment, she has been offered 
body awareness therapy and a mentor who helps her clean up the apartment, which 
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she describes as essential for her current ability to take action in her life. She needs 
structure and stability and wishes she could continue with the pedagogical and body 
awareness treatment that has ended. 
When I visit Susie a year later, she has started studying again. And even if 
she struggles (and ends her studies again a couple of months after my visit), she is 
trying every day to manage and keep herself on track. Some initiatives are huge (as 
her decision to not let her son’s chaotic life influence her own) while others are 
smaller, but all of them mark a change in perspective, habits, and ways of managing 
life. With laughter in her voice, Susie shows me how she has made her own system 
of boxes, bags, and hooks for her to remember where she puts her stuff. She points 
at her wall and desk where all sorts of coloured boxes store make up, keys, pencils, 
notebooks etc. Like a large-scale pencil case or a printer’s drawer, the end of Susie’s 
apartment keeps most of the things she needs from the moment she wakes up until 
she leaves her place in the morning. The installations make me think of an external 
brain, in which different areas hold different functions: A tangible, practical memory 
system that visually communicates what needs to be done during the day. Some 
things are for morning rituals, others are for studying, and together the installation 
materializes the ordering of everyday practices. These small installations come 
forward – they somehow illustrate and orchestrate their own purpose – and they 
become part of Susie’s way of acting and thinking. 
A combination of medical treatment and practical help in housekeeping has 
enabled Susie to incorporate new practices and ways of handling her difficulty with 
structure. Still, she sometimes forgets things, but she is carefully using new 
techniques and crafting new skills in order to better function. Within the analytical 
framework of the artisan’s workshop, we can understand Susie’s organization of her 
apartment as a moral task, by which she disciplines practices according to certain 
guidelines and with a certain telos. Like John, Susie is exploring how she is affected 
by ADHD and is facing her difficulties. She is determined to overcome her problems 
and is exerting all her energy into the art of crafting herself as a person who is able 
to navigate in ordered chaos. This practice, this care of the self in Foucauldian 
terms, is a continuous challenge of self-evaluation that demands repetitious exercise 
before it is incorporated into the individual’s life and self. Taking medication and 
practicing the ability to structure everyday activities are some of the moral 
implications of getting an ADHD diagnosis. 
The moral laboratory: Experimenting with experiences 
The practice of testing different drugs, judging their effect, and assessing 
levels and intervals of pill intakes is an experimental process that often follows an 
ADHD diagnosis. It is a process in which new experiences are made. Every day and 
in all sorts of activities, drugs influence concentration, bring calmness, and make 
everyday activities manageable, my informants report. But sometimes the drugs also 
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influence the individual’s perception and ways of being in the world in staggering 
ways. 
The third scene in Mattingly’s analytical framework is the moral laboratory. 
Drawing on the neo-Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, Mattingly advocates for a 
focus on everyday ethics and describes what she calls the moral laboratory. As a 
heuristic term, the moral laboratory allows us to investigate moments and spaces 
where moral deliberations come to take centre stage and the metaphor emphasizes 
how everyday spaces can become ‘spaces of possibility, ones that create experiences 
that are also experiments in how life might or should be lived’ (Mattingly 2014:15). 
The moral laboratory captures the ethics of everyday life and the individual’s many 
doubts, choices, hopes and practices, while trying to strive for the best good. Moral 
laboratories are ‘experiments in hope and possibility’ (p. 15). Mattingly (2014:63) 
insists on the ordinary and everyday activities as scenes for moral experience and 
experimentation, and argues that the everyday is ‘characterized not merely by 
routine or the repressive but also by the new and the unexpected’. Contrary to the 
two previous scenes, in which certain texts, guidelines or laws structure the moral 
tasks, the moral laboratory is a scene in which the moral task is much more 
uncertain. Playing with the semantic relation between experience and experiment, 
Mattingly (2014:16) illustrates ‘the experimental nature of experience itself’. In 
Mattingly’s analyses, she describes the moral laboratory as a space, a location for 
moral experiences. In my material, the space is not necessarily a physical space but 
more of a metaphorical space: a space in an evaluative time in life. However, the 
concept of the moral laboratory is compelling because it emphasizes that moral 
deliberations exist not only as rational or aesthetic choices but also in everyday 
practices, and that considerations about how to live life and how to become a good 
person have an experimental character. My informants explore the possibilities of 
the diagnosis as researchers of ADHD in the laboratory of everyday life. Each day is 
an experiment in how life can be lived and while testing new treatment opportunities 
and challenges, each day holds new ways of perceiving and being in the world. 
Most of my informants are treated with central nervous system stimulants. 
They describe symptoms of ADHD as restlessness that trembles through the body 
and as racing thoughts that complicate concentration and rest. Taking drugs often 
ease the bodily and mental chaos, I am told. However, having always experienced 
restlessness and considered it as a part of one’s being, the sudden calmness brought 
by drugs can be overwhelming. Karen illustratively describes how she experienced 
taking her first Ritalin tablet: 
Karen: I remember the first day, I was so excited and thought: it’ll 
probably not work. I got Ritalin to start with. Then I got home, and it was 
quiet, and I took the pill, and when 20–25 minutes had passed, not a 
damn thing had happened. The shitty drugs don’t work! Bloody hell 
that’s not okay! I got disappointed of course. And then some time passed. 
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And all of a sudden my head was just totally quiet. I promise you, it was 
quiet. And I was like, everything stood on end. So I jumped over to the 
couch and sat down and waited till it was over, because that was just 
wrong! (Laughs) 
Mikka: You’ve never tried that before? 
Karen: Never! So I just sat there till it passed. ’Cause I couldn’t 
manoeuvre in it, it was wrong, it was crazy. 
Mikka: What did you expect? 
Karen: Nothing, ‘cause what was I to expect? Nobody told me how 
others experience it. Nobody had explained what I should expect. And I 
didn’t know that many [with ADHD] at that time. (…) And it didn’t take 
long before, with this Ritalin, I got the feeling that I was a total wacko. 
Completely. I promise you it was wrong. Then it was quiet, then it was 
chaos, then it was quiet, then it was chaos. I wish someone would have 
talked to me about what to expect, what I’m going through, what are the 
… I mean it’s the craziest thing I’ve ever gone through. Try to imagine 
that you’ve always been like that [restless and hyperactive] and then you 
get this drug and then someone pulls the rug out from under you, swush, 
and you lay down there. And it’s slippery, as you can’t even imagine. It’s 
like being in an oil slick you can’t come up from and there are no edges 
to hold on to. You just float around. And you see it coming - that is 
actually the worst of it - but what? Why? You have no idea. 
Karen’s description is extraordinary in its intense character and emotional richness 
and not all my informants give such a dramatic portrayal of their experiences with 
drugs. Some experience a sudden ability to do the dishes without being too 
distracted to finish the task and others sense a change in temperament and level of 
patience with their kids. Karen’s description demonstrates the invasiveness of drugs 
on the individual’s being in the world. This way of being – a calm, non-chaotic state 
– seems strange when it is first encountered and experienced. How to relate to this 
way of being and how to assess if this is how it is supposed to be? Karen is 
experiencing a profoundly different state of mind and being. All her life, her 
thoughts, bodily sensations, and actions have been chaotic and speeding, but Ritalin 
changes her condition dramatically, and consequently, it changes her relation with 
her children and her ability to be a mother. Karen tells me: 
The medicine has made it possible for me to have my life back. It has 
made it possible for me to enjoy my kids and be with them. I can help 
them and be there for them and give them everything I have in me.  
Living a life in chaos has interfered with Karen’s ability to take care of herself and 
her children, but the ADHD diagnosis and the subsequent treatment has helped her 
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keep her thoughts straight – and, she tells me, it has been crucial in the path life has 
taken her. 
Ann also describes how medical treatment has given her calmness and 
consequently made her enjoy moments with her children more. The drugs give ‘an 
inner calmness’, as she describes it and enables her to read bedtime stories to her 
children without having her ‘head speeding 180 [km/h]’. Being present in the 
moment and being patient with her children corresponds to the way Ann considers 
herself as a person and as a mother. However, the drugs also change her in some less 
desirable ways and Ann continuously experiments with labels and dosages of drugs 
in order to determine when side effects are acceptable, and when she is comfortable 
and able to recognize herself and her reactions. Ann continues:  
I would prefer to find the right medical treatment because I feel it helps 
me. But I don’t want it to change my personality and make me different. 
I don’t want my way of being and the way I act towards others to change. 
I’ve always liked that about myself. But I feel, I’ve noticed a tendency 
for me to be more egocentric, if you can say that. It’s hard to put into 
words. But I’ve become a bit more introverted maybe. I feel I’m more 
me when the drugs are effective and there’re not too many side effects. 
When it comes to treating myself nicely and taking care of myself, it’s 
better with medication. But I sure need to get used to being on 
medication. A lot of things have been really good, ’cause I feel like I’m 
more patient with my kids and I don’t go off as easily. And that, I feel, is 
more me. Sometimes [before the diagnosis and the treatment] I felt like it 
wasn’t me going off, but it was something else doing it for me, and I was 
almost surprised by my reaction. And when it comes to that I think the 
medication has really helped me keeping calm and being the person I’d 
like to be. 
Karen and Ann talk about experiences of being ‘more me’, being able to ‘give 
everything I have in me’, and being ’the person I’d like to be’. A certain ‘I’ is 
examined, strived for, and experimented with and the drugs become the facilitators 
of the experimental process. Changing moods, abilities, and perceptions, drugs work 
as ‘capsules of potentialities’ (Trivelli 2014:159), creating prospects of another 
future and maybe even another ‘I’. Sometimes the drugs change the individual so 
profoundly that he or she loses oneself, as Ann demonstrates, while at other times 
the drugs help to reveal the ‘real self’ (Kramer 1993). Taking Ritalin is an 
experiment in hope and possibility as well as literally an experiment with experience 
in the assessment of how many, what kinds of, and in what interval the drugs must 
be taken in order to become that ‘I’. However, that ‘I’ is not a specific ‘I’. The 
process of experimenting and striving does not have an exact goal or telos. Rather, 
this ‘I’ is constantly experimented with in different contexts, with very different 
criteria, and more often than not, the experiments are conducted in messy situations, 
embedded in everyday practices and social life. These situations, in other words, are 
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not crossroads where the choice between left and right is clear-cut. Little changes in 
everyday life and changes in bodily sensations and reactions all become structuring 
for how Karen and Ann each assess themselves as a mother and as a good person. 
Research examining the effect of Ritalin shows that the drug regulates self-
perceptions and helps with self-management (Singh et al. 2010). Loe and Cuttino 
(2008), for example, speak of high school students’ ‘medicated self’ and how the 
adolescents strategically perform ‘identity management’ in order to control their 
disordered body in an ambiguous experiment that strives to balance the experience 
of feeling true to the authentic self and managing the ideal self. Discussing the 
necessity of drugs in order to perform academically or more generally in order to 
live up to the complex demands of the contemporary job market is definitely 
relevant. However, my informants are not striving for an academic career. Their 
project is different and their experimentation with central nervous system stimulants 
is a part of a continuous striving for a manageable everyday life, for being able to do 
the dishes and to read bed time stories to their children without being distracted. 
‘The good’ to my informants is what most people call everyday life. From the 
perspective of the moral laboratory, Karen and Ann are experimenting with 
possibilities, new ways of experiencing and being in the world, and new ways of 
being a parent. The means in the form of taking Ritalin might be radical, but the 
assessment of the effects happens in mundane, everyday contexts and the evaluation 
of the drugs becomes part of a much bigger evaluation of the self and a general 
process of becoming, in which new practices and reactions reveal the new ‘I’. 
Mattingly (2014:16) refers to Hannah Arendt and her description of the ‘I’, the 
moral self, that emerges through practices. Individuals create ‘the new’ through 
practices, and through this new, they create themselves (p. 16). Karen, Ann, and my 
other informants are similarly creating themselves through new practices, rendered 
possible and experienced anew by the effect of drugs. 
Moral striving in a diagnostic culture 
When my informants describe a chaotic mind and a chaotic life as some of their 
primary challenges and the diagnosis as the key to help them order life, it illustrates 
aspects of what they hope and strive for and how they understand their difficulties. It 
also, however, tell us something about the status of diagnoses and what normative 
demands the individual meets (and fails to live up to). It prompts us to ask the 
questions: How and why have psychiatric diagnoses become tools for self-
understandings? And what does the need for a diagnosis tell us about our 
conceptions of how to manage adult life? Diagnoses have become ‘indisputable 
social actors’ (Rosenberg, 2002:240), diagnoses are increasingly used as instruments 
for self-interpretations (Jutel 2011; Rose 2013), and pycho-pharmacology has 
opened up a new world for people to participate in (Martin 2007:xix). Particular 
social conditions are breeding grounds for certain diagnoses and ways of 
understanding human suffering, and each diagnosis reflects normative codes for 
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behaviour in that specific social and cultural context (Ehrenberg 2010; Hacking 
1998; Petersen 2007). Researchers even claim that we live in a ‘diagnostic culture’ 
(Brinkmann, Petersen, Kofod and Birk 2014), in which individuals increasingly 
interpret themselves and their sufferings through a diagnostic language. While the 
diagnostic language and the diagnostic comprehension of human suffering spreads, 
other ways of understanding the human being (social, existential, moral, religious 
etc.) becomes less influential and the overall palette of understanding but also 
addressing human suffering narrows (p. 393). Referencing Baumann (2007), 
Brinkmann (2016) argues that in a ‘liquid society’ (p. 83), diagnoses can be seen 
metaphorically ‘as anchors that somehow promise to solidify people’s experiences 
of suffering’ (p. 83). Rather than struggling to break free from norms, people 
struggle to catch up with development and thereby orient themselves according to 
‘the antinomy of the possible and the impossible rather than the antinomy of the 
allowed and the forbidden’ (p. 83).  
As individuals, we are intertwined with the diagnostic culture, and Susie, 
Christian, Karen, Ann, John, and my other informants make use of the available 
technologies in their different projects of understanding themselves and of 
navigating in a world full of challenges. Karen describes her search for a diagnosis 
as a consequence of being in a turbulent time in life, when she needed help to 
develop new strategies and re-establish her life: ‘I was tearing down and building up 
my life and I was reaching the point of being stuck, something needed to be done, 
but what the heck was I supposed to do?’As an anchor in a liquid society, my 
informants use the ADHD diagnosis as a solidifying, structuring element in a 
chaotic world. They struggle to catch up with expectations for leading an ordered 
life, examine what possibilities to strive for, and search for ways of anchoring their 
experiences of suffering. The diagnostic language helps formulate and ask moral, 
existential questions such as: who am I? What am I capable of? And what are my 
responsibilities? In that perspective, diagnoses become central actors in individuals’ 
evaluative projects of examining and experimenting with the possible and – as I 
have illustrated in the three moral scenes – considerations about the good life and 
initiatives for managing life are unfolded, practiced and experimented with within a 
diagnostic framework.  
Conclusion 
What can an analytical focus on morality tell us about experiences of getting 
an ADHD diagnosis? While the limited literature on the topic illustrates how the 
diagnosis offers an explanation of problems experienced and how medical treatment 
helps the diagnosed to function better, the moral aspect of the implications of getting 
an ADHD diagnosis reveals new mechanisms in the implications of being diagnosed 
with ADHD. Each moral scene unfolds certain aspects of how diagnoses and 
medication produce narratives, practices, and changes in perception that become part 
of a process of understanding oneself, caring for oneself, and striving to be a good 
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person. In this article, I have illustrated how individuals use the ADHD diagnosis as 
a part of a self-evaluative and self-constitutive project of becoming and how the 
diagnosis becomes the available tool in the endeavour to structure, evaluate, and 
experiment with possibilities in a life of chaos, differentness, and difficulties. The 
diagnosis offers a narrative for the individual to use in the process of accounting for 
one’s actions and understanding one’s life-trajectory, it gives guidelines and 
encourages the individual to craft new skills, and it organizes the individual’s 
experiences and perception. All these practices and experiences are moral. They are 
structuring for the ’I’ for each individual – the way they perceive themselves, how 
they act, and what they hope and strive for.  
While my empirical point of departure is ADHD, I believe the analytical 
framework offered by Mattingly and presented in this article can be applied to 
research on the experience of getting other psychiatric diagnoses as well. The 
dramatic rise of not only ADHD diagnoses but of psychiatric diagnoses in general 
through the past couple of decades calls for research in the practical and existential 
implications of getting a psychiatric diagnosis. Investigating further the interplay 
between the individual’s moral practices, social conditions and norms, and 
diagnoses as mediators and interpretive frameworks might contribute to nuanced 
understandings of the moral implications of diagnosing. 
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ADHD AND TEMPORALITY: A DESYNCHRONIZED 
WAY OF BEING IN THE WORLD 
Mikka Nielsen 
ADHD is, I argue, an impairment in sense of time and a matter of difference in 
rhythm. In this article I explore how ADHD can be understood as a certain being in 
the world, or more specifically, as a disruption in the experience of time and a state 
of desynchronization and arrhythmia. Through excerpts of interviews with adults 
diagnosed with ADHD and observations from the interviews I illustrate how 
impairment in time is manifested in an embodied experience of being out of sync. I 
suggest that the experience of ADHD is characterized as 1) an inner restlessness and 
bodily arrhythmia; 2) an intersubjective desynchronization between the individual 
and its surroundings; and 3) a feeling of lagging behind socially due to difficulties in 
social skills. In closing, I argue that an increasingly accelerating society is 
augmenting the experience of being out of sync rather than eliminating it. 
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ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) is a psychiatric disorder described 
in the DSM-5 as involving symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. 
Patterns of behavior are characterized by a failure to pay attention to details, 
difficulty organizing tasks and activities, excessive talking, fidgeting, and an 
inability to remain seated in appropriate situations. ADHD was previously held to be 
confined to childhood, but in the last couple of decades, adults have increasingly 
been diagnosed with the disorder1 (Barkley, Murphy and Fischer 2008:9). According 
to the diagnostic criteria, symptoms need to be traceable from the age of 12 years 
and must be apparent in different contexts, with the implication that the disorder is 
solely located in the individual, independent of time and place. In this article, 
however, I suggest that ADHD is not only an individual phenomenon, symptoms of 
ADHD appear in relations, clashes, interactions, and different contexts. I examine 
what we categorize as ADHD2 as impairment in sense of time and difference in 
rhythm. Using Lefebvre’s (2004) phenomenology-inspired rhythmanalysis and 
Fuchs’s (2014, 2013, 2005) theories about mental disorders and temporal 
disorientation, I explore how to understand ADHD as a certain being in the world 
and specifically, as a disruption in the experience of time and a state of 
desynchronization and arrhythmia. This perspective emphasizes the corporeal, 
embodied and intersubjective elements of ADHD and calls for an acknowledgment 
of intercorporality and how bodies resonate with each other (Fuchs 2014:405). 
Hence, “tasks that require mental effort over a long period of time,” tendencies to 
“interrupt or intrude on others,” and being “on the go acting as if ‘driven by a 
motor’,” for example, symptom descriptions that correspond to what my informants 
describe and are included in the diagnostic criteria, I suggest can be understood 
within a context of different rhythms clashing and of desychronization.  
Through data excerpts from my field research on ADHD and 
interviews with adults diagnosed with ADHD, I illustrate how impairment in time is 
manifested in an embodied experience of being ‘out of sync’. I argue that ADHD is 
characterized as 1) an inner restlessness and bodily arrhythmia; 2) an intersubjective 
desynchronization between the individual and his or her surroundings; and 3) a 
feeling of lagging behind socially due to difficulties in social skills. In closing, I 
argue that the increasingly accelerated pace of contemporary society might augment 
the experience of being out of sync, rather than eliminating it. I do not propose to 
explain whether the arrhythmia that I identify as part of the experience of ADHD is 
either cause or effect related to certain neurological processes; my aim is rather to 
offer a framework for understanding ADHD as an embodied and relational 
phenomenon. I believe this perspective can contribute to our understanding of 
ADHD as not only a neurobiological disorder or a diagnostic category that is 
“making up people,” as Hacking (2007:288) puts it, but also as a certain way of 
perceiving, acting and being in the world. 
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PERSPECTIVES ON ADHD 
ADHD tends to be presented in one of two ways. The first is from a neurobiological 
perspective describing the disorder as an impairment in executive functions (Barkley 
2008). The alternative is from a critical, sociological perspective, whereby ADHD is 
explained as a consequence of the medicalization of deviant behavior and social 
control (Conrad 2007; Timimi and Leo 2009). Neither of these perspectives tell us 
about the experience of living with symptoms of ADHD, or of how ADHD unfolds 
within specific contexts and relations. Research conducted with people with 
schizophrenia, mania and depression have explored these disorders as disruptions in 
temporal perception (Fuchs 2013; Ratcliffe 2012), and I use this research as a basis 
for understanding ADHD as a specific way of temporally being in the world. In this 
article, I add to the literature on the relational elements of time and ADHD, by 
comprehending ADHD as a rhythmic phenomenon. 
The relation between time and ADHD is identified in the psychiatric 
literature. Clinical experiments demonstrate that people with ADHD allegedly have 
an impaired sense of time. Barkley and colleagues (2001, 1997), for example, tested 
children’s ability to evaluate temporal durations, and concluded that children with 
ADHD tend to under-reproduce time intervals when asked to reproduce certain time 
intervals (Barkley et al. 1997). From experiments measuring children’s perception of 
time intervals, Walg and colleagues (2012) suggest that children with ADHD 
perceive time intervals as longer than others due to “an internal clock that runs with 
a higher rate“ (2012:2) due to a different brain structure in temporal processing.  The 
authors proposed that if the internal clock in children with ADHD runs faster than 
others, “their impulsivity could arise from the fact that, from their subjective point 
of view, a rather long time interval has already passed” (Walg et al. 2012:2). 
Similarly, in a study examining ADHD as a product of a diminished sense of 
rhythm, Gilden and Marusich suggest that people with ADHD “have a rhythm cut-
off that is faster in tempo than those without ADHD” (2009:265). By testing the 
ability of adults diagnosed with ADHD to synchronize and reproduce a 
metronome’s rhythm, these researchers found that people with ADHD start 
meandering or losing the rhythm when the tempo is slowed down, and therefore 
have greater difficulties than others reproducing the rhythm within a certain tempo.  
Within the anthropological literature, Goodwin (2010) also links 
ADHD to theories about time and becoming. ADHD is not a single thing, Goodwin 
argues, but rather it “refers to a multiplicity of symptoms, bodies, [and] practices” 
(2010:2). Hyperactivity and impulsivity, on which Goodwin focuses, are not simply 
symptoms of a person trapped in a body or in a brain, but rather processes operating 
through the body and bodily practices. Within a frame of time and consumption, 
Goodwin argues that rituals of self-stimulation like body rocking are used as a 
strategy for “becoming the moment” (2010:15); the phrase, borrowed from Deleuze, 
means to “inhabit time without concern for the future (the main criterion of 
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impulsivity), and thus to live differently in the present” (Goodwin 2010:50). It is a 
practice of “losing track of oneself and connecting with the outside world through 
the intensive process of sensation” (Goodwin 2010:50). Following Barkley, 
Goodwin describes time as a burden to people with ADHD. He further body rocking 
is a way of escaping time and “inhabiting a body, and more broadly the world, in, or 
out of, time” (2010:15). Body-rocking, in this sense, holds a special relation to time 
in the way it consumes time. By immersing oneself into a world one controls (e.g., 
by performing body-rocking), time is made entirely one’s own, at least momentarily, 
Goodwin argues. In the same way that new technologies (e.g. iPods and 
videogames) shelter us from the surrounding world and allow us to rest in bubbles of 
entertainment, body-rocking provides instant gratification and an affective regime of 
becoming the moment (Goodwin 2010:50).  
 
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL RATIONALE: STUDYING 
METAPHORS AND RHYTHMS 
This article is part of my PhD thesis, in which I examine adults’ experiences of 
getting an ADHD diagnosis and of living with symptoms of ADHD. Throughout the 
three-year period of research conducted in Denmark, I interviewed, spent time with, 
and had informal conversations with people diagnosed in adulthood with ADHD; I 
followed some of my informants to the doctor; and I participated in several public 
seminars and conferences about ADHD for patients and professionals in order to 
investigate various aspects of how ADHD unfolds. This article is based on the 
analysis of 21 interviews (ranging from one to four hours) with 13 adults (five men 
and eight women, aged 26-45 years) diagnosed with ADHD, using a semi-structured 
interview guide, and on observations made during the interviews. The interview 
guide was structured thematically, treating the experience of getting the diagnosis, 
the bodily aspects of the disorder, and practices related to handling the illness. The 
interviews were primarily conducted in the homes of the interviewee, which offered 
a natural opportunity not only to ask and answer questions, but also to observe and 
talk about everyday practices and routines.  
Taking my point of departure in rhythmanalysis, I examine ADHD as 
a rhythmic phenomenon using two different approaches: I understand metaphors in 
my interview data as mediating experiences of ADHD and I use my own bodily 
experiences of being with my informants as data.  Examining embodied experiences 
of ADHD through verbal communication naturally has its limitations, but as I will 
demonstrate, verbal as well as bodily interactions may give access to embodied 
experiences and the rhythmicanalytical approach can help us glimpse into ADHD as 
a certain way of being in the world. Lefebvre states that “everywhere where there is 
interaction between a place, a time and an expenditure of energy, there is rhythm” 
(2004:25), and I take this assertion as a fundamental point of departure. I study the 
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rhythms of bodies, of thoughts, and of interactions. Bodies are located in specific 
places, times and interactions. Time, space, and everyday life are interrelated and 
need to be thought of together; the method for doing this, Lefebvre suggests, is 
rhythmanalysis (2004:25). Pointing to time as relative, Lefebvre (2004) describes 
rhythms as a measure: “A rhythm is slow or lively only in relation to other rhythms 
(often our own)” (2004:25) and “we each have our preferences and frequencies” 
(20). Whether they are thought of in relation to societal rhythms of working hours, 
biological rhythms of sleep, or social rhythms of interactions, rhythms always exist 
in reference to something or someone. To study symptoms of inattention, 
hyperactivity and impulsivity from a rhythmanalytic perspective therefore entails an 
investigation of ADHD as a relational phenomenon in reference to time. Here I draw 
on Fuchs (2014; 2013; 2005) and his theory of temporal experiences and states of 
desynchronization. When rhythms are not in accord, Lefebvre speaks of arrhythmia, 
and when differences in temporal experiences occur, Fuchs speaks of 
desynchronization. Both phenomena address the pathological, examine the moments 
of clashes, and of the body imposing itself. These perspectives serve as my point of 
departure for understanding ADHD as a rhythmic phenomenon and a 
desynchronized being in the world. 
In analyzing the interviews, I was stunned by how metaphorically rich 
a language my informants used, and especially how similar their descriptions of the 
bodily experience of ADHD were. I started searching for metaphors describing the 
bodily experiences of ADHD, and found picturesque material of speed and energy 
accumulating. Metaphors of driving and racing were continually used when 
describing ADHD, and I began to collect these passages in order to make an 
assemblage of accounts. Literature about metaphors points to their fundamental role 
in enabling us to conceptualize experiences. Metaphors both express experiences 
and structure our perception of the world and way of navigating it (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1994). Our metaphorical descriptions and experiences are entangled; 
experience and concept are one. “Metaphor is not merely a figure of speech, drawing 
an analogy or playing on a resemblance for the sake of verbal effect,” Jackson 
(1983:131) argues – pointing to the idea that metaphors not only refer to something 
else nor are they used solely as comparisons or associations – that they describe 
actual experience. Referring to Binswanger (1963), Jackson (1996) states that when 
we use physical metaphors for emotional experiences – when for example 
“disoriented individuals speak of the ground giving way beneath them, of being 
thrown, losing their footing, and of falling, these are not...physical metaphors of 
mental states. Body and mind are effectively one, and what these images give 
evidence of is the actual experience of disoriented Being” (Jackson 1996:9). Jackson 
argues that a ”metaphor reveals not the ‘thisness of a that’ but rather that ‘this is 
that’” (1983:132). Thus, descriptions of a head speeding at 180 km/h and thoughts 
about being a hodgepodge do not reveal the “thisness” of how ADHD is 
experienced. This is the actual experience of ADHD. The descriptions do not just 
serve as figures of speech, but are actual expressions of a speedy and chaotic being. 
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Based on this argument, I use the metaphorical descriptions of ADHD as accounts of 
my informants’ actual experiences and being in the world.  
While the interviewees described feelings of being misunderstood, 
speeding thoughts, inner restlessness, and struggles with timing, I also often felt 
confronted with feelings of restlessness, misconnection and misinterpretation during 
the interviews. The intuitive sense of living at a different pace than the person I was 
sitting in front of supported the metaphorical descriptions of ADHD I got from the 
interviews. I felt my own rhythm challenged, and I used this information to support 
and elucidate what my informants were telling me about ADHD as a chaotic and 
restless state of being. According to Lefebvre, to gain an understanding of rhythms, 
the rhythmanalyst needs to experience the rhythms through his or her own body. 
“The rhythmanalyst … draws on his breathing, the circulation of his blood, the 
beatings of his heart and the delivery of his speech as landmarks” (Lefebvre 
2004:31). Lefebvre encourages researchers to call in their senses when studying 
rhythms, to “arrive at the concrete through experience” (2004:31) and to pay 
attention to rhythms through concentration and by spending time in the field. 
Inspired by Lefebvre, I used my own experience of being out of sync and sensing 
my own rhythm being challenged. “To grasp a rhythm, it is necessary to have been 
grasped by it; one must let oneself go, give oneself over, abandon oneself in to its 
duration,” Lefebvre (2004:37, italics in original) says. Taking my own rhythm as a 
reference point in my research, using my body as a metronome, and trying to be 
grasped by or adapt to the rhythm of my informant, I include my own experiences 
and notes from the interview settings to illustrate the feeling of desynchronization 
and of rhythms clashing.  
 
THE RHYTHM OF THE BODY 
My informants describe themselves as restless, unable to find inner calmness, and 
they explain how the feeling of restlessness manifests itself as racing thoughts and a 
craving for movement. Focusing on the rhythms of the body, I start by exploring 
ADHD as characterized by an inner restlessness and a bodily arrhythmia. 
Experiences of incongruence between mind and speech or body and mind 
are often portrayed in interviews as causing misunderstandings in interactions with 
other people. Kelly describes herself as “too busy to sit down and understand what’s 
going on,” and reveals how she is sometimes ahead of herself, thinking faster than 
she speaks:  
I’ve been very flighty in my thoughts and in my construction of 
sentences [especially before she started taking Ritalin], and 
earlier, it brought a lot of misunderstandings. I believe I’ve said a 
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whole word or a full sentence, but I haven’t. A word such as 
‘not’ is quite crucial in a sentence! If I have a sentence in my 
head, and I’m about to say it, but I skip the essence while I keep 
on talking, it’s not hard to see why people don’t get it. So in that 
perspective, there’s been many misunderstandings and much 
frustration and I’ve been thinking: why can’t people understand 
what I just said. But I haven’t necessarily. 
Another of my informants, Kenny, describes his mouth as 
occasionally getting the best of him, especially if someone interrupts him or changes 
the subject of the conversation: “It’s getting out of control and my mouth and brain 
are not connected any longer. It’s running way way too fast. It starts like if I’m 
having carbonic acid in my arms and it has to get out,” Kenny says, also describing 
his speech “like a fire from another world.” Throughout the years, many 
relationships have ended due to Kenny’s outbursts; even more doors have taken a 
punch when he loses control. 
Kelly and Kenny both have difficulties controlling their speech as they 
experience their mouths taking over, leaving rationality or specific words behind. 
There is a discrepancy between mind and mouth and when distractions occur, these 
verbal stumbles happen. Kelly explains the phenomenon as if her head speeds too 
fast and her mind perceives too much: “You haven’t got time to take everything in. 
You try to engage in 20 things, but you can only participate in one or two at a time. 
So you have to cool down, pull over, and ask: how far did we get? What is our goal? 
And what can be saved for later?” Similarly, Kenny describes the phenomenon as 
thoughts racing too fast but adds the element of bodily expressions to the feeling of 
losing control. In the following, he elaborates on the bodily feeling of ADHD and 
how he copes when ADHD strikes:  
Kenny: Mostly, I can feel the tensions here [he points at his head] 
and it’s like… it’s like trembling electricity through the brain 
‘bizzzz’. Those are the physical symptoms. And then I realize that 
I start shaking my legs [he is moving one of his legs restlessly].   
Mikka: What’s with that leg? 
Kenny: Well, it’s nothing now. But it’s because the energy 
accumulates. And it has to come out somehow. When I go to a 
meeting for example where we have to sit on our butts and are 
being taught from the black board – then my legs start moving. I 
fiddle with something. It’s like carbonic acid all over and that 
energy needs to be released. So I’ll sit and jump a bit. 
Mikka: So that’s the valve? 
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Kenny: Yes, it is. It brings calmness. 
During the interview with me, Kenny moves restlessly on the chair, 
waving his arms to underline his arguments, he has tics in his left eye. He speaks 
almost non-stop with great enthusiasm, gesticulating to emphasize his points. The 
experience of restlessness and the need for ‘calibrating’ the body or letting the 
energy out is consistent in my data. The body is speeding and the thoughts are 
racing. Only movement – or drugs – can ease the restlessness. A woman, Susan, 
explains how the medication has changed her body – or the ‘tempo’ of her body: 
I get an inner calmness. I guess that’s the best way to describe it. 
For example, when reading bedtime stories to my kids, they are 
too big for that now, but when I did, it almost like… I did it, but it 
was not the nice experience that I wanted it to be – before I got the 
medication. Because my head was speeding 180 [km/h] while I 
was reading. I didn’t have the calmness to do what I was doing. I 
also tended to be really short-tempered and everything just shot 
out of my mouth and maybe sometimes inappropriately. The 
medication helps with that as well. It’s a kind of general calmness 
in the body. I have so much more calmness in my body. But I have 
to get used to it; driving in a lower gear, if you can say it like that, 
and accept it. I find it quite hard realizing that my body feels 
drowsy in my world. But I guess that’s just because I’m in a 
normal tempo now. But compared with previous-me, this is 
drowsy to me and I have to accept that it’s okay and don’t feel 
guilty about not running around all the time. 
The drugs help Susan to find ‘a normal tempo’, and even if the current 
tempo seems drowsy to her, she appreciates the benefits of the slower tempo.  
According to Lefebvre, “the body consists of a bundle of rhythms, 
different but in tune. It is not only in music that one produces perfect harmonies. 
The body produces a garland of rhythms, one could say a bouquet” (2004:30). The 
rhythm of the body here refers to the beat of the heart, the repetition of breathing, 
and to the circular element of rest, sleep and work. “Each segment of the body has a 
rhythm ... (and) “these rhythms are in accord or discord with one another,” Lefebvre 
(2004:47) states. The body is a polyrhythmic subject producing and containing 
different rhythms that need to correspond or resonate in order to maintain health and 
rest in a state of what Lefebvre calls eurhythmia (2004:78). Lefebvre continues: 
“Rhythms unite with one another in the state of health, in normal (which is to say 
normed!) everydayness; when they are discordant, there is suffering, a pathological 
state of which arrhythmia is generally, at the same time, symptom, cause and effect” 
(Lefebvre 2004:25).  
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My informants experience restlessness and a feeling of mind and 
speech that do not always follow each other. Like other phenomenological 
philosophers arguing that the body becomes the center of attention in times of 
disturbance or illness (Leder 1990), Lefebvre claims that “normally we only grasp 
the relations between rhythms, which interfere with them. However, they all have a 
distinct existence. Normally, none of them classifies itself; on the contrary in 
suffering, in confusion, a particular rhythm surges up and imposes itself: palpitation, 
breathlessness, pains in the place of satiety” (2004:31). From a rhythmanalytic 
perspective, we can understand the restlessness connected to ADHD and the feeling 
of speediness as a kind of rhythmic disharmony. The thoughts race too fast, the 
blood runs too fast, the limbs move too much. And they do not always follow each 
other. The different rhythms of the different segments of the body are not in accord 
or do not resonate with each other, so creating a state of arrhythmia. Falling asleep 
becomes difficult, concentrating on reading bedtime stories is almost impossible, 
and sitting still at meetings demands fidgeting with pencils and movements of the 
legs in order to let some of the accumulated energy loose. Feeling the inner 
restlessness draws attention to the physical body that is normally not present, and the 
bodily arrhythmia is experienced as disturbing and pathological. What Leder calls a 
“dys-appearance” (1990:84) of the body or an “absence of an absence” (1990:91) of 
the body, which we normally ignore, Lefebvre describes as a rhythm surging up and 
imposing itself. When it feels to Kenny like carbonic acid or electricity is running 
though his body, his limbs call attention to them, revealing a disharmony. And when 
Susan realizes that her head is speeding at 180 km/h, her thoughts impose 
themselves, disturbing her ability to concentrate on reading and being in the moment 
with her children. 
 
WHEN THE WORLD IS IN A DIFFERENT PACE 
Understanding ADHD as a phenomenon of bodily arrhythmia was my first 
analytical point. By focusing on the intersubjective aspects of rhythms, my second 
argument points to ADHD as the desynchronization of the individual and his or her 
surroundings. My informants continuously told me how they are always late and 
how they find it difficult to manage time when working on a task, as illustrated by 
Judith:   
It just not there. The sense of time. It’s now, now, now. It’s about 
being in the present. That’s how we are. I only just learned about 
time. Well, not watching the clock and seeing what time it is, but I 
mean sense of time and having an idea about how long things take. 
How long it takes to do grocery shopping and knowing when I’ll 
be back home again. Like getting a sense of it. 
EXPERIENCES OF ADHD IN ADULTS 
120
 
Judith’s description illustrates some of the troubles with assessing time and why 
managing time can be difficult. From the psychiatric perspective presented by 
Barkley and his colleagues (2001, 1997), Judith’s sense of time might be impaired. 
Judging time poorly creates misunderstandings and incongruences when making 
agreements and coordinating things with other people, but my argument about 
ADHD as a certain temporal way of being in the world involves even more complex 
experiences of rhythmic confrontations. An excerpt from my field notes exemplifies 
how difference in rhythm often characterized my interviews and interactions with 
my informants. 
I’m visiting one of my informants, Peter. We sit on his couch, it is 
morning, and we have couple of hours to catch up from our last 
talk before I follow Peter to his psychiatrist. Peter describes how 
he still feels restless even though he has started taking drugs. Too 
many thoughts fill his head and he wants to discuss with the 
psychiatrist whether he should increase the dosage of medication. 
He slept badly last night. His girlfriend woke him up because he 
was kicking and moving toward her side of the bed. According to 
Peter, it is because he did not take his medication yesterday and 
never reached the deep sleep because of his restlessness. 
Peter describes his restlessness and how it affects his 
everyday life. My digital recorder lies on the table and records 
Peter’s every word. But something – not caught by the digital 
recorder – illustrates Peter’s restlessness just as well as his words. 
While we talk about his restlessness and his many thoughts, Peter 
is everywhere. He looks into his phone to check the alarm he sets 
in order to remember his medicine; he lights a cigarette with the 
lighter he has been fiddling with since we sat down; and one of his 
leg is moving up and down during our conversation. Every time I 
ask a question, we somehow end up in a totally different place. I 
sense that I am getting confused from our staccato conversation, as 
we jump from subject to subject, and from all the activities 
happening during our conversation. Peter’s restlessness fills the 
room. I get the feeling that we are speaking and thinking in 
different tempi and directions. Peter interrupts before I am done 
talking, not because he is impolite – his is one of the most polite 
people I’ve interviewed – but because new thoughts keep striking 
him, independent of my questions and our conversation. I sense 
Peter’s restlessness. It sneaks into my body. I observe and sense 
the restlessness he describes with his words with much more than 
my hearing. It crawls into my way of talking, as I have to stop my 
sentences half way through in order to adapt to our abrupt 
conversation. My concentration weakens as I follow Peter’s eyes 
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to his phone and lights another cigarette. My breath almost 
shortens. I need to improvise to find common ground with Peter.  
While Peter has difficulties finding inner calmness, the interview 
probably adds to his feeling of restlessness. I demand concentration on specific 
details and I guide our conversation following a certain structure, which I know is 
difficult for Peter. "I’m way ahead. I’m not even listening,” Peter tells me when he 
describes how receiving details of an order from his boss or teacher is difficult, 
because he is already thinking about performing the task. When the conversation 
gets too slow, he starts meandering, like the test persons from the rhythmic 
experiments, and I get the feeling that Peter is already ahead of me too, losing focus 
on the present question. 
Fuchs (2014) makes an interesting analytic comparison between 
different temporal orientations in states of mania and of depression. What 
characterizes mania, according to Fuchs, is “an acceleration and finally uncoupling 
of the individual from the world time” (2014:411; italics in original). “The manic 
person is constantly ahead of himself, addicted to the seemingly unlimited scope of 
possibilities. Interest in the present is always distracted in favour of the next-to-
come. The future cannot be awaited and expected, but must be assailed and seized 
immediately” (Fuchs 2014:411). Fuchs emphasizes that our experience of time is not 
a solipsistic phenomenon but happens in reference to others. There is an 
intersubjective element as we engage with and are ordinarily temporally 
synchronized with others (Fuchs 2014:81). The body is a “resonance body” in which 
“interpersonal and other ‘vibrations’ constantly reverberate” (Fuchs 2014:405). The 
body interacts with other bodies in a continuous interplay of reciprocal 
understanding or intercorporality, Fuchs argues, referencing Merleau-Ponty 
(2014:405). Everyday contact with others implies a “fine-tuning of emotional and 
bodily communication and intercorporal resonance” (Fuchs 2014:409) in order to 
establish a feeing of being in accord with others. This fine-tuning or social 
synchronization, however, can be challenged in various ways by either “a 
retardation or acceleration of inner time in relation to external or social processes” 
(Fuchs 2013:75), causing a state of desynchronization. We are not always 
synchronizing with our environment, and we can be either “too late” or “too early.” 
Waiting, for example, imposes on us a slower time structure to which we can 
respond with patience or impatience (Fuchs 2013:81). Peter and I are not following 
the same rhythm, and a kind of uncoupling takes place. Peter accelerates. He is way 
ahead, and becomes restless when I keep returning to his previous answer and ask 
him to elaborate. Our intercorporal resonance and fine-tuning is challenged by what 
I experience as Peter’s acceleration and what he probably experiences as me 
stretching out time. We find ourselves in a state of desynchronization. 
If we return to Kenny and Susan, they too offer examples not only of 
inner arrhythmia but also of desynchronization. For Kenny, attending a meeting is a 
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confrontation with a specific time set. There is probably an agenda for the meeting 
and a specific rhythm to the interaction. Following the argument that people with 
ADHD have “an internal clock that runs with a higher rate,” as illustrated by the 
experimental studies, we can understand Kenny’s impatience. Kenny is confronted 
with another rhythm, another time than his own. The feeling of the energy 
accumulating in his body, as Kenny describes it, reflects the continuous 
accumulating time difference between his internal time and worldly time. Seeing 
Kenny’s impatience at the meeting, Peter’s restlessness in the interview setting, or 
Susan’s inability to concentrate on reading bedtime stories to her children while her 
thoughts are speeding, as matters of desynchronization, opens up a new way of 
understanding ADHD as a phenomenon that is not just located in the individual but 
is also intersubjective or relative. The feeling of energy accumulating at Kenny’s 
meeting, and Susan’s conscious attention to her thoughts while reading bedtime 
stories illustrate how confrontation with others creates a desynchronization that 
results in discomfort. Sometimes the different rhythms of the body are not in accord 
with each other; at other times, the desynchronization happens between the 
individual and its surroundings. Analytically, I differentiate between these two kinds 
of temporal differences, although they might happen concurrently. The mouth 
outpaces the brain when Kenny is interrupted; Susan’s thoughts are racing, making 
the quiet situation with her children challenging; Peter becomes restless and jumps 
from subject to subject when he is interviewed by me. All are examples of an inner 
state of arrhythmia happening in interactions with others or in specific contexts that 
demand a certain time structure, therefore resulting in desynchronization.  
 
SOCIAL SYNCHRONIZATION: TRYING TO KEEP UP BUT LAGGING 
BEHIND 
In their analysis of the importance of rhythm in social performance, King and de 
Rond write (citing Collins) that “rhythmic synchronization is correlated with 
solidarity” (2011:76). Examining a boat race between legendary Oxford and 
Cambridge oarsmen, the two authors describe how one team demonstrates a unity 
and creates a feeling of togetherness by moving together (and finally winning the 
race). Only when a common rhythm is found, is a social performance and an 
experience of solidarity successful, they conclude. Although this makes sense in the 
case of rowing, it also makes sense in the broader context of being social, being in 
accord, and finding common ground. 
My third analytical point relates to a different aspect of timeliness 
connected to ADHD. It is not about how ADHD is a different way of being but 
about the social consequences of this being. The consequence of being different are 
dispiriting, my informants remark, and they often tell me about feeling different, 
having difficulties with being social, and continuously experiencing 
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misunderstandings. Lilly describes how she kept to herself before she started taking 
Ritalin:  
I have always been kind of… back then… I distanced myself… 
and I’ve just been thinking: my brain is speeding so fast, and it 
actually… it has always been like that with me. Because it was 
always racing. 20,000 thoughts. No one had any idea that it was 
racing like crazy in here. And I remember that, because it was also 
like that, when I was a kid. I could stay in my own world and those 
thoughts were just going around and round. I kept to myself. I 
wasn’t open. But I was very observing, I remember that. And was 
thinking a lot of thoughts. I remember how I felt. And when I was 
looking at myself in the mirror I remember that inner…. I felt 
like… I was restless inside and I felt like… I don’t know… 
The feeling of being different can cause withdrawal from social 
settings, as can the feeling of having too many thoughts and too much restlessness, 
causing the need for a social “timeout”. In that way, the phenomenological being out 
of sync results (among other things) in a very concrete social desynchronization. 
What is normally felt as an indefinable difference sometimes leads to severe 
exclusion, as Karen, a woman in her mid-forties, explains: 
Karen:  I once read this piece that made me so extremely sad, and 
it still does. Someone was doing a presentation about ADHD, and 
when I saw the slides afterwards on the Internet, it said: It’s not a 
question of whether you’re excluded from sociality; it’s a question 
of when you are. And I was so happy reading it first, but then I 
was so so sad. 
Mikka: Why? 
Karen: Because it’s true. I was being excluded, even though I still 
tried to be inside and tried to keep at it, and tried to be like the 
others think you’re supposed to be. And then it said it right there: 
it’s not a question of whether but a question of when. And it’s true, 
‘cause you get no social training. You get a whole lot less because 
you have to withdraw. You can’t hold all that shit that’s happening 
around you. So if you only get like a fourth of the social training 
compared to others, well then I’m constantly 75% behind. The 
result is, now that I’m 45, I am supposed to manage that level of 
sociality, but I’m not. There’re a lot of basic things I’m not able to.  
Jensen (2017) uses the concept of chrononormativity from queer 
theory to analyze the general comprehension of autism as a development disorder, 
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and autistic individuals as being behind in terms of language and social 
development. In a queer context, chrononormativity is a description of 
heteronormativity applied to perceptions of time, and refers to the idea that queer 
persons are out of sync with society’s expectations for people to follow a specific 
chronology in life (Freeman 2010). In the context of expectations of social skills, 
people with autism often lag behind of what is expected. Similarly, the social skills 
for adults experiencing symptoms of ADHD are weaker than chrononormatively 
expected from adults. From a rhythmanalytic point of view, bodies are trained to 
follow the rhythms of calendars, institutional work hours, and interactions as part of 
a “dressage” of the body (Lefebvre 2004:48), and there is a normative expectation of 
the individual, particularly from a certain stage in life, to rhythmically integrate into 
interactions without effort. Intercorporal resonance happens in daily contact with 
others, as Fuchs writes (2013:81); withdrawal from sociality impedes the 
opportunity to establish and fine-tune synchronization with others. After years of 
socializing less than her peers, Karen cannot live up to the level of social skills 
expected from her as an adult in chrononormative terms and her desynchronization 
with others intensifies. The rhythmic synchronization has tough conditions, and it 
seems to be a vicious circle where the feeling of being different causes withdrawal 
from social settings, leading to a lack of social training. Karen tells me how she is 
constantly restraining her body from moving restlessly to avoid “getting ‘punches’ 
from others” annoyed by her constant movement. She shows me how she is twisting 
her feet around the legs of the chair and crossing her arms to keep control of her 
body. But despite her good intentions and efforts to fit in, Karen still needs to 
withdraw sometimes and cannot catch up with others when it comes to fitting in.  
I am not stating, by pointing at some of the social consequences of 
being out of sync, that arrhythmia is a result of lack of social training. Rhythmic 
attunement and synchronization processes are, as I propose throughout this article, 
complex phenomena that manifest themselves in both interactions and within the 
body. However, social interaction, as a form of art, requires rhythmic 
synchronization: “At the centre of an interaction ritual is the process in which 
participants develop a mutual focus of attention and become entrained in each 
others’ present bodily micro-rhythms and emotions” (Collins 2004:47). Social 
activities are shaped by interaction rituals, and whether we participate in a boat race 
or in ordinary social interactions, a sense of connectedness and “successful 
collective performance” (King and de Rond 2011:583) depends on the entrainment 
of bodily rhythms. Karen, Lilly and my other informants struggle with rhythmic 
synchronization and with keeping up to the chrononormative expectations of their 
ability to socialize.  The consequence of arrhythmia is sometimes a feeling of 
difference and social exclusion. 
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IS SOCIETY CATCHING UP ON ADHD? 
So far I have proposed that ADHD can be understood as a desynchronized and 
speedy way of being in the world. People experiencing symptoms of ADHD may 
perceive the surroundings as too slow because of racing thoughts and a restless 
body, but also sometimes they find the outer world chaotic because the inner world 
is occupied with too many things. 
One might think that a speedy being would be an advantage in a world 
where everything goes faster and faster. Rosa (2015) argues that modern society is 
continuously accelerating in all kinds of spheres: technological, social and in the 
pace of life. New computer models increase their processing speed every couple of 
months; the average time people spend sleeping and eating decreases; changes of 
intimate partners and places of residence are also faster and faster (Rosa 2015:63). 
The heightening of the tempo of life,  “understood as an increase in episodes of 
action or experience per unit of time” (Rosa 2015:78), results in an acceleration of 
actions and/or a stacking of actions (multitasking), leading the individual to feel a 
continuous lack of time (2015:78). At first, this perspective seemingly proposes that 
synchronization between the person experiencing symptoms of ADHD and the 
surroundings would happen over time. If the time of a speedy individual is met by 
accelerating world time, then we might expect synchronization and the impatience 
and restlessness of the person might be neutralized as the world catches up. 
However, researchers contradict the perspective, claiming that the complexity of 
modern society and changes of school and work conditions account for the 
increasing number of individuals who experience symptoms related to ADHD 
(Timimi 2009; Nielsen and Jørgensen 2010). Høgh-Olesen (2005) takes Rosa’s 
argument further and asks: what are the personal consequences of the acceleration of 
western society? According to Høgh-Olesen, each individual has an optimal level of 
stimulation, whereby the individual is neither bored from being under-stimulated or 
stressed out from being over-stimulated (2005:61). To answer his own question, 
Høgh-Olesen argues that the restless pulse of western society causes an increased 
level of stimulation and so creates different kinds of mental deprivation, from 
anxiety to anorexia, for those who cannot cope with the bombardment of 
stimulation. People with ADHD are said to have an impairment in the brain’s reward 
system, causing both boredom and a strong reaction to environmental stimuli 
(Gordon, Lewandowski and Lovett 2015). From that perspective, getting the right 
level of stimulation, in Høgh-Olesen’s terms, is a balancing act between under- and 
over-stimulation. The question of synchronization, of being in accord with 
surroundings, also becomes a matter of accommodating to a society that keeps 
bombarding the individual with stimuli. 
Being a middle-aged adult in modern society demands rhythmic 
synchronization in both social interactions and engagements with institutional, 
occupational and domestic life. Lefebvre and Régulier speak of work as “the 
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reference to which we try to refer everything else back” (2004:83). We organize the 
day according to our work. Our bodies are expected to adapt to the temporal regime 
of society and follow the rhythm of a seven-day week and eight-hour job. These 
disciplining practices, this dressage of the body in both social and institutional 
perspectives, require that individuals are capable of multitasking, managing time, 
and rhythmically adapting. In military and sporting training, intervention through 
rhythm has a goal, Lefebvre writes, “to strengthen or re-establish eurhythmia” 
(2004:78), and Fuchs points to the benefits of resynchronizing therapy for people 
with depression in order “to give rhythm to everyday life” (2014:408). My 
informants use various strategies for resynchronizing with the surrounding world, 
aligning with the temporal regimes of modern society, and overcoming feelings of 
restlessness. Using calendars and apps on the phone in order to remember 
appointments and take medication on time is a common practice; constraining and 
locking the body can be a strategy for acting in ways that correspond to the norms of 
social behavior; moving the limbs can momentarily ease the experience of time 
being too slow, and as argued by Goodwin, consume unbearable time. Taking 
medication is also a strategy for creating calmness and strengthening the ability to 
concentrate and rest in the present moment. 
To assume that an accelerating society and a speedy being fit perfectly 
together would be a consequence of taking both claims too literally. Symptoms of 
ADHD (and other disorders) do not ease when the pulse of society accelerates. On 
the contrary, demands of multitasking might trigger and aggravate feelings of 
restlessness and chaos. A bodily experience of racing thoughts or of restless limbs 
does not necessarily lead to a more productive everyday life (often the opposite) 
since the speediness, my informants describe, manifests itself as, for example, 
chaotic thinking, and jumping from task to task without finishing them, preventing 
productivity. An accelerating society only intensifies the experience of inner chaos 
and acceleration. What my informants need are strategies to find a valve, as Kenny 
describes it, or to put their thoughts in a slower tempo, as Susan explains, and 
alternative strategies for resynchronizing not accelerating surroundings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have examined ADHD as a matter of difference in temporal 
experience and rhythm, and I have argued that ADHD is manifested in an embodied 
experience of being out of sync. By using the metaphorical descriptions from my 
interviews with adults diagnosed with ADHD as portrayals of actual being in the 
world, I have illustrated how differences in perception of time, bodily restlessness 
and the experience of speedy thoughts are connected, and how these can be 
understood within a frame of rhythm and desynchronization. Phenomenological 
research on rhythm and experience of time has guided my analysis and led me to 
CHAPTER 8. ADHD AND TEMPORALITY: A DESYNCHRONIZED WAY OF BEING IN THE WORLD 
127 
conclude that ADHD can be understood as a rhythmic and desynchronized way of 
being in the world. 
Purposely, I have eschewed discussion of the legitimacy of ADHD as 
a psychiatric diagnosis, and instead I have taken it as an underlying basis of my 
analysis that some people experience specific symptoms related to what we 
categorize as ADHD. As demonstrated by Hacking (2007) and Singh (2011), among 
others, the demarcation of diagnosis and illness experience is complex; the two are 
inevitably entangled. As noted by Good, “illness narratives are structured in cultural 
terms” (1994: 136). My claim, however, is that even when acknowledging the 
entanglement of diagnosis and experience, and recognizing that experiences are 
informed by cultural narratives of suffering, we may also as researchers try to 
address aspects of the different ways of experiencing that form our diagnostic 
categories. I believe that a rhythmic perspective, as I have presented here, can offer 
an important contribution to the existing literature on and understanding of ADHD 
by examining it as a certain way of perceiving, acting and being in the world. My 
contribution is an attempt to investigate the phenomenology of the disorder to gain 
insight into the embodied experience of ADHD. This does not mean that we should 
ignore the societal structures and the problems imposed by an accelerating society 
on people with symptoms related to ADHD. Rather, we should keep investigating 
how suffering can be understood and how different ways of being in the world 
unfold from multiple perspectives.  
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NOTES 
1. Research points to a 3.3-5.3 % prevalence in the American, adult population 
(Barkley, Murphy and Fischer 2008). 
2. Prospectively, I use the term “ADHD” when I refer to the symptoms and bodily 
experiences connected to the diagnostic category ADHD. 
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Abstract 
In this article, I illustrate how individuals diagnosed with ADHD relate to, engage 
with, and interpret ADHD and explanations of the diagnosis. Based on my research 
on adults’ experiences of ADHD, I describe how my informants 1) identify with 
ADHD as a specific way of being human as well as 2) distance themselves from 
ADHD by separating themselves from and disclaiming behavior connected to 
ADHD. Notions of ADHD as a brain disorder, I argue, form the basis of both ways 
of relating to ADHD. Lastly, I discuss how neurobiological explanations of ADHD 
produce specific choices about and hopes for treatment. The analysis is based on 
interviews with 13 adults diagnosed with ADHD in adulthood; on observations 
made at conferences and seminars about ADHD for professionals, patients and 
relatives; and lastly on observations from online blogs and forums about ADHD as 
part of a two-year anthropological fieldwork conducted in Denmark. 
Key words: ADHD, diagnosis, entification, identification, neurobiology 
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The number of people diagnosed with ADHD has risen immensely within the last 
couple of decades, and researchers argue that individuals increasingly search for 
diagnoses in order to understand their experienced problems (Brinkmann, 2016; 
Conrad, 2007; Jutel, 2011). ADHD is listed in the diagnostic manual DSM-5, but the 
diagnosis is not only used by doctors in order to categorize suffering and direct 
treatment. People diagnosed with ADHD also use the diagnosis as a resource for 
understanding themselves. In this article, I illustrate how individuals diagnosed with 
ADHD relate to, engage with, and interpret ADHD and explanations of the 
diagnosis. Based on my research on adults’ experiences of ADHD, I describe how 
my informants, who have all been diagnosed with ADHD in adulthood 1) identify 
with ADHD as a specific way of being human and 2) distance themselves from 
ADHD by separating themselves from and disclaiming behavior connected to 
ADHD. Notions of ADHD as a brain disorder, I argue, form the basis of both ways 
of relating to ADHD. 
Early in my research, I interviewed Susan, who was diagnosed at 40 years old. As 
her Facebook profile picture, she has a cartoonish drawing of a man with an 
orchestra in the top of his head and a caption saying “ADHD is like a symphony 
orchestra without a conductor”. Susan’s use of the picture and her description of 
ADHD illustrates some of the aspects I will examine in this article about how people 
diagnosed with ADHD understand and relate to ADHD. Referring to her profile 
picture, Susan explains what ADHD is: 
Well, if you see it as a workplace, there’s the doorkeeper in the back of  
the head who doesn’t know how to close the doors so everything comes
in...And then there are some confused employees in lack of a leader to tell 
them what to do so they’re scuttling around like confused chickens. And 
then sometimes the frontal lobes are acting like the boss. So all the 
knowledge is in the brain, but it’s a long way sometimes because those 
neuro-things don’t know their way so they’re jumping around before 
they find their way, right. Well, I don’t know. I don’t know how to 
describe it. All I know is that I find it harder to keep a sense of 
perspective and I get easily confused and stressed – easier than most 
people. 
The Danish ADHD association made the picture, Susan tells me, and I can see why 
she, a humorous woman with a merry personality – whether it is caused by ADHD 
or not (as she phrases it) – has chosen the comical drawing as her profile picture. 
The picture illustrates Susan’s identification with ADHD and her wish for being 
open about the fact that she is diagnosed with ADHD. But the picture also 
demonstrates how ADHD is commonly described and perceived: as a brain disorder. 
Susan’s picture of ADHD as located in the brain points to a central theme in this 
paper, namely the widespread neurobiological explanation for ADHD. 
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In the sociological and anthropological literature on the consequences of 
neurotechnology and neuroscience, it is argued that not only scientists’ but also 
laypeople’s perception of the human being is being altered, and several studies 
declare the neurosciences to be the order of our time and contemporary society 
(Farah, 2012; Illes & Racine, 2005; Lynch, 2009; O’Connor & Joffe, 2013). 
Researchers have examined the biological turn in psychiatry and argued that the 
human being (and human suffering) is being understood through a neurobiological 
lens, and that this way of thinking establishes certain criteria for how to think about 
and explain human behavior and self-understandings. Some researchers argue, for 
instance, that we take for granted that “our brain is necessary for our self” (Dumit, 
2003, p. 39); that we perceive ourselves as “neurochemical selves” (Rose & Abi-
Rached, 2013); that neuroscience legitimizes mental illnesses as “real” (Cohn, 
2012); and that we understand personhood as “brainhood” (Vidal, 2009). In a 
biomedical time, investigating how people absorb neurobiological knowledge is 
highly relevant. Neurobiology, however, does not exclusively determine how we 
think of ourselves as moral beings, even when diagnosed with what is conceived as 
a neurobiological disorder. Psychologist Ilina Singh (2013) has analyzed children 
diagnosed with ADHD and their discourses about self, brain, and behavior. Singh 
challenges what she calls the neurocentric literature that describes “a collapse of the 
self into the brain” (2013, p. 817). Rather, Singh suggests, “individuals resist 
significant external pressures to subjugate the self to the brain” (2013, p. 814), and 
children’s discourses exhibit evidence of notions of agency and responsibility 
despite having an ADHD diagnosis. In this article, I do not claim that people 
diagnosed with ADHD unambiguously subjugate the self to the brain, but I try to 
outline different positions and ways of relating to ADHD as a brain disorder. I will 
examine how my informants make use of existing explanations of ADHD and 
illustrate how they creatively position themselves in relation to ADHD. 
The analysis is based on 21 interviews and several conversations with 13 adults (five 
men and eight women, ages 26–45) diagnosed with ADHD in adulthood as part of a 
two-year anthropological fieldwork conducted in Denmark.1 All my informants, 
except two who experienced severe unwanted side effects, receive pharmaceutical 
treatment for ADHD. During the research, I have attended conferences and seminars 
about ADHD for professionals, patients, and relatives as well as followed several 
online blogs and forums about ADHD. My interviews dealt with questions regarding 
experiences of receiving the diagnosis, understandings of ADHD, and practices 
related to handling the illness. None of my interview questions explicitly mentioned 
the brain or addressed neurobiological aspects of ADHD, but as I will show in the 
article, my informants often referred to brain processes when explaining what 
ADHD is and how it is part of who they are, or when blaming the brain for making 
them act in certain ways. 
I will start by briefly introducing ADHD as a diagnostic category and pointing to 
some of the explanations of ADHD I have encountered during my fieldwork. Then I 
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will describe the two positions of how my informants identify with and distance 
ADHD, and finally, I will discuss the implications of neurobiological explanations 
of ADHD in relation to considerations and expectations about treatment. 
Explaining and relating to ADHD 
According to the American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic manual (APA 
2013) ADHD is categorized as a neurodevelopmental disorder, and symptoms are 
defined as inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. The Danish Health 
Authority’s clinical guidelines for diagnosing and treating ADHD in adults 
recommend treatment with central nervous system stimulants, and if the patient is 
assessed to benefit from it, medical treatment can be combined with cognitive 
behavioral therapy. Despite decades of research, neuroscience has not yet granted 
specific biological markers that can determine mental illnesses, but the neurological 
explanation of ADHD seems to be dominant in public information about ADHD.  
If you visit www.sundhed.dk (“sundhed” means “health” in Danish, and the website 
is hosted by Danish Regions and the Ministry of Health), and search for “ADHD” 
you will find a short video explaining what causes the disorder. On a black 
background, the contour of a head with a fluorescent blue brain appears. We 
recognize the colors from pictures of brain scans and the video has a very 
“scientific” look to it. A voiceover explains that “attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, called ADHD, is a frequent behavioral disorder caused by problems in the 
brain”. The video zooms into the brain and we see from the graphics how 
neurotransmitters communicate information before the voiceover continues: “Some 
researchers state that ADHD is caused by a genetic error in particular 
neurotransmitters” and “other theories point to the fact that poorly working nerve 
receptors that recognize dopamine causes ADHD”. We are told about neurons, 
neurotransmitters, synapses, and receptors, and finally how symptoms of the 
condition are impulsivity, hyperactivity, and lack of ability to concentrate. The 
graphics guide us through the brain and the voiceover explains the mechanisms of 
all the different physiological processes in ADHD. 
Philosopher Ian Hacking claims that diagnoses are “making up people” (2007, p. 
288) and that diagnoses are creating new ways of being human that was not 
available before the particular diagnosis was recognized. Similarly, anthropologist 
Emily Martin (2007) argues that a diagnosis brings new subject positions. Once 
diagnosed, the individual is no longer a person with life problems but a person living 
under the description of the particular diagnosis. According to Hacking, diagnoses 
offer new ways of being a person as well as new ways of relating to one’s body, 
oneself, and one’s environment. Experiences can be interpreted in a diagnostic 
context and pathological picture, and previous experiences are reinterpreted and 
verbalized within this framework. Certain social and cultural contexts, or what 
Hacking (1998) calls “ecological niches” (p. 13), produce certain conceptions of the 
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human and of the normal and abnormal. Rose (2007) argues that in a time when we 
have become “neurochemical selves” who have come to ”understand ourselves, 
speak about ourselves, and act upon ourselves – and others – as beings shaped by 
our biology” (p.118), neuroscience “not only establishes what counts as an 
explanation, it establishes what there is to explain” (p.192). Within Hacking’s 
theoretical framework, the proliferation of neuroscience into multiple disciplines 
founds a niche into which human behavior, preferences, and mental illnesses are 
explained in biological terms. Our contemporary times and Western societies hold 
specific perceptions of suffering, explanations for illnesses, and expectations of 
human capabilities, and within this niche, an ADHD diagnosis and its explanation 
offer a specific frame for understanding notions of being human. Hacking’s analysis 
describes the mechanisms of how diagnoses emerge, the dynamics between 
diagnoses and the diagnosed, and why some diagnoses suddenly appear and others 
are removed from the diagnostic categories. The emergence of ADHD as a 
diagnostic category and explanations of ADHD as caused by errors in 
neurotransmitters or poorly working nerve receptors establish ADHD as something 
that can be pictured in a video, that can be addressed with psychoactive drugs, and 
that can explain unwanted behavior and sensations.  
During my fieldwork, whether I attended conferences, followed debates about 
ADHD, or interviewed people diagnosed with ADHD, the brain was continuously 
mentioned as the locus of the disorder. The message was that ADHD brain works in 
certain ways, it prompts certain behaviors, and medical treatment can alleviate the 
unwanted symptoms. “You are not ADHD – you have ADHD” was repeatedly 
mentioned at every conference I attended, and ADHD was often described as a 
disorder that needs treatment and ought to be recognized in the same way as diabetes 
or a broken leg. This biologization of mental illnesses (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013) 
ranks ADHD alongside any somatic disease and explains ADHD as a matter of brain 
processes just as diabetes is a matter of insulin production and a broken leg a bone 
fracture. What I came to learn by interviewing people diagnosed with ADHD, 
however, was how the neurobiological explanation of ADHD was used in complex 
processes of understanding actions, sensations, and ways of being human. The 
broken leg metaphor is not only simplistic for understanding how people diagnosed 
with ADHD relate to ADHD; it might actually have the opposite effect than the 
intended legitimizing effect. On the one hand, my informants consider ADHD to be 
something separate from the person, causing problems and suffering, but on the 
other hand, ADHD is also described as another way of being human that needs to be 
recognized. The condition needs treatment since it causes various difficulties, but at 
the same time it needs to be acknowledged as a way of being a person. “You cannot 
cure ADHD, there’s not something wrong with me. I’m just different. I’m not 
broken”, as Kelly, one of my informants, describes it. ADHD is not just a disorder; 
it is also a way of being human and the diagnosis is used as a mirror for interpreting 
humanness. Even if ADHD is considered a physical brain disorder and if the 
inattentive, impulsive, and hyperactive behavior is a consequence of brain 
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mechanisms, ADHD differs as a diagnosis from a broken leg because of the ways 
people diagnosed with ADHD relate to ADHD, act upon it, and use it as a mediator 
for understanding themselves. 
Identifying with ADHD 
Susan has downloaded a cartoon picture of an ‘ADHD brain’ to use on her Facebook 
profile and a great deal of ADHD merchandise is available online ranging from cups 
and stickers to t-shirts with AD/HD printed on the chest, referencing the logo of the 
rock band AC/DC. The Danish ADHD association sells jewelry such as a heart-
shaped locket called “The wild ADHD heart” with “ADHD” engraved on the back 
of it. A text describes the symbolic meaning of the locket: “Open it and show the 
world the true you. Close it again and be who you are. Carry the jewelry with pride.” 
The industry of ADHD merchandise reflects an interesting phenomenon of people 
diagnosed with a psychiatric diagnosis, who take on the diagnosis, infuse it with 
pride, and use it as a resource. Goffman (1963) once described how people 
experiencing stigma make use of different strategies of stigma management by 
either trying to cover up for the stigma or revealing it and performing a voluntary 
disclosure (p. 125). Generally, people try to pass as normal, not revealing their 
differentness, Goffman says, but the use of ADHD merchandise illustrates another 
strategy of establishing ADHD as a legitimate identity by voluntarily disclosing it. 
ADHD is something to carry and hold with pride, as the locket’s description says. 
The diagnosis is not only accepted as a clinical explanation, it is also acted upon and 
used as a way of expressing oneself. In that perspective, the clinical diagnosis is 
transferred into an identity marker to play with, relate to, and mirror oneself with. 
One of my informants, Karen was diagnosed four years ago at age 41. She does not 
wear ADHD clothing or jewelry, but she identifies with ADHD as a way of being 
different, and the diagnosis has helped her understand how and why she is different. 
The consequences of not being diagnosed earlier have been severe, Karen’s tells me, 
and she wishes she had been diagnosed when she was younger: 
I’ve always had it [ADHD], but I’ve never learned… no one ever showed 
consideration for me, I was never recognized as the person I am, which 
had the effect that I wasn’t thriving. And it had the effect that I didn’t get 
to know myself and I didn’t use my resources appropriately. 
Karen considers ADHD to be a fundamental part of her and she believes that the 
diagnosis has brought recognition and understanding of who she is, which earlier 
was never revealed or acknowledged. She has always been hyperactive “’cause 
hyperactivity keeps the brain awake”, as she says, but she never learned how to use 
the hyperactivity constructively and was continuously reprimanded for her behavior. 
Today, she is determined not to be ashamed of the person she is and to discover how 
to navigate in life, knowing that she is different from other people. Because people 
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with ADHD are different from normal people, she tells me, they are made for 
another purpose: 
It’s like we’re all cars, but we’re not made for the same purpose. A 
Ferrari drives extremely fast and someone’s arriving as an old Skoda. I 
mean hello, they’re not made for the same thing. But they’re vehicles. 
And then you have buses, but it’s just a shame that I’m not made for 
transporting passengers and that makes it difficult for others to 
understand. 
Karen’s explanation resembles many other descriptions of ADHD I met during my 
research. Metaphorically, Kelly describes herself as being like a plug with a 
grounding connection as opposed to a normal plug without a grounding connection: 
“In a normal power socket with only two holes, the plug with the grounding 
connection doesn’t fit. I’m just made differently. You can say that I have more, I just 
don’t have time to process it all.” And Thomas describes himself as running another 
operating system than other people. In the following, I ask him to elaborate on what 
he means by that, and he says, 
Well, let’s say a computer uses Windows as its operating system. And 
then you run Windows, but it’s not like… I just use another operating 
system! I control things differently. I mean … it’s not a disadvantage, if 
you learn how to live with that. And you can. If you have the ability to 
take advantage of the impulsivity and the creativity you have because 
you’re extra impulsive, you can create miracles, I think. But you have to 
live in this … well, I think if I had lived many, many years ago, I would 
probably have been a good hunter and have been very well-liked, but 
because I have to conform to this society, it doesn’t comply with ADHD, 
so … 
The description of ADHD as another operating system was not new to me. On the 
many Facebook forums I follow, a frequently shared picture depicts red flourishing, 
free floating, entangled organic lines on a black background with text written across 
the picture saying: “ADHD isn’t a system error, it’s just another operating system”. 
The picture gives associations to electric voltage or human tissue studied through a 
microscope and the text teaches us that ADHD is not a human fault but just a 
different way of functioning.  
The idea that different ways of being, acting, and perceiving are caused by different 
“operating systems” or that the ADHD brain is “like an orchestra without a 
conductor” reflects a way of thinking about mental illness as caused by different 
biological designs of the human being. A massive medical literature deals with 
ADHD as a neurobiological disorder and explains human differences as biological 
variants. As an example, a genetic study of a particular Kenyan ethnic group has 
been used to explain ADHD as a product of evolutional adaptation (or the lack 
EXPERIENCES OF ADHD IN ADULTS 
142
 
thereof) and why some particular receptor variants in the brain related to ADHD are 
an advantage for tribesmen living as nomads and a disadvantage for settlers 
(Eisenberg, Campbell, Gray, & Sorensen, 2008). The study was referenced in 
newspapers worldwide and used as an explanation of why some people do better 
under certain societal circumstances and how natural selection has not adapted to the 
increasing urbanization of modern society. A similar perspective is presented by 
author and radio host Thom Hartman (1994), who associates ADHD with an 
evolutionary adaptation to the environment and links ADHD to the quality of 
prehistorical hunting skills. Within discussions and research about autism, the 
question of neurodiversity and of autism as representing a different neurotype than 
the so-called neurotypical human is put forward (Silberman, 2015). Parallel to the 
position stating that ADHD is just another operating system or neurological variant, 
Silverman argues that autism is simply a naturally occurring cognitive variation that 
differs from the most common brain. Rather than looking at autism, ADHD, and 
dyslexia as checklists of deficits and dysfunctions, these cognitive variants should be 
regarded as strengths that contribute with particular skills to the cultural and 
technological evolution (p. 16). Noticing, for example, that surprisingly many IT 
engineers in Silicon Valley have children diagnosed with autism, Silberman asks 
whether they represent a certain “tribe”. Silberman’s investigation of autism leads 
him to different activists, one of them explaining why they refer to themselves as 
“autistic” instead of “people with autism”: “We talk about left-handed people, not 
“people with lefthandedness” (…) It is only when someone has decided that the 
characteristic being referred to is negative that suddenly people want to separate it 
from the person” (p. 441). Similarly, the people I have interviewed emphasize that 
people with ADHD are not “broken”, as Kelly says and Karen even describes how 
people with ADHD speak “ADHD’ish”, following a different logic than other 
people. 
In their research on adolescents’ experience of having an ADHD diagnosis, 
psychologists Sheila Jones and Morten Hesse (2014) argue that  
by being conceived as a brain dysfunction, ADHD becomes an 
understanding that is applied not only to the difficulties of inattention, 
hyperactivity, and impulsivity, but also in some sense to the person as a 
whole, to their self-image, and to their identity (p.1). 
According to the two authors, ADHD can be regarded as a “technoscientific 
identity” – an identity produced through the application of technologies as for 
example diagnoses. On the one hand, a technoscientific identity is in inscribed upon 
individuals, who thereby are required to define themselves as lacking certain 
abilities and “flawed in their very constitution” (p. 2). But on the other hand, a 
technoscientific identity can “work to increase a sense of control over experienced 
illness by applying bio-medical information and characteristics directly to the 
person’s sense of self and thereby encourage the person to become the 
classification”(p. 1). Within the framework offered by Hacking, diagnoses make 
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certain ways of being and experiencing possible, and the classifications into which 
the individual is put or put him or herself into, thus, have a formative effect on the 
individual’s self-understanding. The person becomes the classification, as Jones and 
Hesse writes.  
My informants creatively engage with the diagnosis. They apply information about 
the diagnosis to their self-image and use the diagnosis as a mediator for 
understanding themselves as a technoscientific identity. However, my informants do 
not define themselves as “lacking certain abilities”. Rather, they redefine ADHD as 
a particular construction of the human species, who is “made differently” or for 
another “purpose.” Using the diagnosis and the explanations attached to it as 
something to carry with pride and acknowledging different neuro-versions of the 
human species as performing diverse functions in society opens up new ways of 
relating to the diagnosis. ADHD is much more than an illness. It is a specific way of 
managing (and failing to manage) based on certain neurological structures in the 
brain, my informants note. Living in a society that favors certain behavior over 
others might lead to unfulfilled expectations and experiences of failure and my 
informants all emphasize that living with ADHD is challenging. Other ways of 
being are the norm. But my informants oppose stigmatization and prepare for the 
challenges they meet. They identify with ADHD as a certain way of being human 
and insist on being accepted, understood, and helped with their difficulties. 
Distancing from ADHD 
While my informants relate to ADHD as a category to identify with, they also 
sometimes distance themselves from ADHD. By distancing I do not refer to a the act 
of rejecting the diagnosis, but I use the term distancing to describe what my 
informants report of as experiences of ADHD as something “other” that acts through 
them, something that takes control, and determines actions. 
At the beginning of the article, we met Susan with the cartoon picture of the ADHD 
brain. Susan has difficulties controlling her temper, and, especially before she 
started taking Ritalin, she sometimes would burst out with accusations. In the 
following, Susan explains how ADHD makes her react in ways she cannot recognize 
as hers: 
My sense of pedagogy tells me that you don’t yell into the head of a child 
or push it. That was definitely my ADHD. It was also my ADHD that 
made me react totally exaggerated if someone accidently touched me 
when I was on the bus. That’s not me as a person because I’m always 
happy and positive. I also wonder, how I could sometimes sit and talk to 
somebody ‘la la la’ and be happy, and then somebody just incidentally 
touched me, and then I was like ‘What the hell are you doing?’ And then 
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I suddenly became like, ‘I’m really sorry.’ It just came out of nowhere. I 
mean, that is definitely my ADHD. 
Susan’s description of ADHD as acting through her and seizing her in ways she 
cannot avoid demonstrates a distancing between herself as a person and ADHD as 
an entity. ADHD is part of her, yet it is separate from her as a person. Susan 
identifies with ADHD and uses the diagnosis to understand her actions, but she also 
distances herself from it. Externalization is a common therapeutic technique for 
separating the problematic behavior from the person in order to address this 
behavior without accusing the person for it (White, 2007). Psychologist Svend 
Brinkmann (2014) describes the process of transferring responsibility from the 
person to the entity of ADHD as an action of “disclaiming mediation” (p. 130). By 
converting a temperament into an object, or what Brinkmann refers to as 
“entification” (p. 128), the trait is separated from the person.  
Kenny, another of my informants, makes a similar distinction between himself as a 
person and ADHD – or more specifically, between himself as a person and his brain. 
In this interview excerpt, he answers my question of what the diagnosis means to 
him: 
It makes me accept that this is how things are. It’s not my fault. It gave 
me calmness to get the diagnosis because: ah, that’s the explanation to 
why I’ve done as I’ve done and behaving bad. That’s still comforting. 
Because if nothing was wrong with my brain or what to call it, then I’d 
be the one having the problem, I mean Kenny the person and not my 
head. It can’t be an excuse, but it’s an explanation. It is. To me. 
Kenny has read a lot of literature about ADHD and knows about common 
explanations of ADHD, but the description of ADHD as something “other” than him 
as a person is not only a theoretical explanation of brain mechanisms and 
neurobiology, but also a very concrete, bodily experience of ADHD as acting 
through him. He describes ADHD as tensions in his head, as electricity running 
though his brain, and explains how the accumulation of energy in his body 
sometimes results in dramatic outbursts. He experiences a restlessness and bodily 
unease and he labels these experiences ADHD. Knowledge about synapses and 
neurotransmitters offers a language and an explanation that help interpret 
experiences in specific ways. In her auto-ethnographic study of depression, Elena 
Trivelli (2014) writes, “when ‘illness’ takes over as the explanation of one’s 
behaviour, unconscious processes, life circumstances and decision-making faculties 
turn into neurons, synapses or failed electric impulses. In this paradigm, one does 
not act. Illness does” (p. 157). Kenny’s description of ADHD is similar: ADHD acts. 
It infiltrates his body and makes him react in inappropriate ways. However, 
distancing from the behavior and bodily experience is not the same as rejecting 
responsibility or autonomy. Even if Kenny is distancing “Kenny the person” from 
“the head”, he is emphasizing that he, Kenny, is the one who is responsible. Since he 
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has identified his problems as ADHD, he is more aware of his reactions and how to 
cope with then, and he feels even more obliged to regaining and not disclaiming 
responsibility. 
Rose and Abi-Rached (2013) argue that the influence of neuroscience does not 
imply a perception of personhood as brainhood: “it’s not that we are brains but that 
we have brains” (p. 22), as the authors put it. The brain and its functions are brought 
into focus, but we do not incorporate the instrumentalist view that our brain solely 
dictates who we are as a person. The same is true for my informants. Naturally, 
ADHD describes only certain aspects of the individual and is not sufficient for 
understanding the whole person. However, O’Connor and Joffe (2013) suggest that 
people tend to adapt neuroscientific knowledge into their self-perception if they 
have been provoked to consider their “brainhood” during a diagnostic process (p. 
263). “The brain may not intrude spontaneously in day-to-day consciousness, but 
rather becomes salient when something goes wrong”, O’Connor and Joffe (2013 p. 
263) assert. In the event of a diagnosis, the functions of the brain, which are rarely 
the object of attention, make a kind of “dys-appearance” (Leder, 1990, p. 84) and 
become inescapably present. The so-called normal brain is considered passive and 
“lets the real self talk through it” (Dumit, 2003, p. 45), while the mentally ill brain 
“substitutes itself for the real self and speaks instead” (p. 45), as Dumit states. When 
Kenny experiences his thoughts as racing, and when he behaves contrary to his 
intentions, he understands this as a consequence of his brain. In this way, he draws 
on a neurobiological explanation of ADHD in his interpretation of his bodily 
experiences and his behavior. However, Kenny’s descriptions also demonstrate how 
brain mechanisms do not dictate who he is as a person, precisely because he is able 
to transform ADHD into an entity and knows what to distance himself from. 
In his study of experiences of chronic pain, anthropologist Byron Good (1994) 
describes how pain can provoke experiences of the body as an object, distinct from 
the acting self: “The pain has agency. It is a demon, a monster lurking around, 
banging the insides of his body. (…) At the same time, pain is a part of the subject, a 
dimension of the body, a part of the self” (p. 39). While we normally consider the 
self as the author of our actions, that “we act in the world through our bodies” (p. 
39), the body becomes an object when it is in pain, Good argues, just as Leder and 
Dumit do. Experiencing a force or an agent acting through you, it appears, is not 
exclusively connected to ADHD, but is a common human experience. Good refers to 
a study by Godfrey Lienhardt who conducted fieldwork among the Dinkas, a people 
living in the southern part of Sudan. The Dinkas are exposed to possession, to being 
taken over by a power. In order to act on the power of possession, a name needs to 
be called out and the power identified. In Lienhardt’s words:   
With the imagining of the grounds of suffering in a particular Power, the 
Dinka can grasp its nature intellectually in a way which satisfies them, 
and thus to some extent transcend and dominate it in this act of 
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knowledge. With this knowledge, this separation of a subject and an 
object of experience, there arises for them also the possibility of creating 
a form of experience they desire, and of freeing themselves symbolically 
from what they must otherwise passively endure (Lienhardt as cited in 
Good 1994, p. 43). 
In Good’s analysis, medical treatment for chronic pain is like Dinka divination. By 
grasping the suffering as an agent and by calling out a name in the form of a 
diagnosis, an image of the pain is constructed in the body of the suffering person: 
“To name the origin of the pain is to seize power to alleviate it “ (p. 45). For the 
Dinkas, as for Good’s and my informants, the naming and the concept of suffering 
as an entity or an object is about grasping the experience in a way that satisfies us 
and corresponds to our cultural conception of the origin of suffering. While powers 
of possession legitimately explain suffering among the Dinkas, neurobiological 
explanations help Kenny, Susan, and other with similar experiences understand their 
actions and bodily sensations. Experiences of tensions in the head, of losing control, 
and of bursting out are explainable and can even be pictured in an animated video as 
mechanisms functioning in specific autonomic ways. Only by making an entity of 
the suffering is it possible to distance oneself from it. And by distancing oneself 
from ADHD it is possible to handle the difficulties related to ADHD. 
Explanations of ADHD and expectations to treatment 
 “If you suffer from something that can be treated with drugs, then obviously you 
can’t say that it’s part of your personality, because you don’t treat personalities,” my 
informant Jenny explains when we discuss whether ADHD is a disorder or not. 
According to Jenny, the answer is complicated. If ADHD is not a genuine disorder, 
psychiatry would not treat it. But as she elaborates later in the interview, ADHD and 
personality are intertwined: “Well, your personality is made in the brain, and if 
ADHD is implemented in the brain functions, then it’s hard to separate.” Jenny’s 
answer exemplifies the complexity of how people diagnosed with ADHD relate to 
ADHD and, similarly, it illustrates the connection between comprehensions of 
ADHD and decisions about treatment thereof.  
During my research, I realized that a certain narrative about taking drugs for ADHD 
is widespread: It was repeatedly described by my informants and by participants at 
online forums that drugs prescribed for ADHD only work if you have ADHD. The 
effect of the drug is the litmus test that will determine whether you have ADHD or 
not since the drug will have a relaxing effect if you have ADHD and a stimulating 
effect like amphetamine (which the drug is closely related to) if you have a normal 
functioning brain. Explanation and treatment mutually confirm one another: If 
ADHD is caused by a (dys)function of the brain, drugs addressing that function are 
the solution; likewise, if the drugs work as expected, the brain must be 
(dys)functioning in a specific way. Figuratively speaking, swallowing the pills 
means swallowing the meanings attached to them and vice versa. As another 
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informant, John, answers when I ask him why he started taking Ritalin, ”I guess you 
follow the assumption that the drugs can do something to the brain, and well, then 
you have to try it out.” The neurobiological explanation is not only descriptive and 
neutral, but it produces choices and hopes for treatment. 
If we look back on medical descriptions of behavior connected to what we call 
ADHD today, the disorder has a long history of being considered a brain disorder 
that needs pharmaceutical treatment (Comstock, 2011; Mayes & Rafalovich, 2007). 
As noted by Fernando Vidal (2009), the neurobiological explanation fits our 
Western conception of the human being as an autonomous self, and patients have 
endorsed the chemical imbalance theory as a morally neutral way of explaining 
people’s difficulties. Cultural narratives and explanations of illness and treatment 
are connected, and patients’ decisions about accepting the offered treatment often 
rely on whether explanation and treatment correspond. The neurobiological 
explanation and the pharmaceutical treatment that follows it, however, sometimes 
fall short. One of my informants, Peter, had high hopes when he started treatment 
for ADHD, but he is not only surprised by the experimental process of finding the 
right label and dosage of the drugs, he is also disappointed with the uncertainty of 
psychiatry and biomedicine: 
I can’t understand why science isn’t better than that. They have 
discovered how depression is caused by lack of serotonin in the brain, 
and how some substance in the brain, which I can’t remember, causes 
ADHD. So why haven’t they discovered what [drugs] to give you? 
Peter is frustrated with science’s inability to produce the exact substance his brain is 
missing. And John, who decided to accept taking drugs because “it could do 
something to the brain”, feels left alone with his problems after his visit to the 
psychiatrists, which only left him with a prescription for Ritalin. John explains: 
It was just: ‘What kind of drugs should we prescribe? Do you think you 
need more or less? Should we increase or decrease the dosage?’ I think 
they were really preoccupied with the drug thing. And: ‘we’ll try out 
some new drug if you experience problems with the current drug.’ But 
actually I also needed to talk about some of the things I was fighting with 
at home. 
That neurobiological explanations to illnesses reduce human experiences to brain 
mechanisms are widely criticized. Martin (2010) argues that neuroscience “claims to 
explain phenomena on one scale (those embodied for example in social 
relationships, places, practices and institutions that have a material existence outside 
the brain) by means of phenomena on another scale (those embodied in the brain)” 
(p. 369). Psychiatrist Thomas Fuchs (2012) has a similar concern and claims that 
neuroscientific explanations overshadow other explanations or simplify the 
dynamics of mental processes and therefore leave out other possibilities of 
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treatment. As an organ of mediation of biology and social processes, the brain is 
embedded in interrelations between the social environment and the individual, and 
isolating mental disorders to brain structures only reveals one side of the coin, Fuchs 
argues. Nevertheless, as anthropologist Janis Jenkins (2010b) writes, “the 
pharmaceutical imaginary has come to pervade subjectivity as the cultural and 
existential ground in everyday life” (p. 17). As “pharmaceutical selves” we not only 
“orient ourselves towards drugs, but are produced and regulated by them” (Jenkins, 
2010a, p. 4). To my informants, pharmaceutical treatment is the primary treatment 
and only a few have been offered alternative help in the form of housing assistance, 
body therapy, psych education, and conversation therapy, and while such activities 
have been temporary, pharmaceutical treatment is considered lifelong. The 
conception that drugs can compensate for the impairment in the brain and that a 
certain response to drugs verifies the diagnosis leaves the individual in a position, in 
which drug treatment seems to be the obvious choice. And on the one hand, my 
informants welcome the pharmaceutical treatment, since it corresponds to the 
comprehension of ADHD as a brain disorder and not the least help them managing 
everyday life. But on the other hand, my informants experience various kind of life 
problems, as also John expresses, and while drugs help alleviate some unwanted 
effects of ADHD, complex problems sometimes require multifaceted solutions 
outside the realm of drug treatment. 
Conclusion 
Researchers have pointed out that diagnoses are not only a tool for doctors to direct 
specific treatment, but the individual who receives the diagnosis engages with it and 
uses it as a mediator for understanding him- or herself (Brinkmann, 2014; Jutel, 
2011). Neurobiological explanations of mental illness and a general biologization of 
human behavior and emotions shape how individuals think of their illness and 
difficulties in life (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013). In this article, I have examined how 
ADHD is interpreted and related to by adults diagnosed with ADHD. My research 
supports other studies pointing to the fact that an ADHD diagnosis not only 
stigmatizes or turns individuals into passive patients but also brings relief and leads 
to actions and an increased sense of responsibility (Halleröd, Anckarsäter, Råstam, 
& Scherman, 2015; Young, Bramham, Gray, & Rose, 2008). The way my 
informants relate to ADHD does not entail a “total collapse into the brain”, as Singh 
puts it, even if they understand themselves and their difficulties in neurobiological 
terms, but they creatively interpret what it means to be a human being with a 
specific neurologically structured brain.  
I argue that distancing from ADHD implies a separation of the self from the brain 
and an opportunity to act on ADHD, and not a sense of being determined by the 
brain. Moreover, my research illustrates how people can identify with ADHD as an 
alternative way of being human. I found elements of both positions of identifying 
with and distancing from ADHD in most of my interviews and my informants do not 
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hold either one of the positions, but rather they switch between them when 
explaining different aspects of ADHD. Both positions involve the underlying 
premise that ADHD is located in the brain, but they entail opposite perspectives on 
the relation between the person and the brain. Examining how people diagnosed 
with ADHD relate to ADHD and how explanations of ADHD inflict decisions of 
treatment opens up a nuanced understanding of the dynamics between diagnostic 
explanations, self-understandings, and treatment. My research illustrates that 
relating to ADHD involves complex and nuanced self-interpretations and actions, 
rather than a singular mode of interpreting oneself. However, my research also 
shows that identifying problems in neurobiological terms implies the acceptance of 
dealing with the problems in a certain way, and additional or alternative strategies to 
drug treatment are often disregarded or less prioritized. 
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CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have examined adults’ experiences of ADHD. I have studied aspects 
of life with ADHD, embodied experiences of ADHD, the implications of being 
diagnosed with ADHD, and ways of relating to the diagnosis. It has been my 
ambition to analyze the phenomenology of ADHD, unfold experiences of ADHD, 
and comprehend these experiences within the context of our time, culture and ways 
of understanding the human being. Two research questions have guided my study, 
namely 1) how can we understand experiences of living with symptoms of what we 
categorize as ADHD? And 2) how do individuals experience getting an ADHD 
diagnosis as an adult, and how is the diagnosis understood, used and acted upon? In 
order to answer these questions, I have drawn upon the data I have collected and the 
knowledge I have gained throughout my fieldwork the past three years, which 
consists of interviews and conversations with adults diagnosed with ADHD as adults 
and of observations at doctors’ consultations, conferences and online forums about 
ADHD. 
As I have described previously in this thesis, the majority of research on ADHD 
presents either neurobiological perspectives on ADHD or explains ADHD as a 
social construct and the emergence of the ADHD-diagnosis as a consequence of 
medicalization processes. I have not positioned myself within any of these 
explanations of ADHD, but rather I have examined how the explanations have an 
impact on individuals’ experiences of ADHD. My research has delved into the 
intersection between experiences and diagnostic categories, as I understand 
experiences as socially and culturally embedded. I have examined experiences of 
ADHD in relation to social relationships, family struggles, cultural explanations of 
suffering, and expectations of being human without understanding these experiences 
as simply products of social and cultural dynamics but rather in constant relation to 
these. In the following, I will outline the arguments, contributions and conclusions 
of the three articles in this thesis, I will summarize some of the general findings in 
my research, and lastly, I will point to avenues for future research on experiences of 
ADHD. 
10.1. THREE CONTRIBUTIONS: MORALITY, TEMPORALITY AND 
NEUROBIOLOGY 
Each of the three articles in this thesis has offered a perspective on the exploration 
of experiences of ADHD and helped answer my research questions. The first article 
“Structuring the self: moral implications of getting an ADHD diagnosis” has 
investigated experiences of being diagnosed and the practical and existential 
consequences thereof, the second article “ADHD and temporality: a desynchronized 
way of being in the world” has examined the phenomenology of ADHD and 
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experiences of living with symptoms of ADHD, and the third article “My ADHD 
and me: identifying with and distancing from ADHD” has analyzed how my 
informants use a neurobiological explanation of ADHD when relating to ADHD in 
different ways. While the second article has mainly answered my first research 
question about how we can understand experiences of living with symptoms of what 
we categorize as ADHD, the first and the third article have primarily answered my 
second research question about how individuals experience getting an ADHD 
diagnosis as an adult, and how the diagnosis is understood, used and acted upon.  
10.1.1. ADHD AND MORALITY 
Moral aspects of psychiatric diagnoses are often treated in examinations of 
diagnoses as distinguishing the normal from the abnormal, of stigmatizing effects of 
diagnoses, or of diagnoses as tools for social control (Conrad, 2007; Goffman, 1963; 
Jutel 2011), all perspectives dealing with social and cultural expectations of the 
individual. As I outlined in chapter 2 of this thesis, some researchers claim that 
behavior connected to what we call ADHD today has been identified in children 
throughout the last couple of centuries, dating back to pediatrics diagnosing children 
as suffering from immorality and defects of moral control. These insights illustrate 
how psychiatric diagnoses mark the transgression of moral boundaries and chart 
normative standards for behavior and emotions. My analysis of the moral 
implications of getting an ADHD diagnosis, however, has examined different moral 
aspects of psychiatric diagnoses, as I have focused on the individual’s experiences 
of being diagnosed rather than assessed the societal status of psychiatric diagnoses. 
The analysis is therefore also a contribution to the existent literature on adults’ 
experiences of getting an ADHD diagnosis. In the article “Structuring the self: moral 
implications of getting an ADHD diagnosis” I have examined the formative process 
of getting an ADHD diagnosis and how individuals diagnosed with ADHD use the 
diagnosis as a part of a self-evaluative and self-constitutive project of becoming in 
the effort of structuring, evaluating, and experimenting with possibilities in a chaotic 
life. Inspired by Mattingly’s (2012; 2014) notion of three moral scenes from which 
practices can be analyzed, I have argued that the implications of being diagnosed 
with ADHD entail different moral tasks when existential questions are raised, 
judgments and choices are made, and everyday practices are scrutinized, evaluated 
and often changed following the diagnosis.  
From my fieldwork I noticed three main implications of the diagnosis: Firstly, my 
informants find the diagnosis relieving. They understand the diagnosis as an 
explanation for their problems and use the diagnosis as a frame for interpreting their 
life-trajectory as well as a prognosis for their future. The diagnosis has “made it 
possible for me to pin up my reactions and challenges to something,” as one of my 
informants said, noticing that she is treating herself better after her difficulties have 
been accepted as a medical condition. I have analyzed this first process of being 
diagnosed as a trial in which the individual is interrogated and handed a verdict in 
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the form of a diagnosis. In this process, a certain self-narrative – structured around 
the diagnosis – is produced along with a moral ‘I.’ This moral ’I’ is shaped by the 
diagnostic narrative and it is held responsible for taking the necessary measures of 
handling the identified problems. Secondly, my research showed that resources 
following the diagnosis in terms of medication, guidelines, access to ADHD 
communities, and occasionally therapy or housekeeping assistance, help my 
informants incorporate new routines. By analyzing the process of changing ways of 
thinking and acting as a workshop in which the individual cultivates practices, I 
have illustrated how the diagnosis initiates moral deliberations about how to manage 
everyday difficulties. Thirdly, my informants describe the effects of the medical 
treatment as a never-experienced calmness and an increased ability to overcome 
practical as well as personal challenges, but also as a (sometimes unwanted) 
profound change in ways of being and perceiving. My informants experiment with 
experiences while assessing when the drugs facilitate the experience of being “more 
me” or “being the person I’d like to be,” and I have analyzed this process as a moral 
laboratory, where the ‘I’ is examined and experimented with in order to be a good 
parent and a good person. I have called the different implications of the diagnosis 
moral tasks. I find that each moral scene unfolds aspects of how a diagnosis and 
medication produce narratives, practices and changes in perception that becomes 
part of a process of understanding oneself and caring for oneself. My informants’ 
search for a structuring element in their chaotic life is met by the diagnosis, which in 
turn carries a moral commitment of structuring the self according to the normative 
ideals of becoming “the person I’d like to be.”  
10.1.2. ADHD AND TEMPORALITY 
The relation between time and ADHD is identified in the psychiatric literature and 
clinical experiments demonstrate that people diagnosed with ADHD have an 
impaired sense of time and assess time differently than others (Barkley, Koplowitz, 
Anderson & McMurray 1997). My contribution to this literature on ADHD and time 
is a phenomenology-inspired analysis of the rhythmic, intersubjective, and 
intercorporeal aspects of ADHD, and hence the analysis also contributes to the quite 
limited literature on embodied perspectives of ADHD. In the article “ADHD and 
temporality: a desynchronized way of being in the world,” I have suggested that 
ADHD is not only an individual phenomenon, but symptoms of ADHD appear in 
relations, clashes, interactions, and in different contexts. 
My informants describe themselves as restless, unable to find inner calmness, and 
they explain how the feeling of restlessness manifests itself as racing thoughts and a 
craving for movement. From a rhythmanalytic perspective, I have analyzed these 
embodied experiences of ADHD as expressions of rhythmic disharmony or what 
Lefebvre (2004) calls a pathological state of arrhythmia. The body is a polyrhythmic 
subject producing and containing different rhythms that need to correspond or 
resonate in order to maintain health, but when thoughts race too fast and the limbs 
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move too much, as my informants express, the rhythms of the body are not in 
accord, which creates a state of arrhythmia and discontent. To further examine the 
intersubjective and intercorporeal aspects of ADHD, I have drawn on Fuchs’ (2014) 
idea that we experience time in reference to others. The body is a resonance body, as 
Fuchs states, and we constantly fine-tune bodily communication and intercorporeal 
resonance. However, when inner time accelerates in relation to outer time and 
external social processes, as I have argued is the case in ADHD, a desynchronization 
occurs. In everyday activities, such as when attending meetings or reading bedtime 
stories to their children, my informants are confronted with another expenditure of 
time than their own and the body imposes itself as restless or speedy. The 
rhythmanalytic perspective has also opened up an examination of the social 
implications of desynchronization and for a general discussion of the pace of 
modern society and I have proposed that people with symptoms of ADHD struggle 
to follow normative expectations of integrating into the rhythms of working hours 
and social interactions, to dressage the body, as Lefebvre calls it. In an accelerating 
society (Rosa 2015), when demands of multitasking and adaption to shifting milieus 
intensify, the risk of rhythmically losing track similarly increases. 
10.1.3. ADHD AND NEUROBIOLOGY 
The effect of neuroscience on contemporary understandings of the human being is 
intensely discussed within the social science literature and researchers argue that 
neuroscience establishes certain criteria for how to think about and explain human 
behavior and self-understandings (Farah, 2012; Illes & Racine, 2005; Lynch, 2009; 
O’Connor & Joffe, 2013). In the article “My ADHD and me: identifying with and 
distancing from ADHD” I have contributed to this literature by illustrating different 
positions of how individuals diagnosed with ADHD relate to ADHD when drawing 
upon neurobiological explanations of ADHD.  
From my fieldwork, whether I attended conferences, followed debates about ADHD, 
or interviewed people diagnosed with ADHD, I noticed that brain processes and 
ADHD were continuously linked together, stating that the ‘ADHD brain’ works in 
certain ways, prompting certain behavior, and that medical treatment can alleviate 
unwanted symptoms. But even if neurotransmitters and synapses are central in 
explanations of ADHD, my informants use the neurobiological explanation of 
ADHD in complex ways in order to understand themselves. I have argued that my 
informants relate to ADHD by both identifying with ADHD as a way of being 
human and by distancing from ADHD when separating the self from ADHD and 
disclaiming behavior connected to ADHD. To understand ADHD as a way of being 
human, using the diagnosis and the explanations attached to it as something to carry 
with pride, and acknowledging that alternative neurological wired brains perform 
different functions in society are examples of how to identify with ADHD, I argued. 
In this perspective, ADHD is much more than an illness. It is a specific way of 
managing (and failing to manage) based on certain neurological structures in the 
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brain. Distancing from ADHD similarly involves a reference to ADHD as a brain 
condition, but in this process my informants separate ADHD from the self. I have 
examined my informants’ descriptions of unwanted outbursts and unintended 
actions as examples of how ADHD is transformed into an entity that is acting 
through and seizing the individual in unavoidable ways. Naming the experiences 
ADHD and explaining them as caused by brain mechanisms corresponds to our 
cultural conception of mental illness and enables a distancing from ADHD. The 
neurobiological explanation, however, is not neutral and besides producing certain 
ways of relating to ADHD, it also produces choices and hopes for treatment. “Brain-
centered understandings can lead to brain-centered interventions” Martin (2010: 
279) argues, and likewise my research has shown that my informants all receive or 
have received psychopharmaceutical treatment for ADHD. Even if the 
neurobiological explanation of ADHD renders various ways of relating to ADHD 
possible, the explanation might reduce comprehensions of how to live with ADHD 
and options for coping with the difficulties ADHD bring. 
10.2. EXPERIENCES OF ADHD: A RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
In the three articles, I have presented different perspectives on experiences of 
ADHD that each have demonstrated aspects of the implications of being diagnosed, 
difficulties with restlessness and chaotic thinking, and ways of understanding and 
relating to the diagnosis. Common to the perspectives, however, has been the 
exploration of ADHD as a relational phenomenon. Throughout the thesis, I have 
examined the dynamic relation between experiences and diagnostic category and I 
have illustrated how experiences of mental illnesses are socially embedded. I have 
argued that cultural narratives of illness inform experiences of ADHD and that 
experiences of ADHD are situated within relations, interactions, and in social 
contexts.   
Firstly, I have found it important to emphasize that experiences of ADHD are 
intertwined with the desire of being a good parent, of wanting to navigate in society, 
of keeping a job, maintaining friendships, and of being accepted. Similarly, 
experiences of restlessness and feeling socially out of sync with people around you 
provoke the feeling of being different and misunderstood. In chapter 1, I introduced 
Karen, who told me how she had reached a point in life when her own strategies for 
managing no longer sufficed and that the diagnosis brought new resources for her to 
implement in her effort to navigate life. Karen and the other people diagnosed with 
ADHD I have interviewed evaluate themselves in relation to their role as a parent, as 
a friend, and as an employee. They orient themselves in the world based on 
expectations from themselves and others and their experiences of ADHD are shaped 
by and situated within relations to others. When life is chaotic, a diagnosis and 
treatment following the diagnosis may help structure everyday practices and 
thoughts and facilitate experiences of striving to meet one’s own and other’s 
expectations. Secondly, I have wanted to emphasize that within our specific culture 
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and place in time, certain ways of being in the world and certain ways of 
understanding oneself are available, and experiences of ADHD exist within these 
particular circumstances. In a time and place when the diagnostic language 
dominates our way of understanding and making sense of suffering (Brinkmann 
2014a) and when diagnoses offer legitimacy to people’s experienced problems, 
people reach for diagnoses in order to cope with their difficulties. My research has 
shown, along with previous studies, that an ADHD diagnosis offers a vocabulary 
and a narrative for the individual to interpret his or her experiences through and that 
explanations of the diagnosis are used as models for understanding oneself. 
Experiences of ADHD are entangled with the diagnostic language and previous life 
events as well as future opportunities are assessed through the diagnostic 
descriptions.  
10.3. AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
During my research I have followed five of my 13 informants for one or two years. 
Some of my informants were recently diagnosed with ADHD the first time I met 
them and were still exploring the implications of being diagnosed, while others had 
been diagnosed for several years. In the article “Structuring the self: moral 
implications of getting an ADHD diagnosis” Christian described how he thinks 
more pragmatically about the consequences of the diagnosis now than he did in the 
years after receiving the diagnosis. Unfortunately, due to limited time and number of 
informants, I have not been able to further examine the aspect of how my informants 
relate to and potentially relate differently to the diagnosis over time.  
My informants report that the ADHD diagnosis has helped them develop new 
perspectives and new strategies even if they still struggle with everyday practices 
and in social relations. In evaluative processes of experimenting with different 
strategies for how to live life, diagnoses serve as instruments for interpreting 
challenges and opportunities, I have argued. But as Christian says, the importance of 
the diagnosis might change over the years. Similarly, concerns in life might change, 
abilities to manage life might change, and life situations might change. Asking 
questions regarding the temporal aspect of being diagnosed could contribute with 
valuable perspectives on individuals’ experiences of living with a psychiatric 
diagnosis. Will the diagnosis become insufficient for understanding and managing 
new difficulties in life if the individual’s life circumstances change? Will a diagnosis 
be inadequate and maybe even withdrawn if the individual develops strategies for 
coping with his or her difficulties in such a degree that symptoms of ADHD 
disappear? You might “grow into your ADHD rather than grow out of it” a 
participant in an online debate answers a question about whether another participant 
still has ADHD if he no longer experiences the same difficulties that previously led 
to a diagnosis. Children sometimes outgrow symptoms of ADHD, research says 
(Barkley, Murphy & Fischer 2008, p. 69; Jørgensen, 2014, p. 75). But can adults 
also develop in ways that render a diagnosis superfluous? And in that case, what are 
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the implications on the individual’s self-perception? Or what if the characteristics of 
the diagnosis change? For each new edition of the diagnostic manuals, diagnostic 
criteria are changed, which renders new possible ways of understanding suffering. 
What are the implications on individuals’ identification with a diagnosis when 
diagnostic criteria change – if any? This PhD. thesis has pointed to ADHD as 
socially and culturally embedded, it has emphasized that experiences unfold in 
various contexts of interactions, and that the individual is constantly changing and 
formed by his or her relation with the world and others. An interesting avenue for 
future research could be to further study ADHD from a relational perspective and 
additionally examine how individuals diagnosed with ADHD relate to the diagnosis 
in a life perspective and through changing circumstances. 
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This thesis is an examination of adults’ experiences of ADHD. It is a study of life 
with ADHD, embodied experiences of ADHD, the implications of being diagnosed 
with ADHD, and ways of relating to the diagnosis. The number of people diagnosed 
with ADHD has increased within the last couple of decades and so has the number 
of prescriptions for drugs treating ADHD. We know, however, only little about the 
effects of diagnosing and about phenomenological aspects of ADHD. By analyzing 
how individuals experience symptoms of ADHD, interpret themselves through the 
diagnosis, and make use of the resources following the diagnosis, this thesis is a con-
tribution to a limited literature on adults’ experiences of ADHD.
